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ABSTRACT 
As seafaring states evolve into nations and nations into empires, the power that 
protects such maturation is seapower. Geographic isolation via deserts or seas can obtain 
time for political and social evolution. However, only a formidable naval presence can 
ensure external security in order that internal reforms take root. No major modern power 
has survived without an adequate indigenous navy. This doctrine holds true especially in 
revie\ving the navy of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century. 
In this thesis, l show that the absence of tangible fleet units cost the Ottoman 
Empire not only the peripheries of the state, but also the opportunity at political 
evolution. Covered in this thesis will be the Ottoman naval assets available at the turn of 
the twentieth century and how such assets were obtained. Also covered is the conduct of 
bordering states when Istanbul's political reformers realized that lacking naval power 
invited waterborne aggression, and how those efforts to correct deficiencies became a 
causation for war. Finally, this thesis reviews the military success and failure of the 
Ottoman navy and how the outcome affected the future of the Empire. 
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CHAPTER I 
OTTOMAN NAVAL SITUATION, 1900-1912 
The sea had been the lifeline of the Ottoman Empire since the fall of 
Constantinople on 29 May 1453. 1 The spread of Islam went along with shipborne trade 
and piracy. Under Sultan Suleiman II (1520-1556), the Ottoman Empire reached its 
zenith, but an empire reaching from Algiers in the Mediterranean to Aden on the Red 
Sea around to Sinbad's Bussorah on the Persian Gulf and the entire Black Sea region 
needs to control the sea lanes. It ,vould be a secure empire as long as no power possessed 
a naval force capable of projecting both land and sea power into the Sultan's realm. See 
Appendix I. The Ottoman defeat at Azov by the little fleet of Peter the Great of Russia 
was a precursor to imperialist seizures in the nineteenth and twentieth century .2 
In the sixteenth century, Ottoman shipbuilders had enjoyed a fine reputation, but 
the navy, like the empire, had failed to keep up with the latest technology. By the 
tv,1entieth century, the constraints of economics, the progression of naval science, and the 
internal/external political situation left the Sultan's subjects with a naval force incapable 
'Phillip Paneth, Turkey: Decadence and Rebirth (London: Alliance Press, Ltd., 
1943), 12. 
2Virginia Cowels, The Romanov.\' (London: Harper & Row, 1971 ), 34. Also, see 
Felix Grornov, Fleet Admiral, Russian Federation Navy, "After Three Centuries," 
Proceedings (October 1996), 42-46. 
of defending the empire. The inability of the Ottoman navy to control the intrusion by 
hostile forces and the loss of sea lanes condemned the empire. The Ottoman Empire's 
enemies could and did pick the most advantageous sites to attack, all with little concern 
for possible retaliation by Ottoman naval forces. Compounding the problem, failure to 
secure sea lanes forced Ottoman ground forces to transit via undeveloped land routes, 
away from possible hostile naval gunfire, delaying distant forces to an extent that when 
such forces did arrive in theater, in several cases the conflict had been decided. This had 
2 
been the case in the Greek-Ottoman War of I 897, the Italian-Ottoman War of 1911-1912, 
and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.3 
Controlling the sea has been the linchpin in empire building. Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, writing in The Importance ofSea Power, clearly defines the consequences of 
neglecting a naval force capable of securing one's coast,that being the loss of the 
peripheries until a country under attack is enveloped by enemies. No modern empire has 
lasted that did not invest resources into indigenous industries capable of supporting native 
shipbuilding. A political state at peace and with secure borders may be able to obtain 
naval forces along with expertise to utilize such assets from abroad, but this is only 
temporary. Governments that may try to acquire hardware and experience abroad are 
subject to political extortion and the difficulties of mismatched systems, replacement 
parts and repair facilities. This was the crux of the Ottoman naval situation on the eve of 
World War I. 
3 Ahrnet Guleryuz and Bernd Langensiepen, trans. by James Cooper, The Ottoman 
Steam Navy, 1828-1923 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 7-19. 
The term "naval assets" encompasses all the facets that create a navy. This 
includes ships, bases, personnel, and infrastructure to support operations. The twentieth 
century dawned upon an Ottoman fleet wholly unable to fulfill the basics of any naval 
operation with the naval assets available.The Ottoman Navy in 1876 was ranked fourth 
3 
largest in the world. Jn order to maintain the fleet, two hundred British workmen toiled at 
the arsenal on the Golden Horn, repairing and constructing ships for the Sultan's needs. 
In 1876, when Sultan Abdul Aziz ( 1861-1876) was deposed, Ottoman fleet personnel 
were involved in a large share of the revolution. Abdul Aziz was succeeded by Sultan 
Murad (1876), who proved unable to reign, and Abdul Hamid rose to power. Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II ( 1876-1909) feared the armed forces and wanted to prevent a popular 
uprising led by the military. Apart from units surrounding the Istanbul garrison, well 
equipped in order to impress foreign diplomats, the armed forces were neglected. The 
Ottoman fleet and the foreign support that maintained it were allowed to decline so that 
within five years of Abdul Hamid's accession, all the British support personnel were sent 
home except for a small advisory mission. The warships stationed at Istanbul were 
forbidden to train or conduct operations and not once were fleet units allowed to venture 
outside the Dardanelles.4 
Abdul Hamid, began to consolidate power by removing ministers in place under 
Abdul Aziz with the exception of the Minister of Marine, Hassan Pasha. Sir Edwin 
Pears notes in Forty Years in Constant inop!e 187 3-1915 that Hassan was a brave, bluff 
4Sir Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople /873-/915 (New York: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1916), 170-171. 
4 
sailor who did not fear the Sultan. Under Hassan, the naval schools languished and fleet 
operations were non-existent. The inactivity of the fleet and the irreverence shown to the 
Sultan's person would suggest that the Minister of Marine had some leverage on Abdul 
Hamid. During most of Abdul Hamid's reign, the Ottoman government was an autocracy, 
and the Sublime Porte subservient. 5 The naval budget prior to the reinstitution of 
parliamentary oversight in 1909 was entirely up to the discretion of the Sultan. W.S. 
Monroe, in his book, Turkey and the Turks, quotes the Englishman Sir Edgar Vincent's 
report on Ottoman finances and states that 1905 expenditures of $95,000,000 resulted in a 
naval budget of $3,000,000: less than four percent of government expenditures.6 
The German Vice-Admiral von 1-lofe and British Admiral Henry Wood conducted 
an inspection of the Ottoman fleet in April and May 1897. This report revealed the extent 
of neglect under Abdul Hamid. The guns on all the ships of the Osrnaniye class were 
useless, with runners on the Armstrong guns immovable, and hydraulic pistons on the 
Krupp quick-firing guns bent. Some ships did not have the complete armament installed 
upon turnover from the builder. One example was the lack of breaches for the 240mm 
guns on the Aziziye, which were still lying at the arsenal in Istanbul. The training of gun 
crews had been so neglected that it took over two hours to load, train, fire, and reload the 
5The Sublime Porte was originally the gateway to the palace where the Sultan or 
the Grand Vizier conducted business. the metonymy became official and the expression 
came to mean the Ottoman government itself, or the Empire. It was frequently 
abbreviated to "the Porte." Sec David Walder, The Chanak Affair (London: The 
Macmillan Company, 1969), 11. 
6 W.S. Monroe, Turkey and the Turks (Boston: LC. Page and Company, 1907), 
143. 
Armstrong guns found on most large combatants. To compound the situation, the fleet 
passage from the fleet anchorage at Halie to Lapseki took place in full view of foreign 
observers, showing the European diplomats the true state of the Ottoman fleet. 7 
The inspection of the Ottoman fleet at Canakkale gave Hofe the opportunity to 
5 
witness gun training by "experienced" crews. Hofe noted that few crews were able to 
train the guns properly and that the time required to load and train the guns would be 
ample to allow any enemy to approach the Ottoman fleet without difficulties or danger. 
The poor showing of the fleet dictated a return to the safety of the fleet anchorage at Halie 
on 15 May 1897. 8 The inspection by Hofe and Wood resulted in a recommendation for 
expansion of the fleet. Recommended was the modernization of armored warships and 
the construction of six cruiser-types abroad. After the report was presented to Abdul 
Hamid, there followed a series of diplomatic intrigues and industrial double dealings, 
with the Sultan playing off one potential supplier of warships against another. 
During the civil unrest of the late 1890s in the East and the Greek regions, 
compensation claims from Western nationals had been submitted but not resolved. The 
Porte, at the instigation of the Sultan, refused to pay, maintaining that foreign influences 
incited much of the unrest and thus were not entitled to remuneration. 9 Western Powers 
implied force would be employed to obtain compensation and the Sultan recanted, 





recognizing the validity of such demands. He had a reputation for cleverness that 
exhibited itself clearly when addressing compensation claims. In order to satisfy the 
demands of the Western Powers, Abdul Hamid ordered ships from the nations submitting 
compensation claims and allowed for a generous mark up to cover damaged property. 
The Sultan needed to avoid direct responsiblity for the civil unrest inorder to perserve the 
Ottoman Empire. He requested advice from London on how to handle the Caucasus 
region in the belief such an appeal would temper Russian demands to protect non-
Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. England used the request as a pretence with Russia to 
dismember the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence. Russia deemed the Black Sea 
basin and the area clown to Baghdad \Vas St. Petersburg's, and England viewed the 
remaining of Abdul Hamid's possessions as London's to exploit. 10 
The Porte had planned on submitting the recommended naval plan to Western 
Powers at one time but the British naval advisors tipped off the Thames Iron Works as to 
the commissioners' plans. The British shipbuilders offered to take over the Tersane-i 
Amire naval shipyard at Istanbul on lease for five million lira for a period of five years 
and to modernize the yard. Thames Iron Works then would build three battleships, three 
cruisers, and institute a modernization program on older warships. Thames Iron Works 
insisted that all material should be imported duty-free from Britain; however, the Sultan 
refused the deal. 
1°F.O. 1552, Russia, Sir N. O'Connor to Count Mouravief( St. Petersburg, 12 
February 1898. Found in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperly, eds., British Documents on 
!he Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. I (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1927), 12-13. 
The Krupp Works provided field artillery for the Ottoman army and naval guns 
for the Dardanelles and Bosporus, submitted an offer on the commission plans. This 
offer was leaked to Krupp's British con,petitor, Armstrongs of Elswick, who bid t\vo 
million lira below Krupp. Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II succeeded in convincing Krupp 
to rebid the contract, however German complaints of bribery and corruption resulted in 
the Sultan replacing the naval minister and a modified program with new bids. The 
modified program consisted of two battleships, two protected cruisers, two armored 
7 
cruisers, and two light cruisers. The program was considered by Krupp as unrealistic and 
the company refused to submit new bids,subsequently, the British shipbuilder 
Armstrongs received the first order in January 1898 for a cruiser, the Hamidiye, and two 
large torpedo boats. Armstrongs assumed and settled all English compensation claims. 11 
The Krupp Works did receive a contract to rebuild seven warships on 11 August 1900. 12 
The arranged price was 648,000 gold lira. However, the ships did not arrive until May of 
190 I because of Otttoman delays in paying for fuel in Genoa. 
The Essen Armaments Company of Germany was a consortium that included 
Krupp Works, Germania Werft, Schichau, and Vulkan Werft. As a group, they were 
owed 648 000 oold lira by the Ottomans . Not included in this amount was the upkeep of 
' C, -
sailors who manned the ships the consortium had contracted to rebuild. Funds for the 
upkeep of the crev.1 during the shipyard period was non-existent. Intervention by 
12GOleryUz, 10. 
8 
Germany's Kaiser went unheeded concerning the destitute sailors and by the summer of 
1901, nearly thirteen months of non-action had reduced the crews to paupers. Instead of 
paying the salaries of the crews, the Sultan demanded that the consortium advance 6,000 
gold lira in order to make one of the ships, the lzmir, ready for sea and to pay the salaries 
of the four Ottoman supervisors in the shipyard. The consortium now had to submit to 
this extortion because refusal to meet the Sultan's demands could endanger negotiations 
for a large contract for the Ottoman army. 13 The Sultan now proposed that the consortium 
reduce the cost of reconstruction of the ironclad Asar-i Tevfik from 282,000 to 65,000 
gold lira. This amount would not cover work already carried out. As consolation, 
Germania Werft received the contract to build two torpedo cruisers, the Peyk-i Sevket and 
the Betk-i Satvek along \Vith an armament orders for field artillery and naval guns for the 
Dardanelles and the Bosporus. Krupp and the consortium conceded to the pressure. 14 
The Italian shipbuilder Ansaldo got involved in Ottoman fleet expansion in 
January 1900. Italy presented claims to the Sultan's government for Italian property 
destroyed during the uprising of 1895-96. The Sultan once again hoped to settle these 
claims by placing armament orders with various Italian firms. In October 1898 Ansaldo 
submitted a bid to rebuild the ironclad Mesudiye and other ships. The armaments were 
originally to be supplied by Krupp Works but Krupp did not desire to be part of any 
additional Ottoman fleet contracts, so Armstrongs guns were substituted. In January 
I) Ibid., 12. 
14 lbid. 
1900 Ansaldo quoted a price of $2,332,800 to refit the Mesudiye, the Muin-i Za.fer, and 
the Feth-i Bu/end. This price was not final, and further discussions led to reduced 
remuneration. Ansaldo assumed and settled all Italian compensation claims. 15 
The United States government also submitted claims for compensation for losses 
incurred by American citizens during the Armenian disturbances. Most of the American 
claims were for damages to missionary property. The claims ammounted to 22,000 gold 
lira. For five years, diplomatic relations between the United States and the Ottoman 
9 
Empire revolved around the issue of the indemnity for damages. After the Spanish-
American War of 1898, a preliminary agreement to build a protected cruiser in the United 
States to offset the indemnity claims was reached yet the Sultan was still not fully 
prepared to cooperate . Final agreement was still not attained after two years of further 
negotiations and it would take a show of gunboat diplomacy in the form of the United 
State's battleship USS Kentucky (BB-6) sent to Istanbul in December 1900 to cause real 
movement on the cruiser contract. 16 General Ahmet Pasha went to the United States to 
negotiate with the American government over this ship. Ahrnet Pasha suggested the 
builder, William Cramp and Sons of Philadelphia, reduce the cost of the cruiser from 
585,000 to 300,000 gold lira. Additionally, Cramp would pay the Ottoman government 
100,000 gold lira in order to settle indemnity claims. The American government 
16Leland J. Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic 
Interpretation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), 236-241. See also 
Lloyd C. Griscom, Diplonwtica!ly 5jJeaking (Boston: Little, Brown, 1940), 134. 
officially refused the suggestion but let it be known that indemnity claims would be 
waived if and when the contract was signed with Cramp. The contract was signed in 
December 1900 after the Kentucky visit. The final cost of the ship was 355,000 gold 
lira. 17 
French compensation claims had not progressed sufficiently to satisfy Paris, and 
French naval forces seized the island of Mitylene on 5 November 1901. The French 
occupied the island and approprite customs duties. The Sultan appealed to Germany's 
Kaiser for assistance but was advised to pay the claims. The Sultan made a down 
payment, but France had to resort to gunboat diplomacy again in 1905 to extract further 
payments. 18 French shipbuilders did not engage in the intrigue that plagued the English 
and Germans over naval purchases. The French armament manufacturers concentrated 
10 
on sales of artillery, equipment, and munitions for the Ottoman army. They provided 
items "off the shelf' instead of long-term as required in ship construction. The Ottoman 
government's practice of spreading military sales around did entice French shipbuilders 
Schneider-Crevsot to submit a successful bid to build four Sivrihisar- class torpedo boats. 
Further orders from Schneider-Crevsot resulted in the 200-ton Refahiye- class and the 
420-ton Afarmaris. The Marmaris design was based on an indigenous Ottoman warship 
class that had been successful in coastal duties and the overall size of the class of ships 
was compatble \:Vith the overhaul facilities available to the Ottomans.While negotiating 
17Fred T. Jane, ed. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1910 (London: Sampson Low Marston, 
1910), reprint New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1969), 421. 
18Monroe, 51-52. 
11 
the torpedo boat proposals, the French shipbuilder Atelier de la Garonde convinced the 
Ottomans to purchase four destroyers. These were of the Durandal class were 280 tons 
and proved to be excellent at convoy and anti-submarine activities. Overall, they were 
among the better ship purchases negotiated by lstanbul. 19 
The English had been a fixture in Ottoman naval circles since the reign of Sultan 
Abdul Aziz, however, the naval advice received always favored English interests. The 
English technical advisors served the British first, the Ottomans second. The senior naval 
advisor's order of "advising" was to secure business for English yards, to protect English 
interests in the Empire, and finally to train Ottoman officers. Shortly after the Young 
Turk Revolution of 1908, Istanbul requested that London provide an admiral to 
reorganize the Ottoman Navy and oversee a proposed spending program of 
$76,000,000. 20 The British naval mission commander, Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, 
arrived on 18 September 1908. He started his mission by proposing that the overman and 
overage naval officer corps be reduced. This would leave a younger corps of British-
trained officers.Attempts to downsize the naval officer corps met fierce resistance. A 
naval rank was considered to be no more than an additional source of income and 
promotion dependent on the benevolence of influential contacts. Gamble had by 
March 1909 succeeded in reducing the bloated officer corps but with a British naval 
19Gi.ileryuz, 12-13. 
20Paul Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Siniation, 1908-1914 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1971 ), 314, and see TA. Brassey, The Naval Annual 1909 
(Portsmouth: .J. Griffin and Co., 1909) 43. 
12 
mission in operation in Greece, one must question Gamble's true motives in reducing the 
manpower of the Ottoman Navy on the eve of the Balkan War. 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II was deposed on 26 April 1909 and was replaced by Sultan 
Mehmet V (1909-1918). 21 The Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.), known in the 
West as the "Young Turks," gained in power, and serious reforms in both the political 
and military arenas were anticipated. Gamble arranged a naval maneuver for the benefit 
of the newly-elected parliamentarians. The training was not very realistic when 
compared with western fleets, but Gamble took the opportunity to address the 
parliamentarians on the need to modernize the fleet. The Admiral pointed out that flags, 
banners, and paint are no substitutes for new construction, but his plea had little chance of 
succeeding because Ottoman funds were not available. The C.U.P. did recognize the 
diplomatic value of a blue-water fleet when the cruiser Hamidiye participated in "show 
the flag" roles at Britain's coronation of King George V in 1910 and the opening of the 
Panama Canal in 1914.22 
From the beginning of 1910, Gamble clashed with Ottoman ministers regarding 
warship orders and finances. He proposed that all decisions in naval matters should be 
left to the Minister of Marine, Arif 1-Ialil Pasha, and himsell: an arrangement that would 
have ended the influence of the Ottoman Foreign Office. Political rivalries within the 
bureaucracy of Ottoman government had become defined with a British naval advisor, 
21 Paneth, 73. 
22New York Times, 30 March 1914. 
13 
German army influence, and the French-inspired C.U.P. 
Admiral Gamble prepared a program of new construction ,:vhich was to include 
two capital ships, three cruisers, and ten destroyers. The Porte wanted the battleships 
first, and the Minister of Marine used this program during secret negotiations with the 
British shipbuilder Armstrongs. The agreed upon amount for the two capital ships, five 
million gold lira, was far beyond the treasury's means. When the government learned of 
the unauthorized dealings, Ferik Hali] was replaced as minister of marine by Sadrazam 
Hakki Pasha. 
Gamble found the position difficult, and the strain began to extract a toll on the 
admiral. He noted the job of reorganizing the Ottoman fleet " ... an awful task and a 
thankless one. I mean one never sees any radical change or improvement -- and it 
requires a man in strong health and full vigour to stand the disappointment and continued 
grind .... They are talking very big about a programme of construction, and the 
engagement of the officers l want, but nothing practical has been done and until the actual 
steps have been taken, I cannot believe in any of their promises or assurances." 23 
Discouraged and ill, Gamble submitted his resignation in February 1910 but not before 
he advised the Porte to acquire small ships initally in order to facilitate training for 
younger officers. 
Gamble was succeeded as naval mission chief by Admiral H.P. Williams. Al bay 
Mahmut Muhtar, the Ottoman Minister of Marine, refused to work with the British and 
23 Quote found in Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situalion, 315. 
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disliked cooperation in any sort. The Minister's deep distrust of the British mission lay in 
his annoyance that the work of modernizing the Empire's defenses lay in the hands of 
foreigners. The commander of Ottoman army forces was General von der Goltz of the 
German mission and Admiral Williams commanded the fleet. The Italian-Ottoman War 
of 1911-12 and the First Balkan War of 1912-13 witnessed a German-trained army 
routed, a British-trained and- equipped fleet impotent, and Istanbul saved by Russia when 
it put the brakes on Bulgarian drives on the Dardanelles. For Russia would not allow 
any power other than the Ottoman Empire to control the straits. 24 
The role of the Dardanelles Straits cannot be underestimated. The only passage 
out of the Black Sea had been a blessing and a curse for the Ottomans. Control of the 
Straits basically meant control of the Black Sea. For nations that relied on Black Sea 
ports to import/export, the straits were a commercial jugular vein. Concern for free 
navigation led to the Straits Convention of 13 July 1841 in which Austria, France, Great 
Britian and Russia affirmed Ottoman control . Istanbul's control was reaffirmed by the 
Treaties of 1856 and 1871.25 
The Italian-Ottoman War forced the closing of the Bosporus Straits in April 1912, 
which adversely affected Russian commercial interests in the Black Sea and brought 
24James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak, Turkey al the Straits (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1940), 90-94. 
25 Barbara Jelavich, The Ofloman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits 
Question, 1870-1887 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971), 20-23. Also, see 
Charles G. Fenwick, International Law (Nev-.r York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 
1948), 396. 
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renewed Russian concern over the balance of power in the region. The Russian Ministry 
of War assumed that the Ottomans would cooperate closely with Austria and Germany 
should a general war break out in Europe. The Russians did not fear the Ottoman army 
because roads into the Caucasus mountains were neglected and railroads were too scarce 
to allow quick mobilization against Russia. It was Ottoman naval power that the 
Russians were feared. Russia had been powerless to prevent the Ottomans from closing 
the straits to neutral commerce during the Italian conflict. This halt in commercial 
shipping reminded Russia of it's mvn vulerablity to economic strangulation. Russia 
received three-fourths of her imports through Black Sea ports. Ottoman naval 
modernization raised serious questions about the security of Russia's own Black Sea 
coast. 
In a Black Sea naval arms race, Russia was at a distinct disadvantage.The 
Ottomans could purchase battleships abroad and acquire a fleet quickly. International 
treaty on the closure of the Dardanelles to warships prevented Russia from adding to the 
Black sea fleet except through local shipyard production. Russian Foreign Ministry 
officials concluded that if Russia took no effective countermeasures, the Ottomans would 
possess naval supremacy in the Black Sea by 1916. In the opinion of the Russian Naval 
General Staff, that would constitute a "serious threat to the integrity of the Empire. "26 In 
1912 these concerns produced for the Black Sea fleet a naval construction program 
consisting of three battleships, nine destroyers, and six submarines, all to be completed 
26 William C. Fuller, The Quest for Exits (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 436. 
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by 1918. This program would cost $52,668,933. 27 After World War I started, to ensure 
that the Bosporus Straits remained open and free to Russian shipping, Russia demanded, 
on 4 March 1915 that the allies consent to the Russian annexation of Istanbul, all of 
Thrace, and the Sea of Marmara, along with numerous islands. Under pressure of war 
conditions and of the need to keep Russia in line, England and France had to acquiesce. 28 
The desire to control waterways in the Sultan's domain was a British goal also. 
The route to India and the Far East passed through the Suez Canal, an Ottoman waterway. 
A substantial portion of Britain's food imports, including five-sixths of the barley and 
one-half of the oats, originated in Russia and passed through the Straits. By I 911, the 
Black Sea accounted for one-third of Britain's food imports and, when added to the 
portion transiting the Suez Canal, nearly half of Britain's food supply passed through 
Ottoman waters. 29 
The naval balance in the Aegean Sea area has traditionally been unstable.The 
equilibrium dissolved when Greece acquired the cruiser Georgios Averofl(Avendf) in 
1910. The purchase from Italy of such an offensive platform forced Istanbul to acquire 
some sort of balancing force. Ottoman naval purchases prior to the Greek acquisition of 
the Averoff were directed at coastal defense along with confronting Russian warship 
construction. The treasury on hand at the beginning of the Twentieth Century could 
27 ]bid., 437-438. 
"Shotwell, 100-101. 
20"Strategy and Food Supplies: The Mediterranean Route," The Times (London), 
4JuneI912. 
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afford to counter only one serious threat. Russia was barred from injecting warships into 
the Black Sea and had to rely on local construction with limited facilities available at 
Sebastopol and Novorossisk. This restriction permitted for Ottoman naval acquisition at 
a somewhat leisurely pace.With Greece having such a large cruiser, along with Russian 
ship construction accelerating, the Ottoman Empire was faced with two hostile neighbors 
arming at breakneck speed. 
Adding to Ottoman naval concerns was the British assistance given to the Greek 
navy during the period prior to the First Balkan War of 1912-13. The British naval 
mission in Greece began in 1911, and it was more active than the British mission to the 
Ottoman navy. The role of the British was not restricted to advising as with the 
Ottomans. Destroyer tactics used so successfully against the Ottomans were a direct 
result of the British Commander Hubert Carda le. The sucessfull Greek blockade of the 
Dardanelles can be attributed to the British Commander Hugh Watson, who refitted 
many ships during the conflict to maintain the pressure. The Balkan War of 1912-13 
\Vitnessed the Greek and Ottoman fleets both with British influence and direction, 
locked in combat. Greek intradition in the Dardanelles prevented Ottoman 
reinforcements from reaching the battlefield and resulting in the shaughter of muslim 
civilians30 
Ottoman fear that the Greeks could force the Dardanelles led the Porte to order 
eight twelve-inch coastal howitzers from Krupp and to a request a retired German naval 
30D.J. Cassavetti, He/las and the Balkan Wars (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1914), 
26-31. 
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officer to advise in the operation of such weapons. The German Vice-Admiral Wilhelm 
Schack, who had a reputation as an expert in coastal fortifications, was sent down to 
Istanbul. Since the presence of a German expert in defensive emplacements would have 
risked a British protest, Admiral Shack remained incognito. 31 Ottoman desire for naval 
supremacy in the Aegean Sea was driven by fear of Greek and Bulgarian genocide of 
Turkish Muslims, not by imperialism. Past conflicts had shown that when the power of 
the Sultan was absent, slaughter of Muslims by Greeks, Bulgarians,or Russians was not 
only possible but probable. The loss of strategic islands to Greeks in preceding conflicts 
removed early warning stations resulting in the entire coast of Anatolia open to naval 
attack. The loss of power in the peripheries could lead to the slaughter of Turks in 
Anatolia proper unless the balance of naval power in the Aegean was restored. 
The Ottoman naval assets in Mesopotamia prior to 1914 consisted of the gunboat 
Marmaris, smaller gunboats the Dogan, the Se/manpak, and the Tarantula, and some 
minor police motor boats: an adequate force to police the north end of the Persian Gulf 
The military presence was not sufficient to enforce Istanbul's sovereignty and on 23 
January 1899, the Sheikh of Kuwait agreed not to cede territory or receive foreign 
representatives ,vithout England's sanction. l n return, the Sheikh received 15,000 rupees 
and in order to enforce the agreement, the government of India was authorized to prevent 
by force any attempt on the part of Istanbul to enforce governmental control. In 1901, a 
quarrel between the Sheikh of Kmvait and the Amir ofNejcl (now Saudi Arabia) resulted 
11 Report by Austrian military attache, Istanbul, 27 May 1914, cited in Halpern, 
The Mediterranean Naval Siruation, 353. 
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in conflict, and when Istanbul dispatched troops to quell the fighting, England warned the 
Porte that the British government would prevent Ottoman forces from removing the 
Sheikh of Kuwait. A protectorate was not established over Kuwait, and both England and 
Germany considered Kuwait part of the Sultan's dominions but Istanbul considered 
English interference as aggression.32 
Principal naval bases for Ottoman naval forces in 1914 were Alexandretta, 
Basrah, Canakkale, Beyrut, Djeddah, Hocliecla, Jaffa, Samsoun, Izmir, Sinope, Smyrna, 
Trebizond, and the main arsenal at lstanbul. 33 The mercantile marine, or civilian vessels 
capable of being requisitioned for military use numbered 143 steamers of 69,333 tons net 
and 900 sailing craft of 180,000 tons net. 34 With inadequate ground infrastructure, bulk 
movement of any commodity was in most part waterborne. The main Ottoman coal port 
was Zonguldak, roughly 150 miles from the Bosporus Strait on the Black Sea. Small 
sailing craft in most regions of the Empire were sufficient for local needs. For large bulk 
import/export, foreign- flagged bottoms dominated the market. 
The Ottoman navy did have a marine unit of about 4,000 men. The author 
speculates that the marines were incorporated into regular army units in addition to the 
traditional roles assigned to marine units: shipboard security, pier sentry, and base and 
12Gooch, Vol. I, 333-334. 
330.J. Parks and Maurice Prendergast, eels., Jane's A// the World's Fighting Ships 
J 919 (London: Sampson Low Marston, 1919; reprint, New York: Arco Publishing 
Company, 1969), 587. 
34Fred T. Jane, ed. All the World's Fighring Ships 1914 (London: Sampson Low 
Marston, 1915), 409. 
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shipyard protection. 
A comparison of the naval forces confronting the Ottoman Empire prior to 1914 is 
found in Table 1. When comparing Ottoman and Greek naval assets, the Ottomans' 
position was not critical so long as the Ottoman navy went on the defensive, utilized the 
larger Ottoman army in planning, and, finally, avoided any confrontation in the Black 
Sea. Comparison of Russian and Ottoman naval assets clearly shows that the Ottoman 
forces were inferior. Co111pounding the situation, the Russians possessed submarines and 
destroyers to control the communations sea lanes, logistics corridors, and overall 
battlespace.Compounding the problem in the Black Sea, the Russians possessed land 
forces adequate to seize and control battlespace in Anatolia proper. Unlike Greece and 
Bulgaria, Russia had resources to provide follo\v-011 forces needed to legitimize claims to 
geographic gains. 
Russian naval plans were more ambitious. In April 1911 Russian Vice Admiral 
Ivan K. Grigorovitch, Russian Minister of Marine, laid down a naval budget construction 
plan calling for a Black Sea fleet one and one-half times the combined forces of Bulgaria, 
Romania, and the Ottoman Empire. Admiral Grigorovitch did not intially acquire the 
funding for the Black Seat fleet buildup. The Russian Duma did fund Baltic Sea fleet 
construction in June 1912, opting to forestall Black Sea costs in order to prepare for 
possible Baltic action. Wr, with the Ottoman fleet on the verge of acquiring the two 
modern dreadnoughts from England, the Duma in April 1914 finally approved the funds 
for an accelerated Black Sea construction program. These ships, along with the smaller 
complementary naval forces needed to support fleet operations, doomed any Ottoman 
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hopes of parity with the Russian Black Sea Fleet. 
Another area of concern for was the rail line from Germany to the Ottoman 
Empire. This line had to bring all the large munitions (5" and larger) down from 
Germany. Ottoman munition works could not produce large- caliber munitions or the 
assorted specialty ordinance (gas, phosphorus, light, shrapnel) needed to supply a modern 
army and navy. The rail line ran through Serbia and Bulgaria. So either country could 
halt shipments of logistics. The shortage of large caliber munitions would plague the 
Ottoman navy and prevent the full utilization of the battleships in both the Balkan Wars 
and World War 1. 35 
35Guleryi.iz, 20, 33. 
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Ottoman enlisted personnel did not have the excellent reputation the Ottoman 
foot soldiers enjoyed. The British press durning World War I expressed a dismell view of 
ethnic Turks and the sea writing: "Since the days when the Ottomans emerged from the 
back of beyond in Asia Minor in 1453, clown through the time of Suleiman the 
Magnificent -- when Turkey was at her apogee -- to the present day the Turk has been a 
useless person at sea. "36 The reasons arc less directed toward the enlisted ranks than the 
officer corps. With multiple sources for Ottoman naval hardware, becoming proficient 
would be difficult but given the correct training, Ottoman sailors proved to be as 
enthusiastic and willing to tackle any task ordered, equaling the reputation of their ground 
forces. 37 
The Ottoman navy entered the 1\ventieth Century lagging behind comparable 
navies. They would spend a considerable sum of money trying to keep pace in a naval 
arms race Istanbul could not afford. The Sultan's Empire was vast and exploitable by 
more industrialized countries. European nations wishing to become empires quickly 
needed regions relatively developed in order to recoup expenses incurred in seizing them. 
Vast regions in Africa had been claimed by France and Great Britain while undeveloped 
areas claimed by Germany, Belgium, and Portugal. Any territory unseized by Europeans 
was fair oame if local authority could be overcome. In the case of Abyssinia, local 
b • 
authority had been successful in preventing colonization. But the Sultan's regions were 
36 The Times Histmyofthe War, Vol. 11 (London: The Times, 1915), 22. 
37/bid., 39. 
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vulnerable to seizure under the right circumstances, and not just in Africa. European 
penetration of the peripheries of the Ottoman Empire had been ongoing. Distant regions 
such as Yemen, Sudan, Algeria, Tunis, and Kuwait, along with not so distant regions 
such as Egypt and Lebanon, had fallen under European influence. The main task of the 
Porte would be to prevent dismemberment of an Empire surrounded by states and 
nationalities bent on doing just that. 
The Ottomans used naval programs drawn up by the British mission along with 
British tactics to utilize such plans. The frenzy of shipbuilding indicative of the early 
Twentieth Century drove naval plans to include large capital ships. The ownership and 
use of capital ships was the driving force behind empire building. It would be these very 
programs that would hobble Ottoman naval forces.The Ottoman ministers responsible for 
naval matters did not seem to realize that the programs the British naval mission 
proposed were influenced by both Alfred Mahan's view on empire building and British 
experience in empire seizing. In neither scenario is the true problem of the Ottoman 
Empire confronted: that of empire protecting. The Ottomans were not into empire 
building or seizing but holding onto what Vias theirs, not antagonize the mainly Christian 
states that the Ottoman Empire bordered. 
CHAPTER II 
ITALO/OTTOMAN WAR 
SEPTEMBER 1912 TO OCTOBER 1913 
In the early Nineteenth Century, the Ottoman Empire in Africa included Algeria, 
Tunis, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, and the northern African desert 
area of Fezzan. European imperialist expansion began in earnest when Algeria was 
seized in 1834 by the French, and by 188 l Tunisia had become a French protectorate. 
Egypt became a vassal state of England in 1882, fol!O\ved by Sudan in 1898. Eritrea and 
Somaliland fell in 1889 to the Italians. At the same time, French forces began to exert 
control upon the Saharan Desert region of Fezzan. 
The loss of the peripheries, which under the best of times were under nominal 
Ottoman control, drained the treasury and injured the pride of the Ottomans. The Sultan, 
being protector of the Islamic faith, witnessed Christian forces with superior naval assets 
conquering Muslim territory at ,vill. The Ottomans, having no control of the sea lanes or 
forces capable of injecting troops to block European landings, became passive spectators 
to the dismemberment of their own empire. By the early Twentieth Century, the only 
territories left in northern African under direct Ottoman control were the provinces of 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, along ,vith the desert region of Fezzan. 
Italy became unified on 18 February 186 l and was therefore late in the colonial 
empire- building era. Eritrea and Somaliland became Italian colonies when the Ottomans 
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were too weak to confront Rome after fighting Greece over Crete in 1897.38 Rome had 
for centuries behaved as if the northern coast of Africa were a legitimate sphere of 
influence, the area in question being Tunisia, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania ,see Appendix 2. 
French ambitions for North Africa began with Napoleon's Egyptian endeavor in the late 
Eighteenth Century and led to the seizure of Algeria in 1832. The occupation and 
proclamation of a protectorate over Tunis in 1881 alarmed Rome and ultimately brought 
Italy into the Triple Alliance with Austria and Germany on 20 May 1882.39 
French Foreign Minister Freycinent reassured Italian Foreign Minister Francesco 
Crispi that France had no intentions of occupying Tunis. France landed troops in 1881 
under the guise of a protectorate. When Italian concerns were voiced, Freycinent stated, 
"The Mediterranean ought to belong to France and Italy."4° Freycinent hinted that since 
France had stolen Tunis, Italy therefore had a "right" to steal Tripolitania. The method of 
flirting with one country in order to extort concessions from another is part of the regular 
mechanism of diplomacy and is made palatable by the fact that alliances rest exclusively 
on self-interest. 
The integrity of the Ottoman Empire had been "guaranteed" by the European 
Powers both in the Treat of Paris in 1856 and in that of Berlin in 1878 but by 1900 the 
distant possessions of the Ottoman Empire were under Christian European "protection." 
18Guleryliz, 8-9. 
'
9Dr. Alfred Francis Pribram, 771e Sec-rel Trealies ofAuslria-Hungwy, 1879-1914, 
Vol. II (London: Oxford University Press, 1920), 65-69; and Lowes Dickinson, The 




Rome feared France would seize Tripolitania from bases in Algeria and Tunis. The 
Italian government, not wishing to be viewed as violating the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire,regardless of Eritrea and Somali land, desired only the continuation of the status 
quo. In the Triple Alliance treaty negotiations, Italy received assurances that if France 
moved into Tripolitania, Germany would aid Italy if war resulted. The third article runs 
as follows: "If it were to happen that France should make a move to extend her occupation 
or even her protectorate or her sovereignty, under any form whatsoever, in the North 
African territories, whether of the Vilayet of Tripoli or of the Moroccan Empire, and that, 
in consequence thereof, Italy, in order to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean, 
should feel that she must undertake action in said North African territories, or even have 
recourse to extreme measures in French territory in Europe, the state of war which would 
thereby ensue between Italy and France would constitute, ipso factor, on the demand of 
Italy and at the common charge of the t\vo allies, the casus foederis with all the 
effects ... "41 Crispi feared encirclement of the western Mediterranean if France were to 
extend complete annexation of Tunis, as in the case of Algeria. With this concern, Italy 
received assurances in the renewed Triple Alliance Treaty of 1891 that the status quo 
would be maintained in Tunis. 
Italy's King Humbert l (1878-1900) pressed colonial expansion by use of the 
military whenever the opportunity presented itself. Humbert sought commercial 
concessions from China and Morocco and territory on the Horn of Africa from local 
41 ibid., 89. 
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tribesmen. Humbert's colonial expansion was not limited to Ottoman territory. The 
friendship agreement between Italy and Abyssinia, the Treaty of Ucciali, signed in 1889, 
was denounced in May 1893 by Abyssinia's Emperor Menelik (1844-1913). Language 
differences led Italy to believe a protectorate existed over Abyssinia, a view Russia ac-
cepted and France rejected. 42 A subsequent war erupted between Italy and Abyssinia in 
J 895 that led to an Italian defeat at Amela Alagi in December 1896. London rejected 
Italian requests to land troops at Zeila in British Somalia resulting in an Italian defeat. 
The f.rench, working out of French Somali land, supplied Menelik with money, weapons, 
and officers.43 However, Italy still held out a desire to maintain Abyssinia as a sphere of 
influence with English help. 44 
The Triple Alliance Treaty did not include French mischief in Italian colonial 
affairs. Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance encouraged French antagonism and 
Crispi realized for Italy to succeed in colonial regions, some sort of accommodation with 
France and possibly England would have to be achieved over the objections of King 
Humbert. Humbert's anti-French sentiments originated in the loss of Nice and Savoy to 
France in 1860. Humbert's assassination at Monza in 1900 elevated Victor Emmanuel III 
(1900-1945) to the throne and would signal the beginnings of a rapprochement with 
France. 





14F.O. Abyssinia 48, No. 184, Sir R. Rodd to the I\1arquess of Landsdown, Rome, 
6 September 1903. In Gooch, Vol. I, 315-317. 
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The new Italian Prime Minister, Rudini, began secret negotiations with France in 
December I 900. Rudini received assurances that if France injected itself into Morocco, 
then Italy would reserve the "right" to herself as a measure of reciprocity to develop 
influence in Tripolitania-Cyrenaica.45 France would get free reign in Morocco and Italy 
in return would get Tripolitania. Paris agreed to respect Italian ambitions in Tripoli in the 
hope of detaching Rome from the Triple Alliance46 
In order to neutralize French covert operations against Italian political and 
colonial spheres, Italy's foreign minister Prinetti and French foreign minister Barrere 
began clandestine meetings on 4 December 1900.47 The final agreement defined the 
respective zones of expansion of the two countries in North Africa, interpreting their 
respective positions in regard to military alliances and guaranteeing their reciprocal 
neutrality in a war not provoked by them. The agreement not only cleared up boundary 
disputes in Tunis, but also removed the threat that France might be attacked by Italy's 
coming to Germany's aid. Victor Emmanuel refused to sign the document because of the 
renewal negotiations of the Triple Alliance Treaty, instead dating the agreement 10-11 
July 1902.48 The secrecy of the agreement leaked out after Victor Emmanuel visited Paris 
on 14-18 October 1902 and London on November 14-21 1902. German Major von 
•
16F.O. Italy, 836, No. 62, Lord Currie to the Marquess of Landsdowne, Rome, 14 
April 1901. In Gooch, Vol. I, 283. 
47Albertini, 129. 
•
18 Ibid., 13 1. 
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Chelius, military attache in Rome, questioned Italian General Saletta about the rumored 
Italian-Franco agreement and received the statement, "We are obliged to maintain good 
relations with France and England on account of the Mediterranean, where lies our vital 
interest. "49 
Italian relations with England had been good since unification in 1861 but the 
Fashoda Crisis in the Sudan hinterland caused concern in Rome. French claims to the 
Nile Valley in and around the headwaters of the White Nile led to the Anglo-French 
Agreement of 21 March 1899. London and Paris agreed to exclude France from the Nile 
basin. In return, France retained the right to expand in West Africa towards the Sahara 
and the interior. The agreement infringed upon an Italian-English agreement signed on 24 
March 1899 in which Italy agreed not to encroach within 150 kilometers of the Nile. 
During the Fashoda Crisis, Italian foreign minister Admiral Canevaro, on 26 October 
1898, assured the English ambassador that Italy could only remain neutral or side with 
England. 5° Canevaro could not convince the English that Italy should occupy Tripolitania 
immediately. Canevaro ,:vas successful in getting England to forgo any claim on territory 
or political inCTuence north of the southern extremity of the Fezzan. 51 This left an area 
150 kilometers from the Nile River west to the Tunis border open for Italian conquest. 
49 Major von Chelius, to General von Schlieffen, 1 December 1903, found in 
E.T.S. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, Vol. III (London: Harper & 
Brothers, 1931 ), 168-169. 
50Albertini, I 04. 
51 F.O. Italy, 797, No. 74, Lord Currie to the Marquess of Salisbury, Rome, l 0 
April 1899. In Gooch, Vol. I, 204. 
Further French territorial advancement in the Sahara south of Tripolitania, 
Cyrenaica, and Fizzan occurred in February 1910. French colonial forces defeated the 
Sultan of Wadai and occupied an area from the Egyptian-Sudan border west to Lake 
Chad and north to the southern extremities of Fezzan. This occupation of the last 
unclaimed area of North Africa gravely concerned the Great Powers. Even though Italy 
had acquired agreements with England, France, and Spain in addition to commitments 
from Germany and Austria, another power might still seize the Vilajet given the proper 
circumstances. 52 
Italy had by agreement secured the right to go into Tripolitania by ignoring 
French imperialism in Morocco and by treaty with Germany and Austria. In order to 
avoid antagonizing Russia, Italian prime minister Racconigi worded an agreement in 
which Rome agreed to respect Russian views on the Straits. St. Petersburg agreed to 
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support Rome concerning Italian interest in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. With the conclusion 
of the Racconigi agreement, Italy had secured Russian, French,German and Austrian 
consent to act in Tripolitania. 
Sir Ernest Grey, the English Foreign Secretary, was disinterested in Italy's desire 
to acquire Tripolitania. Grey wanted to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance because 
Italian naval power was a force to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean. English 
involvement in Italy is clearly visible in the growth of the Italian naval complex. Count 
52F.O. 5704/5704/l 0/22, No. 20, Rodd to Grey, Rome, 15 February 1910. G.P. 
Gooch and Harold Ternperley, British Documents on the Origins ofthe War, 1898-1914, 
Vol. IX, Part I (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1933), 262. 
Cavour, the Italian naval minister, and his protege, Benedetto Brin, encouraged govern-
ment and private shipyard expansion via naval expansion and warship exports. English 
industrialists correctly predicted Italian protectionist sentiments and engaged in joint 
ventures such as the Vickers-Terni Works at Spezia, the Arrnstrongs gun factory at 
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Pozzuoli, and the Peterson works at Naples. Military industrial enterprises which also 
included English backers were the Ansaldo Company works at Genoa and the Odero and 
Orlando factories at Leghorn. 
The fiasco in Abyssinia was caused in part by English refusal to allow Italian 
troops to land at Zeila. Italy could not force a landing due to political liabilities and the 
inferior Italian navy. In order to avoid a repeat, Italy embarked upon a naval construction 
program which in ten years produced the strongest Mediterranean based fleet. Table 2 
shows the grO\vth of the Italian fleet from 1900 to 1910. 
In July 1908, the Italian navy \Vas in essence an English fleet crewed by Italians. 
The English owned a share of the naval yards, the English inspired naval engineering, and 
by 1910 all Italian naval guns were Elswick, as on English ships. Torpedo technology 
was exclusive English Whitehead 18-, 15- and 14-inch.53 Engineering advancement 
followed the English Parson steam turbines and incorporated oil, coal, and mixed-fuel 
stoking. Alternate- fuel power plants allowed for global use of ships, ideal for an English 
Empire circling the world or Italian aspirations for such. 
53 Fred T. Jane, ed., All the World's Fighting Ships I 906/07 (London: Sampson 
Low Marston, 1907; reprint, New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1969), 290. 
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cFred T. Jane, ed. All the World's Fighling Ships 1914 (London: Sampson Low Marston, 
1915; reprint, Nev,, York: Arco Publishing Company, 1969), 286-299. 
Writing in 1909, the British naval constructor, Sir W.H. White, concluded with 
this statement about the Italian-English naval relationship:"The traditional friendship 
betv.reen Italy and Great Britain, and the important influence which the existence of a 
powerful Italian fleet must exercise upon the maintenance of our position in the 
Mediterranean, make it a matter of the highest importance that Italy should not decline 
from her position relatively to other Mediterranean powers, or lose the place that has been 
so hardly and honourably earned amongst the war-fleets of the world." 54 
54 Archibald Hurd, Italian Sea-Power and the Great War (London: Constable and 
Company Ltd., 1918), 122. 
The first decade of the twentieth century witnessed a political firestorm in the 
Mediterranean area. Morocco was occupied by a French mission in January 1905, 
ostensibly to impose a program of reforms on Sultan Abdul Aziz IV ( 1894-1908). 55 
Germany had sizeable economic programs in Morocco and had hoped to ensnare the 
country into Berlin's sphere of influence, however France controlled the police and thus 
was in a position to enforce whatever Paris decided. Greeks on Crete stepped up 
agitation for unification with Athens in 1908, spurred on by Eleutheros Venizeles, the 
future Greek prime minister. The Young Turks movement, seeking to save the Ottoman 
Empire, started on 6 July 1908 and would conclude with the ascension of the C.U.P. to 
power. The Committee of Union and Progress weathered a counter-coup and forced 
Abdul Hamid out. Abdul Hamid was be replaced with his brother, Mehmet who fulfilled 
the role of the quintessential constitutional monarch. 
With the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, the Great Powers 
suspended, then gave up on, demands for reform throughout the empire. With renewed 
spirit sweeping the Ottoman Empire and fear that the C.U.P. might not be as vaciJiating 
as Abdul Hamid, Austria moved to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina on 6 October 1908. 
Austria also encouraged Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria to proclaim independence. The 
Bulgarian autonomous principality under Prince Ferdinand took advantage of uncertainty 
in Istanbul and declared independence on 5 October 1908. Both moves were violations 
of the Treaty of Berlin, though Istanbul considered Bosnia-Herzegovina a lost cause, 
'
5Prince Bernard von Bulow, Memoirs, Vol. II (London: Oxford Press, 1931 ), 
104-106. 
however, Bulgaria had benefited from costly internal improvements. Bulgaria in 1878 
had only a single line of railway 13 7 miles long; in 1911, more than 1200 miles ofline 
were placed in operation. The gross national product had doubled from 1878, and the 
prospect of additional economic growth was excellent. 56 The Ottomans had invested 
heavily in Bulgaria in order to placate Christian European Powers. Prince Said Halem 
Pasha, the new Grand Vizier, feared both for the majority Muslim population and the 
. SI . . s7 threat posed by an aggressive av1c state. 
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The Young Turks leadership protested the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
with an economic boycott of Austria-Hungary commerce. Starting in Salonika, the 
boycott spread throughout the empire. The use of economic pressure to effect political 
outcomes alarmed the great industrial powers, which considered the Ottoman Empire an 
excellent market for finished goods. 58 Italian interests were especially vulnerable to 
boycotts.Maintaining the status quo in regard to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica had been the 
foreign policy of Italy up to J 911. Prior agreements with other powers left the fate of the 
Vilajet up to Rome, and as long as no other power converted the Vilajet, Italy was content 
to exploit but not own. 
The political situation changed in Italy vvhen Giovanni Giolitti regained power in 
1911. An earnest nationalist, Giolitti used whatever means necessary to achieve political 
56Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Political and Social J-J;sto,y ofModern Europe, Vol. JI 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), 521-522. 
57Albertini, 216-219, 214. 
58F.O. 1496/250/11/44, No. 191, Rodd to Grey, 31 December 1910. In Gooch, 
Vol. IX, Part 1, 263. 
results. Corruption was standard practice, and personal fortune Giolitti's goal. 59 Giolitti 
was prominent in the Italian government in the l 880-90s and advocated colonial 
expansion into Abyssinia and Somaliland. Benito Mussolini opposed Giolitti and was 
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arrested and sentenced to five years in prison for inciting resistance among the proletariat. 
The quasi-martyrdom propelled Mussolini to the forefront ofltalian politics.60 After 
World War I, Giolitti would first confront, then mentor Benito Mussolini. It would be 
Mussolini who would subdue Abyssinia and Libya, fulfilling Giolitti's ambition for 
Italian colonial expansion. 
Giolitti had to justify any aggressive action in regard to Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica. G. Lowes Dickinson quotes Giolitti in explaining the reasons for seizing 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica as "Western Africa from Tunis to Morocco was under the 
protection of European administration, Libya was very much behind the times. Slave 
markets were still held in Bengasi, and men and women taken by violence in Central 
Africa were sold in those markets: infamies which it was impossible to tolerate at the 
very gates of Europe." 61 Other considerations needed to be protected were economic. 
The Banco di Roma had been quietly engaged in peaceful penetration of the two 
territories in order to monopolize commercial dealings ,however, the Young Turks 
government had refused to grant Italy the same economic capitulation agreements 
19Giovanni Giolitti, Memoirs of My life, trans. by Edward Storer (London: 
Oxford Press, 1923), passim. 
60Herman Finer, lvfussolini's Italy (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1935), 54. 
61 Dickinson, 220. 
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England and France enjoyed. 
Capitulations were in place since the sixteenth century and allowed for foreign 
commerce while adhering to Islamic laws. Istanbul took the official position that the 
capitulations were privileges granted unilaterally by the Porte to the several powers for 
its own convience and could , therfore, be altered at any time by the government. Italy 
had no such claims to enjoy such capitulations, and since Ottoman finances had suffered 
because of the capitulations, allowing Rome to enjoy such was not in Istanbul's the best 
interest. The Ottomans had been forced to allow Italy some latitude in Tripolitania, but 
Italy desired an agreement to erect postal services in Anatolia and Istanbul refused to 
concede such a franchise. Italy furthermore demanded commercial monopolies for 
harbor construction at Tripoli. The Ottoman General Ibrahim Pasha, Vali of Tripolitania, 
refused to acquiesce. I-le knew fully of Italy's agreements concerning Tripolitania and 
became such a hindrance to Italian expansionism that he was recalled by Istanbul in 
August 1911 in the hopes of improving relations. 62 
The strained relations that Italy experienced with the Young Turks government 
was not the only reason Giolitti pressed for action. Istanbul was occupied with a revolt in 
Yemen inspired by British interests in Aden. The Grand Shirife in Yemen had never 
submitted to Ottoman authority, and the Young Turks' nationalist views benefitted 
English colonial expansion by agitating some non-Turkish ethnic groups in Arabia.63 
62 F.O. 33825/30691/11/44, No. 125, Rodd to Grey, Rome, 17 August 191 l. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 266. 
63 Letter to Sir A. Nicolson from Sir F. Bertie, 14 May 191 l, in G.P. Gooch, and 
Harold Temperley, British Documents on the Origins olthe War, 1898-1914, Vol. Vil 
Compounding the situation ,revolts in Albania, Macedonia, and Armenia drained 
resources to such an extent that the Ottoman Empire was vulnerable in the 
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peripheries.Giolitti also put forward that a real danger existed that Germany or some 
other power was on the verge of securing occupation of Tripoli and, if such happened, 
Italy would lose the chance to occupy the Vilajet forever. 64 Thomas Nelson Page, the 
Unitef States ambassador to Italy, echoed that Germany had been bested in Morocco and 
the Kaiser still wanted to establish a Mediterranean beachhead. France controlled 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis. England controlled Egypt and Cyprus, leaving only 
Tripolitania left to Italy.The Italian press noted frequent frontier encroachments by the 
French and British in Tunis and Egypt respectively. France was rumured to be interested 
in Ghadames, while British designs were on Tobruk.65 
The C.U.P. controled Porte envisioned reforms included economic treaties 
favorable to Istanbul, and Italy feared that Germany intended to supplant Italy as the 
primary economic interest in the Vilayet. Italian banks had begun to sell economic 
enterprises in the region to German banks and Giolitti's hurry to occupy the Vilayet 
indicates that Rome feared political penetration by German economic interests in 
(London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1932), 247-248. 
64 F.O. 6027/6027/12/12, No. 38, Rodd to Grey, Rome, 12 February 1912. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part f, 260-261. 
65 For a complete review of the ground campaign in North Africa, see W.K. 
McClure, Italy in North A/i'ica: An Account of the Tripoli Enterprise (London: 
Constable and Company Ltd., 1913), 32. 
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Tripolitania.66 
The key factor for any military operation along the Tripolitanian coast was 
weather. Winter sea conditions preclude landings at undeveloped beach heads and Italy 
would be risking unacceptable casualties if the Ottomans were allowed to fortify Tripoli 
and Torbruk over the winter months. Sea states above level three would devastate 
landing forces, and to expect such troops to assault fortified positions would repeat the 
Amda Alagi fiasco. Any military action had to proceed before October 1911 in order to 
inject sufficient forces to pacify the small Ottoman garrison before weather conditions 
became unfavorable. 
Giolitti needed to create an excuse in Tripolitania to justify military action. The 
commercial inequalities caused by the absence of capitulations and the threat of a boycott 
of Italian merchantry were seized upon by the Italian press. Rome papers reported, 
" .. .Italian interest being unfavorably rated when compared to other powers." Italian 
honor and national pride were played upon to incite support for drastic action. 67 German 
ne,vspapers such as the Hamburg Zeitung warned Italy "that if she [Italy] does not wake 
up, Tripoli could fall under the influence of France and other Powers." Italian opposition 
papers such as Rome's Ciorna/e d'!talia and Naples' Mattino demanded not only Tripoli 
but also other unspecified territories needed to be acquired to restore the equilibrium in 
6(Thornas Nelson Page, llaly and the World War (Nev,1 York: Charles Scribner's 
and Sons, 1920), 118-121. 
01F.O. 32717/233 l 3/l l/44, No. 93, Grey to Rodd, London, 16 August 1911. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 266. 
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favor of Italy.68 
Internal politics of Italy manifested a situation where Biolitti was confronted with 
the Italian version of a "Young Turk" movement. A vocal majority of Italians demanded 
action over Tripolitania, and Giolitti's own party demanded such action or the prime 
minister, Giolitti, would be replaced. Giolitti learned on 14 September 1911 that a 
boycott ofltaly had started in Tripolitanian ports. This news provided Giolitti his justi-
fication for action, and the Italian fleet was ordered to Spezia from Maddalena.69 
Ottoman diplomatic personnel throughout Europe attempted to obtain assistance 
from accredited governments to prevent the conflict. This "eleventh hour" diplomatic 
attempt failed because of internal politics in both countries. Had Giolitti backtracked, the 
more radical elements of government would have replaced him. For the C.U.P. in 
Istanbul, accommodation with Italy could create a civil war, and thus the Young Turks 
faced or losing everything.The Porte could not provide troops adequate to defend the 
provinces but Istanbul dispatched the freighter S.S. Derna with a hold full of Mauser 
rifles in order to equip the loyal tribesmen. 70 
The Italian government sent a protest on 23 September 1911 over the treatment of 
Italian interests and Italian nationals. Four clays later, Italy issued an ultimatum that 
consent must be given within 24 hours to an Italian military occupation of Tripolitania 
68 F.O. 35685/30691/11 /44, No. 138, Rodd to Grey, Posilipo, 4 September 1911. 
In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 268. 
69F.O. 37412/30691/11/44, No. 143, Rodd to Grey, Posilipo, 14 September 1911. 
In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 270. See also Hurd, 33. 
70McClure, 49. 
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and Cyrenaica. Rome believed 1stanbul would not fight and dispatched a party of Italian 
journalists to Tripoli in order to document the changing of sovereignty. Once the Italian 
fleet arrived and Ottoman forces retreated into the desert, the journalists had to be rescued 
from lawless tribesmen out to loot the city. 71 
The Italian allegations had no merit. Ottoman civil control in Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica had been lax before the Young Turk government came to power. Istanbul's 
refusal to submit to economic concessions in Anatolia and North Africa was directly a 
result of the Ottoman government's attempt to establish economic and governmental 
control: control that Italy demanded. At the end of 24 hours, at 2:30 pm on 29 
September 1911, a state of war existed between Italy and the Ottoman Empire. 72 Istanbul 
fully understood the situation in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Ottoman naval forces were 
inadequate to confront the Italians. British naval advisors, owing to the clause in the 
contract for services which released British officers from advising in times of war, were 
withdrawn on 30 September 1911.73 The British would return to non-hostile positions by 
8 October 1911. Ottoman fleet exercises, vvhich were occurring in Syrian waters, were 
concluded early, and the fleet withdrew to the safety of the Dardanelles by 2 October 
1911. 74 
71 lbid., 38. 
12Albertini, 343. 





The Ottomans appealed again to England for some sort of rapprochement with 
Italy. Ottoman Grand Vizier Said Halem Pasha appealed to England's King George V, 
offering to enter the Empire into the orbit of the Triple Entente if London would intercede 
on the Ottomans' behalf. Said Pasha offered an arrangement by which Tripolitania 
would end up a protectorate of ltalys' with the Sultan's rights acknowledged. 75 England 
refused to assist because Egypt's Lord Kitchner preferred a Christian controlled 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and English policy towards the region mirrors his views.76 
On paper, the armies of the belligerents were equal. However, since Ottoman 
ground forces were based in Anatolia and not North Africa, the numbers are 
misleadingThe naval forces for the two countries are found in Table 3. 
The Ottoman navy was experiencing a reduction in personnel under the guidance 
of the English Rear Admiral H.P. Williams. The uncertainty and politics surrounding 
such reductions had to affect readiness. The Ottoman navy experienced a reduction from 
a high of 31,000 personnel in 1908 to 7,000 in 1912. The Ottoman naval structure and 
commanders are listed in Appendix 3. 
The Italian fleet \Vas divided into three squadrons with two divisions in each 
squadron. Table 4 shows the constitution of the Mediterranean Italian fleet. 77 The third 
75F.O. 43470/43250/11/44, H.M. George V to Grey, London, 2 November 1911. 
In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 780. 
76F.O. 43250/43250/11/44, Grey to Twefik Pasha, London, 2 November 1911. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 780. 
77F.O. 37773/30691/1 l/44, No. 151, Rodd to Grey, London, 22 September 1911. 
In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 274. 
TABLE 3 
ITALIAN AND OTTOMAN NAVAL FORCES 
AT THE START OF THE ITALO-OTTOMAN WAR 
Tvpe of Ship Italy" Ottoman Empireb 
Battleships 14 
Coastal Defense lO 
Cruisers 20 
Destroyers 41 
Torpedo Boats 90 
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Pri111ce Ludwig Amadeus, Duke of Abrussi 





Rear Admiral Count Thaon di Revel 






Source: Archibald Hurd, l!a/ian Sea-Power and the Great War (London: Constable and 
Company, LTD, 1918), passim. 
detachment of mall Italian war hips wa based in Somaliland at Mogadishu and wou ld 
b augmented by the fo llowi ng cru i ers: R.!S. Piernonte , R.l.S. Artigliere, R.I. 
alabria, and R.I. S. Puglia. 
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In all three naval detachments, subsidiary forces, destroyers seagoing torpedo 
boat , supply and repair ve sc i fo ll wed. Additional logistic requirements fo r the 
evacuation of foreign civi li ans from Tripolitan ia and Cyrenaica necessitated lea ing 
comm rcial passenger hips. Break- bulk and cargo ships were also acquired to augment 
littoral and gr und- force supply requirements. The short time period from ultimatum to 
warfare caught procurement, maintenance, and movement planners scrambling to contract 
commercia l carri ers to fulfill Itali an Army requirements. The delay pushed back 
dep loymenting gr und force until the econd week of October. 
The Italian na y was prepared for combat and in place by the ultimatum's 
deadline. Italian army force were not prepared suggesting ground-force commanders 
were kept out of the communications loop and were unaware of the impend in conflict. 
The Italian army had reci ntl rel ea from act ive duty the 1889 class of conscripts on 3 
eptember 19 l 1. fter the ultimatum had been issued, the 1888 class and the 
ju t-relea ed 1889 clas had to be recalled t active duty. Add ing to the Italian army's 
unpreparedness was the fact that summer ground maneuvers had just concluded on 1 
eptember. o logi ti cal planning for the occupation of Tripolitania seems to have 
begun. The order D rm bilizing army c rp ~ r transport were not issued until 25 
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September, and the first army troop transports did not leave Naples until 9 October.78 
General unpreparedness and overconfidence manifested themselves quickly. Ships were 
ordered to sail with one day's provisions aboard. The Italian General Caneva, 
Commander of Ground Forces, had little idea how to fight a mobile war against guerrillas 
and embarked only 20,000 troops. 79 Finally, Italian battalions never reached war 
strength, which would result in newspaper errors in reporting Italian personnel numbers. 
The naval war began the same day that the ultimatum expired. Prince Ludwig 
Amadeus,The Duke of Abrussi and cousin to King Victor Emmanuel II, shelled the 
Ottoman base at Preveze. The torpedo boats Antalya and Tokad, en route to Singin 
(Albania), were attacked off Kalamic (Greece) by Italian destroyers. Tokad fled north 
and was followed and shelled by Italian warships, with the loss of nine men. Ania/ya, 
pursued by two Italian warships, managed to reach base at Preveze with slight damage. 80 
Moving down the Adriatic coast of the Ottoman Empire, the Italians sank the torpedo 
boats Hamidiye and Alpagot at Resadiye (lgoumenitsa, Greece). The royal yacht Trablus, 
undergoing boiler repairs, was scuttled in the harbor, but an Italian boarding party 
managed to close the sea cocks. 
Admiral Aubry's division, Vitorio Emanuele, Regina Elena, Napoli, and Roma, 
was deployed to the Anatolian coast in order to prevent the Ottoman fleet from sailing to 
78Albertini, 344. 
79Denis Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern Hisrory (Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press, 1959), 278-280. 
80GUleryi.iz, 15; F.O. 38784/30691/11/44, No. 162, Rodd to Grey, Rome, I 
October 191 I. In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 294. 
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the Tripolitanian provinces. Political vacillation in regard to Vienna's and Rome's desire 
to localize the conflict prevented the Duke from destroying the Ottoman fleet outright. 
Rome order to intercept the Ottoman fleet was alteredl to seize Tobruk immediately 
suggesting a fear that English or Egyptian forces miglht lay claim to Cyrenaica. 81 
Ottoman naval forces were not as high a priority as \Vas preventing English expansion 
into the region. 
The Duke of Abrussi placed a blockage on the Ottoman Adriatic coast and 
immediately created a diplomatic incident. Blockadirng the coast upset the status quo, and 
Austria objected to warfare being injected into the volatile Balkans. 82 Italy reacted by 
moving the Duke's force to the vicinity of the Dardanelles in order to combat any sortie 
attempted by the Ottoman fleet. 
Unaware of the Italy's true intentions, the Ottomans began strengthening the 
defenses at Selanik and Izmir. In addition, the approaches to Yenikale by the Gulf of 
Izmir were blocked by scuttling the old Osmanli Steamship line steamers Adana and 
Saade/. The Sultan's yacht, Su/tanzye, and the transport Izmir were also released by the 
navy for scuttling and a mine barrage was laid in orde1r to protect Yenikale. 83 
The landing of the Italian marines at Tripoli, wnth no follow-on forces to press the 
objective, alerted the native populace and altered the Italian occupation-force commander 
Admiral Canevaro's plan to seize the hills surrounding the town. A more serious problem 
31 McClure, 215-216. 
82Hurd, 34-35. 
83 Gi.ilerytiz, 15. 
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resulted when the resident population did not embrace the Italians as liberators. Though 
the Ottomans were not Bedouin, once the Italians began shelling Ft. Hamidieh and Ft. 
Sultanieh in Tripoli on 3 October, the fleeing population seemed to have sided with the 
Sultan. The shelling of towns within naval gunfire range, such as Derna on 16 October, 
Benghazi on 19 October, and Homs on 21 October, drove urban Bedouins into desert 
camps for succor. 
The resident population of the Vi lajet of Tripolitania consisted of Berbers and 
Arabs with Negroes in the Fezzan Region. Arab Bedouin tribes, nomadic in nature 
except for the urban dwellers, paid little allegiance to the Ottoman officials, keeping to 
marriage and tribal loyalties. Tripolitania had no manufacturing except for local 
consumption, and business, if any outside of subsistence, revolved around caravan routes 
through Feezan. Seizing oasis towns vital to caravan trade had been the motivation for 
France to expand into the French Sahara. Maintaining control and regulation of trade on 
the caravan routes would be a prime directive for Italian occupation forces. 
The dominant Islamic Order in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was the Sanusiya, or 
Sanusi, founded in 1837 by Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi. Directly descended 
from the Prophet Muhammad, Sayyid Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanusi, or Grand Sanusi, 
was born in ] 787 in Morocco. 84 A fraternity and not a sect, the Sanusi had lodges across 
North Africa. Disagreements with French colonial administration forced the Sanusi out 
of Algeria, Chad, Morocco, and Tunis into Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. When the Italian 
8"E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanusi <~fCyrenaica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1949), 11. 
war spread into Tripoli and Banghazi, the Sanusi organized the native Bedouin tribes to 
resist. 85 The Sanusi may not have embraced the Sultan's government, but replacing an 
Islamic monarch with an Christian was not in the fundamental Islamic fraternity's best 
interests. 
When the war began, Istanbul had 3,010 men in Tripolitania and 1,200 men in 
Cyrenaica. 86 Under normal circumstances, these forces would have been twice as great, 
but g to an English-inspired revolt in Yemen diverted troops to Arabia in early 
1911 .Ottoman governmental policy in the two provinces was benign neglect. Sayyid 
Ahmad al-Sharif, the leader of the Sanusi at the time of the war, controlled the oasis and 
caravan area, maintaining peace and order, while Ottoman authorities controlled the 
urban area. The Sanusi kept in check Bedouin warfare and acted as a governmental 
extension in the Fezzan. 
Once the conflict began, Ottoman forces fell back into the desert and took 
advantage of the Sanusi social structure to begin defensive operations. Mustafa Kernel, 
the future president of modern Turkey, came over across Egypt and organized Bedouin 
tribal forces. Enver Bey, future Ottoman War Minister, also crossed Egypt and initiated 
guerrilla action. A third camp set up by Aziz Bey al Masri utilized Bedouin forces in 
eastern Cyrenaica. 87 Aziz Bey also received assistance from Bedouins residing in Egypt 
85Emrys L. Peters, The Bedouin o(Cyrenaica (London: Cambridge University 




until Lord Kitchner of Khartum, British Consul-General in Cairo and future English 
secretary of war, reminded the Bedouins that " ... present Egyptian law precluded their 
conscription into military service, but if the Bedouins were so inclined for military 
service, he [Kitchner] would see to changing the law." 88 This threat slowed but did not 
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stop Egyptian Bedouins from aiding Ottoman forces in Cyrenaica. England also refused 
to allow Ottoman troops to cross Egyptian territory or Ottoman naval forces to utilize 
Egyptian littoral regions. 89 Aiding Istanbul were the French authorities who did little to 
prevent the flow of supplies from Tunisia. Ottoman military operations received 
personnel and gold through French Tunisia and in order to prevent or restrict such 
supplies, Italian forces were landed at Zuara. Regardless of Italian efforts, the border 
remained porous and Ottoman supplies continued to trickle in. 90 
On 17 October 1911 the German charge d'a1Taires in Cairo, Richthofen, reported 
that the Egyptians desired to send 18,000 troops into Tripolitania to aid their suzerain, the 
Sultan. Lord Kitchener agreed, but stipulated that since Egypt could not be left 
unprotected, the 18,000 Egyptian troops would have to be replaced with 18,000 English 
troops. The Egyptians dropped the offer.91 
88 E.T.S. Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, Vol. IV (London: 
Harper and Brothers, 1922), 62. 
89F.O. 38306/30691/11/44, No. 72, Rodd to Grey, Rome, 30 September 1911. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 286. 
90McClure, 150. 
91 0ugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. IV, 61-62. 
so 
Either England and France could have secured the borders with Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica, but diplomatic intrigue dictated that Italy should bleed and incur expenses far 
beyond the minimum to secure the territory. Not until Italy shifted foreign policy away 
from Berlin did military contraband from Tunis and Egypt slowe.92 
In October 1911 ftaly approached England in order to get an understanding on the 
Red Sea. Italy feared Ottoman Arab forces being transported either by sea or the Hejaz 
Railway. Injection of such forces would make conquest of Tripolitania more difficult. 93 
Italy again received assurances of Egyptian neutrality and assurence that no Ottoman 
troops would be allowed to cross the frontier into Cyrenaica. 
Bedouin forces harassed Italian forces throughout the war. Whenever Italian 
forces ventured beyond naval gunfire support into the open desert, the Bedouin/Ottoman 
forces engaged in a guerrilla campaign, draining Italian morale and resources. Italy had 
planned to commit less than 34,000 troops to conquer the provinces. However, warfare, 
disease, and sheer size of the operation forced the occupation troops upward to 
l 00,000.As the conflict dragged out, the war evolved into an Italo-Sanusi struggle. The 
Sanusi, keeping to the basic concept that the Order adheres to in religion, transferred 
primal emotions to the war and thus changed the war into a struggle to throw off the 
yoke of a foreign power.94 The fight for Tripolitania and Cyrenaica became more brutal. 
92]bid., 63. 
93 F.O. 40481/3069 l /11 /44, No. 162, Grey to Rodd, London, l l October 1911. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 306. 
94Evans-Pritchard, 110. 
Prisoners were few, and Enver Bey, when leading troops, showed a disposition towards 
high Arab casualty figures. 95 Istanbul tried to supply the Sanusi with whatever meager 
resources were available. The Ottomans set up an agency at Marseilles to smuggle 
contraband through Tunis to Tripolitania. The supply line through Egypt, begrudgingly 
allowed by Kitchener, was strictly controlled by the British. France did little to stop 
supplies from reaching Tripolitania. However, on the nights of 16 and 18 January 1912 
the Italian warship R.I.S. Agordat stopped the French steamers S.S. Carthage, with an 
aeroplane aboard that the Italian believed destined for Tunis, and the S.S. Manouba, 
carrying tv,,enty-nine Red Crescent relief workers. The diplomatic uproar in France 
demanded respect for the French flag, and Rome, fearing a diplomatic break with 
perturbed Paris, acquiesced. 96 However, the episode demonstrates the wherewithal the 
Young Turks exhibited towards defending the Empire. 
The Russian ambassador in Rome reported to the English foreign secretary, Sir 
Edward Grey, that Italy had planned to force the straits and engage the Ottoman fieet in 
the Sea of Marmara.97 Such an attack might have fulfilled romantic visions ofltalian 
naval superiority; however, it would have been disastrous. Forcing the straits would 
include engaging land fortifications, possible mined channels, and navigational courses 




91f.O. 44140/30691/11/44, No. 305, Lowther to Grey, Pera, 7 December 1911. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part 1, 322. 
St. Petersburg, Russia informed the Russian minister for foreign affairs that Italy would 
not force the Dardanelles in order not to inconvenience other powers, however, the 
Russians were led to believe that Rhodes might be the next target for Italian naval 
power.98 
The Italians proclaimed the annexation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica on 5 
November 1911. This was in direct violation of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the 
Treaty of Berlin of 1878, both of which guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
The proclamation seems to have been directed at Italian domestic consumption for 
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reality found the Italians in charge of coastal villages and little else. An indication of the 
resistance can be found in British messages discussing Italian massacres of Moslem 
civilians in Tripoli. Such criticism of Italy fueled nationalist papers and placed 
Italo-English relations in a chill. 99 The annexation decree inspired the Ottomans to fight 
instead of negotiate. Determined to hold on for pride, the Porte's position indicated a 
belief that the Italians did not have the staying power to hold on if the conflict dragged 
out. Additionally, unconfirmed English newspaper reports of Italian cruelties on women, 
children and the aged follov,,ed a too-familiar pattern of Christian excesses of Muslim 
refugees. 
The Sanusi resistance became fanatical after Italian Christian bishops talked of a 
crusade. The Arabs responded with a calling for a "jihad," or holy war. Since Arab 
98 F.O. 44772/30691/1 l/44, No. 272, O'Beirne to Grey, St. Petersburg, 12 
November 1911. In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 322. 
99Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, 14 November 1911. In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 322 .. 
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fighters had few if any uniforms, ununiformed prisoners were by Italian definition spies 
and subsequently hanged. Enrico Corradini, an Italianjournalist and nationalist 
politician, described Arabs in general as savage beasts who should be whipped, and those 
opposing Italian liberation from Ottoman rule deserved only to be hanged. 100 
The Ottoman government and foreign diplomatic circles in Istanbul envisioned 
the widening of the war to other areas of the Sultan's domain. Diplomatic intrigue 
narrowed down the areas: England "protected" Egypt, Sudan, Smyrna, Salonika, and the 
Dardanelles because of maritime trade and Austria-l--lungary placed the Balkans 
off-limits.1() 1 The Red Sea was the only legitimate area outside of Tripolitania to exert 
pressure on Istanbul. 
In December 1911 Italy reinforced the Italian forces in the Red Sea. Injection of 
naval forces into this theater was in direct violation of the Italian Memorandum issued on 
11 October 1911 expressing the neutralization of that region. There is no evidence that 
Istanbul violated the memorandum, and with England preventing the overt passage of 
troops through Egypt and the Ottoman fleet hunkered down in the Sea of Marmara, 
Italian internal politics would to be the rational explanation. On 5 December 1911 the 
Italian cruiser Puglia shelled the Sinai town of Akkaba and sank the Ottoman gunboat 
Halie. The Puglia then stopped the Ottoman merchant ship M. V Kayseri en route from 
Suez to Kunfada with coal.The most substantial confrontation between Italian and 
100Smith, 278. 
101 Baron von Marschall to German Foreign Office, 14 November 1911. In 
Dugdale, Vol. IV, 65. 
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Ottoman naval forces occurred on 7 December 1912 at the Ottoman Naval Station at 
Kunfada. 
The Italians had shelled Mocka and Sheikh Said at the south end of the Red Sea 
along with Akkaba in the Gulf of Sinai in early November. 102 The Ottoman naval forces, 
gunboats Kastamonu, Ayintab, Ordu, Bafa, Refahiye, Gokedag, the armed tug Muha, 
and the yacht Sipka were hiding in the internal canals of the Farsan Islands. Ottoman 
ground forces occupied Loheia, Ft. Midi, and Kunfada.The Italians shelled Jebel Tahr on 
7 January 1912 with the cruisers Calabria and Puglia, while the Italian cruisers 
Piemonte, R.1.S. Garibaldino, and Artigliere drifted down the coast to Lith. Loheia and 
Ft. Midi were bombarded by Puglia and Calabria, forcing the Ottoman gunboats to 
scatter back to Kunfida. The Ottoman gunboats broke and fled and the Italians 
systematically sank the all of them. Ground forces at Kunfida engaged in shelling the 
Italian cruisers; however, the Italians stayed outside of the land batteries' range during 
most of the three-hour engagement. 103 The Ottoman forces seemed to be tempting the 
Italians into the canals because restricted maneuverability on the part of the Italian 
cruisers would have placed the ships in position for torpedo runs or triangulation from 
shore/ship gunfire. Italian warships were visually pleasing, however, protection from 
direct fire had been sacrificed in order to gain speed and reduce costs. 
102I-Iurd, 36. 
1031-Iurd, 36-37; Gi.ileryUz, 16. 
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The raid into the Red Sea during January 1912 occurred during the same time 
period of peace negotiations, which started on 12 December 1911 and would last until 15 
October 1912. The Ottoman government recognized that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica 
were lost, but concern for internal elections, Islamic fears of Christian excesses, and the 
indignation of the foreign community pressuring Istanbul to give up, encouraged the 
Young Turks to continue. The Porte did float a feeder that the provinces could be ceded 
to a Mohamidan chief, either KaramanJi Bey, the Egyptian Prince Fuad, or the head of the 
Sanusi, Sayyid Ahmed al-Sharif. Then the question of Ottoman relinquishing 
sovereignty under duress would be less of an internal issue. Italy would not retract the 
annexation decree, and the suggestion went nowhere. 104 Istanbul did want some sort of 
accommodation with Italy. The prospect of an ethnic war in the Balkans began to appear 
probable, and the Porte began to reinforce quietly key points in the region. 
The Italian VADM Thaon de Revel moved the naval operation out of the Red Sea 
up to the Lebanese coast in January 1912. The cruisers R.1.S. Giuseppe Garibaldi and 
R.I.S. Francesco Ferruccio shelled Beirut on 24 January 1912. The Ottoman stationary 
ship A vnillah was set ablaze. From 0930 hours to I I 00 hours, the Italians shelled the 
Avnillah and then Beirut itself. At 1100 hours, the Giuseppe Garibaldi entered the harbor 
and torpedoed the Avnillah, killing t\VO officers and 49 men. The Ottoman gunboat 
Ankara, also in the harbor at Beirut, was scuttled by the crew. Over 140 civilians were 
I0
4German Ambassador to Rome, Herr G. von Jagow, to Chancellor Bethmann-
Hollweg, 4 July 1912. In Dugdale, Vol. IV, 70. 
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killed and 200 injured during the bombardment. 105 Austria protested the shelling because 
it potentially opened and widened the war. ID6 After the shelling ,Italian civilians in the 
Sam (Damascus), Beirut, and Halpe (Aleppo) areas, who up till then had lived peacefully 
within the Ottoman Empire, began to 
ieave. 107 
retaliation and over 55,000 were compelled to 
With few real military targets and no action whatsoever to land troops and seize 
territory, Italian bombardment of civilian areas in the Red and Mediterranean Seas 
suggest an attempt to inspire civil unrest within the Ottoman Empire. Internal pressure to 
protect Anatolia, the flow of Muslim refugees, and the tinderbox Balkan region may have 
influenced Abdul Hamid's regime, but Young Turks were not so timid. The need to 
conclude this conflict rested in Tripolitania and not Anatolia. Italian ground forces were 
not winning and diseases such as malaria and dysentery had sapped the morale of the 
conscripts. What was supposed to a quick victory had lapsed into a quagmire. 
The Italians moved up to Sarnos and bombarded the town on 18 April 1912 
sinking the royal yacht Ihsaniye. The same day, the Giuseppe Garibaldi and the R.1.S. 
Varese shelled the Dardanel !es forts of Seddul bahir and Kumkale, inflicting heavy 
casualties. The Italians also cut underwater telegraph cables belonging to the Eastern 
Telegraph Company between the island lmbros and the mainland, and between 




Salonika. On the same day, the Italians shelled 
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the Ottoman barracks at Vathy on the island of Samos and cut the underwater cable 
between the islands of Rhodes and Marmarice. 108 The obvious progression to the Straits 
forced Istanbul to place the Ottoman fleet at the promontory of Kil id Bahr. 
Porte closed the straits on 20 April 1912 and mined the approaches to the 
channels at Canakkale resulting in trapping over 170 merchant vessels in the Sea 
Marmara. During the war, the Ottomans did not stop Italian flagged vessels from 
transiting the strait and continued business as usual. It was only the fear of a possible 
forcing of the straits by Italy's navy that the Porte engaged in such defensive tactics. 
Istanbul relied on sea-borne commerce and long-term closure of the straits could ruin the 
fragile Ottoman economy but English ships bore a large percentage of Russian cargo 
through the straits, closure got both London and St. Petersburg's attention. Ship owners 
were losing $489,000 each day the strait was closed and both Russian and English 
shippers who had profited from the war now demanded action. rn9 
The Porte reopened the straits on 1 May 1912 and diplomatic exchanges between 
the Powers assured that if any attack upon the straits or possible attack should arise, the 
Porte had the right to the channel. such should occur, Rome, and not Istanbul, 
\Vould be at fault.The fact that Britain could constrain Italy ,vhen English commerce 
suffered did not unnoticed. Mahmud Shevket Pasha, Ottoman minister war, stated 
108Viscount Hythe, The Naval Annual 1913 (Portsmouth: l Griffin & Co., 1913; 
reprint, New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1970), 1 
109F.O. 18473/8565/12/44, No. 260, Grey to Lowther, London, 30 April 1912. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 390. 
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to Major Tyrrell, military attache at the British Embassy in Istanbul, " .. .if England chose 
to forbid Italy to do this or that in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, she would have to 
obey, and there would be no question of war with her [Italy]." 110 Shevket Pasha was 
making a statement proved by the fact that Italy spent twenty years arranging treaties, 
protocols, and agreements that Tripolitania was Rome's to have. Had Britain or 
France,the dominant powers in European a!Tairs, objected to Italy's seizing Tripolitania, 
the war might not have taken place. Shevket went on to state, "The truth of the matter is 
that you (Britain) and France are trying to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance. 
Germany and Austria are trying to keep her there." 111 The position of Italy, desired by 
both hostile camps, gave Rome the carte blanche needed to seize Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica. 
The war in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica \Vas going badly for the Ottomans. Two 
years of drought, along with disease and the high casualty rate experienced when 
untrained irregulars charged trained soldiers, had decimated the Bedouins. Whatever side 
held out longer would be the victor, and in Spring 1912 neither party looked to be 
prepared to compromise. Rome expanded the war again when Italian naval forces under 
Vice-Admiral Amero and ground units under the command of General Ameglio occupied 
Rhodes on 4 May 1912. Ottoman troops refused to surrender and waged a guerrilla 
campaign until overwhelmed on 17 May. The other Dodecanese islands fell by 16 May 
110Letter to Sir Lowther from Major Tyrrell, 29 April 1912. In Gooch, Vol. IX, 
Part I, 392. 
111Jbid. 
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1912 and in retaliation, on 20 May 1912 the Porte expelled 70,000 Italian nationals from 
Ottoman territory .112 The Dodecanese island chain consisted of fifty islands. Greek for 
"twelve islands," the largest being Rhodes. Many geographers apply the term "southern 
Sporades" to the Dodecanese to denote the political separation in place in 1912 .. The 
islands had been Ottoman Territory since 1522, having fallen to Suleiman the 
Magnificent. By the end of May, Italy had occupied Scarpanto, Kasos, Episcopi, 
Nisyros, Kalymnos, Leros, Patmos, Kos, Symi, and Khalki. This occupation was only 
"temporary" due to Article Seven of the Triple Alliance Treaty giving Austria sway in the 
Aegean Sea basin. Italy claimed the islands were in the Sea of Crete and thus open to 
seizure. Austria reluntently agreed to a temporary occupation until hostilities ceased. 113 
In order to consolidate defensive positions, the Ottomans began to withdraw 
troops from Sarnos in early July. An Italian destroyer interfered and was taken under fire, 
resulting in two Italian deaths. In retaliation Italian warships shelled the village of Pl aka, 
destroying shipping and port facilities. 114 
The final naval action of the war happened on the evening of 18 July 1912. The 
Italian naval Capt. Enrico Millo set out with a torpedo squadron of twenty boats up the 
Dardanelles Strait as far as Kephez Point. His objective was to attack the Ottoman fleet's 
German-built battleship Torgud Reis and Barbaros Hayreddin. Any attempt to force the 





damage. He got within sight of the Ottoman fleet at Kil id Bahr before his flotilla became 
entangled in the steel cable boon placed across the channel. Millio did not launch his 
torpedoes because of the range and Ottomans shore batteries forced him retreat to the 
open sea. 115 
The occupation of the Dodecanese brought Italy no nearer to ending the war 
because Rome was prevented from striking the Ottomans at a vital spot, the Straits. f n 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Italian troops overcame enemy opposition and extended their 
occupation zone. On the caravan routes, the Italians seized oasis stops and halted the 
contraband trade. The French attempted to persuade the Ottomans to come to terms, but 
all attempts failed due to the Italian annexation decree. 
Actual peace negotiations began on 12 July 1912 in Ouchy, Switzerland. 
Germany acted as mediator to the distress of Britain. London was concerned that Italy 
might bargain to get the Dodecanese as well as Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The Egyptian 
prince, Said Halim, started the negotiations, but by 12 August a change of government in 
Istanbul brought Naby Bey and Fehrreddin Bey. 116 The talks dragged on until 8 October 
1912, when Montenegro declared war on the Ottomans. Rome was so determined to 
exploit the Balkan crisis that the Italian first squadron was ordered to be ready for action 
in the Aegean Sea. Istanbul was facing bleak choices: conclude a peace of some sort, or 
fight a Balkan war with Italy controlling the sea. 
115Hurd, 38; Guleryi.iz, 16; and Hythe, 196-197. 
116McC!ure, 177. 
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The Ottomans hedged and played for time. The commander of Ottoman forces in 
Tripolitania, Aziz Bey, informed the Porte that if peace were concluded unfavorably to 
the Arabs, the Senusi were prepared to carry on the war on their own. Arab committees 
in the Empire had threatened that if Tripolitania were ceded, it could lead to the abolition 
of the Caliphate. Faced by ethnic insurrection in Macedonia and Albania, and a threat of 
outright warfare from Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, the Porte concluded peace by 
decree-law without approval of parliament. The peace preliminaries were signed at 
Ouchy on 15 October 1912 .117 The formal signing of the peace agreement, the Treaty of 
Lausanne, occurred on 18 October 1912. Kiamil Pasha, Grand Vizier under deposed 
Abdul Hamid and now back in power under Mehmet V, artfully crafted the final copy of 
the treaty, implying both Italian and Ottoman control of Tripolitania. 
The document appears to have been drafted with the intent of ambiguity and 
intrigue. The Italians desired the Ottomans to withdraw their forces from north Africa 
believing that the Arab population would at once submit. In return for this the Italians 
\:Vere prepared to make what appeared to be a purely nominal concession by permitting 
the Arabs to continue to recognize the Sultan as their Caliph and to have relations as such 
through the Sultan's representative at Tripoli. The Ottomans were faced with loss of 
prestige for the Sultan in losing a part of the Empire the Porte could not defend. The 
Italian politicians had promised their people a quick victory without much expenditure in 
lives and treasure and were prepared to sign any agreement that could be presented as 
111Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 430. 
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such, without giving much consideration to the implications of what was agreed upon. 
The terms of the treaty called for a representative of the Sultan as a liaison 
betv,1een the Caliph and the Arab Muslims. The Sultan's representative, the Grand Qadi 
of Tripoli, would have religious and, due to the nature of Islam, political authority. The 
Italians seemed to have been under the impression that the Sultan's secular power could 
be excluded in return for admitting the Caliph's spiritual authority.The rest of the treaty 
required the evacuation of Ottoman troops from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and such 
removal of forces would precede that of Italian troops from the Aegean islands; amnesties 
on both sides; commercial relations; Italian consent to the abolition of the regime of 
capitulations; and payment by Italy to the Ottoman Public Debt an amount equivalent to 
the revenues derived from the lost provinces for a length of time to be determined later. 118 
The Ottoman navy did not fare well in the war. The overwhelming superiority of 
Italian naval assets, planned and utilized to exploit the weakness of the Ottoman navy, 
performed admirably. But the Porte did not have the resources available to place a 
formidable opposition in the battle space. Italian naval yards were English-owned, 
operated, and financed. Ottoman naval yards were the sole property of the financially 
strapped Sultan. The Italians had full utilization of their economy, while the Ottomans 
had to contend with the parasitic nature of the capitulations. The Italians were a 
nationality at peace with itself, while the Ottomans had to deal with rival nationalities, 
ethnic hatred, governmental chaos, and international meddling in the internal affairs of 
118A copy of the treaty can be found in Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 438-442. 
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the empire. 
Ottoman naval losses consisted of gunboats and stationary guard ships, assets 
economical to keep and acceptable to lose. Unlike the battleships, gunboats were 
expendable. Table 5 shows the Ottoman naval assets lost due to the war action. Italian 
actions suggest a desire for the Mahan theory of one decisive sea battle . The Ottoman 
navy refused to follow the Italians script of accepting a quick defeat and, Rome's 
politicians utilized the Italian navy to terrorize Islamic civilians in Ottoman coastal urban 
areas. Hence the shelling of Beirut, Tobruk, Tripoli, Benghazi, and Kunfada. The Greek 
population Ottoman cities of Selanik, Izmir, YenkalC and Rhodes were not shelled 
indicating Christian Italians were not prepared to shell Christian Greeks for non-religious 
reasons. 
International political maneuvering involving Ottoman naval personnel may have 
affected the combat readiness of the fleet. The naval advisor to the Ottoman minister of 
Marine, English RADM H.P. Williams, could not fully exercise leadership due to clauses 
dismissing his service in times of war. Williams did continue naval acquisitions during 
the war, contracting with Vickers in order to follow up on battleship orders to English 
yards. Williams' term of office under the Ottoman government expired on 28 April 1912, 
when he sailed for England, accompanied by his staff. Williams' successor, English 
RADM A.H. Limpus, would arrive in the spring of 1912. 119 Istanbul desired for the 
return of Gamble, however, Gamble refused for health reasons. The Porte regretted 
119Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 282. 
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3 October I 911 
3 October 1 911 
3 October 1911 
3 October 1911 
24 May 1912 
29April 1912 
Source: Ahmet Gi.ileryliz and Bernd Langensiepen, eds., trans. by James Cooper, The 
Olloman S1eam Navy 1828-1923 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 14-17. 
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Gamble's refusal to return and accepted another British naval advisor, relieving English 
fears that Germany would be requested to provide Ottoman fleet leadership. 120 
A naval casualty of the \var was the Ottoman cruiser Drama. Ordered in April 
I 904 it was seized by the Italians in September 1912 and renamed R.!S. Libia. 121 A 
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carbon copy of the Armstrong-built Hamidiye, Drama was built by Ansald-Armstrong of 
Sestri-Ponenti and would see service until 1937. 
Diplomatic problems arose when a number of Ottoman officers being trained in 
Britain completed training and were scheduled to return home. British Foreign Secretary 
Sir Edward Grey asked for assurances that the returning officers would not be employed 
during the duration of the war with Italy. The Porte agreed as long as no publicity be 
given to it. 122 
The resistance shown in the North African theater can be attributed to Ottoman 
officers . The Ottoman garrison on hand in September 1911 was not adequate to defend 
the region, however, Ottoman officers Enver Bey, Aziz Bey, and Neshat Bey provided 
leadership and resourcefulness which resulted in Italy expending unanticipated time and 
treasure. 123 The primary losers in the war were the Bedouins of Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica. Giovoni Mondaini, quoting Italian occupation figures in his book, Rivista 
12°F.O. 3938, Lowther to Grey, Istanbul, 27 January 1912, cited in Halpern, The 
Mediterranean Naval Siruarion, 321. 
121 Gi.ileryilz, 151. 
122F.O. 371, Lowther to Grey, Istanbul, 16 June 1912, cited in Halpern, The 
Medi!erranean Naval Silualion, 322. 
123 McClure, 191-192, 225. 
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Coloniale, claims that the population of Cyrenaica was 300,000 in 1911 but by 1915 the 
population was estimated at 120,000. Bedouins are mostly transient wanderers and such 
figures are extremely questionable. Non-belligerents do leave areas of combat with total 
disregard for borders and political authority. Additionally, with a famine lasting since 
1909 and Italian control of urban and oasis trading centers, Egypt and Tunis were logical 
points of gravitation. Had mortality been as severe as Mondaini states, it is questionable 
the war in Libya could have dragged on until 1932. 
The caution Rome showed with the Italian fleet suggests a desire to avoid massive 
losses of material and pride. The Italians could have rushed the Dardanelles early and 
chanced ending the war quickly. But this would have entail a risk of losing the pride of 
the Italian fleet to either the guns of the Dardanelles forts or the Ottoman battleships. 
Also, had Rome forsaken the risk and forced the straits, shelling Istanbul's Greek 
population would have brought political repercussions. The issue of the Sultan and a 
direct assault upon his person would have caught the attention of France and England, 
both with large Islamic colonies. 
The Ottoman navy did as well as could be expected. The Porte did not budget for 
an offensive fleet, prudently utilizing the Dardanelles and the Bosporus as defensive 
works. However, the expenditure or vast sums for battleships did not address the security 
needs of the empire. The battleships were too expensive an asset to utilize and 
ultimately had to be defended from attack. While the war dragged on during the winter 
of 1912, the Porte indicated that a new naval program was needed. Istanbul maintained 
that in order to protect a coastline of 11,000 miles, nothing less would suffice, and such a 
battle fleet would enable the Porte to cooperate with possible allies in the eastern 
Mediterranean to check foreign powers anxious to further political or economic 
concessions. The program consisted of six dreadnoughts, four scout cruisers, twenty 
destroyers, six submarines, two minelayers, a repair ship, a school ship, and a large 
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drydock capable of handling dreadnoughts. In justification of the expansion, the Ottoman 
naval staff argued that "the disaster in Tripoli has been the result of the weakness of the 
fleet, and to ensure against similar accidents occurring in our distant possessions such as 
those in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, which are closely bound up with our national 
existence, a sufficient naval force must be provided to enable us to affect the balance of 
European Power." 124 
The Porte hoped to prevent dismemberment of the Empire by strengthening the 
fleet. Creation of a naval force capable of defending the peripheries was needed; but 
circumstances would not allow for such a program. Admiral Limpus did attempt to 
moderate the Ottoman program by suggesting smaller assets, ships better suited for 
protection of the Empire's peripheries. However, English shipyards were clambering for 
the business prospects of the program, and any orders for dreadnoughts London wanted 
regardless of the British naval mission's better judgment. 
124 F.O. 371/1486/l 1454, Lowther to Grey, Istanbul, 11 March 1912, cited in 
Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Si!Uation, 318, 319. 
CHAPTER III 
THE BALKAN WARS 
OCTOBER 1912 TO OCTOBER 1913 
It was inevitable that the Balkan states should regard the ltalo-Ottoman conflict as 
an opportunity to fulfill their own territorial aspirations. The Balkan states viewed 
Ottoman Macedonia as the only avenue of expansion. To further each nation's goals, 
armed groups engaged in wanton slaughter of Muslims in order to incite the Porte into 
suppressing Christian nationalists. Any such suppression would invite Great Power 
interference and possible success, as witnessed in Greece in 1825. 
The conflict had three phases: the First Balkan War [8 October 1912 to 17 
December 1912], the Second Balkan War [3 February 1913 to 30 May 1913], and the 
Third Balkan War [29 June 1913 to 29 October 1913]. In the First and Second Balkan 
Wars, the Ottomans stood alone. In the Third Balkan Way, the previous allies turned on 
Bulgaria, with the Ottomans siding with the victors. 
The cause of the First Balkan War have been directed at the C.U.P. regime and the 
zeal in ,,vhich Ottomanization progressed. Nationalities in distant locales of the empire 
resented the coercion towards a national identity other than the age-old millet system. 
Accepting a common nationality could have meant the possibility of conscription into the 
armed forces, acquiring another language, accepting a religion other than their own, or 
the possibility of the acceptance of a different Christian orthodoxy. Additionally, being 
Muslim had privileges not forfeited lightly. 
Another avenue directs the blame on ethnic fighting in Macedonia. Outright 
warfare between forces loyal to Bulgaria and Greece fought the Albanian Beys and 
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Muslim civilians. However, the competing dominant Christian nationalities were hostile 
to each other. Also, each Christian nationality had set up schools and religious structures 
in the hope of legitimizing territorial claims. The non-Islamic population in 1905 in 
Macedonia shows 647,962 patriarchists and 557,734 exarchists. However, many 
exarchists were practicing exarchism under duress and not by conviction. 125 The attempt 
to influence the fringes of Hellenism via forced acceptance of exarchate bishoprics caused 
friction and resentment that would fuel the two succeeding wars, when Bulgarian forces 
attempted to occupy non-Bulgarian regions solely on the basis of established exarchate 
bishoprics. 
Ethnic Bulgarians prior to J 870 belonged to the Greek Patriarch, and nationalist 
sentiments created appeals to Istanbul for action. Sultan Abdul Aziz issued a firman 
establishing the Bulgarian exarchate, conferring immediate jurisdiction over fifteen 
dioceses and providing for a vote in a dozen more. The diocese in question had to vote 
two-thirds for admission into the Bulgarian church, and in the regions of Macedonia no 
group could claim outright loyalty or a numerical supremacy, thus creating regions \Vhere 
125Douglas Dakin, The Un[fication of Greece, 1770-1923 (Nev,1 York: St. Martin 
Press, 1972), 160-162. 
the Greek church existed but the majority might be Bulgarian, or vice versa. 126 But the 
most plausible cause for the First Balkan War can be attributed to the Triple Alliance 
Treaty. 
During the Italo-Ottoman War, Italy occupied Rhodes and other islands of the 
Dodecanese chain. The occupation of islands in the Aegean Sea violated the Triple 
Alliance Treaty between Austria, Germany, and Italy. The treaty stipulated that Italy 
could seek compensation if the status quo were changed in the Balkan Peninsula, the 
Adriatic, or the Mediterranean regions by Austria. Austria could submit a claim for 
compensation to Italy if the latter occupied any islands or places on the coast of Asia 
Minor or the Aegean Sea and both Italy and Austria had an agreement that neither 
country should establish control over Albania. 127 
The consequences of the Triple Alliance Treaty were clear. If Austria pressed 
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compensation for Italy's occupation of the Dodecanese, such territorial claims in Ottoman 
Europe could only be satisfied via the non-Albanian Ottoman Sanjak of Na vi-Bazar, a 
region between Serbia and the region of Albania, an area between the present modern 
Albania, the Yugoslav region of Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
and the Greek region of Ipiro and Thessaly west of the Vardar River. Austrian control of 
non-Albanian Ottoman territory would suppress Serbian ambitions for an Adriatic port 
126Jacob Gould Schurman, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1914), 24-25. 
127Isabella M. Massey, ed. 711e Origins of the War of} 9 J 4, Vol. I (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1952), 20 l. 
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and geographical union with Montenegro. The Bulgarian aspiration for Eastern Roumelia 
and the Aegean Sea would be in jeopardy due to the overwhelming superiority of Austria 
and the Triple Alliance partners of Italy and Germany militarily. Both nations--Italy and 
Germany--would be obligated to assist in securing territorial claims submitted by Austria. 
Greek longing for the unification of Greeks residing in Thrace, Macedonia, and Istanbul 
could remain a romantic dream if Austria had the opportunity to submit such demands. 
The need to act quickly to prevent Austria from following up on Italy's incursion 
became apparent once the Italian/Ottoman War switched from the region of Tripoli to 
Beirut and the Dardanelles. Italian occupation of Rhodes and the Dodecanese Islands 
between 4 May and 16 May I 912 brought the specter of Italy's acquiring a sizable Greek 
population. In the region of Macedonia, rival guerrilla bands financed by either Greece 
or Bulgaria staged assaults upon each other and their supporters. Bulgarian guerrillas in 
the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) fought not only Ottoman 
authorities but the Greek External Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (EMRO) and 
Serbian partisans.The Italo-Ottoman War both encouraged and alarmed the Balkan 
powers. Any action that \veakened the Ottoman Empire was welcomed, but there was the 
tear that Italy might covet territorial acquisitions. Greece in particular feared that Italy 
might acquire not only the Dodecanese, but also Chios, Mitilini, Sarnos, and other 
islands. Protecting Christians in Macedonia was important to Greece but not paramount. 
Questions about Crete dominated Greek Prime Minister Eleftherid Venizelos. A Cretan 
by birth, Venizelos seems to have been more concerned with ridding Crete of Ottoman 
oversight than seizing Macedonia. Bulgaria's King Ferdinand (1908-1918) did not want 
72 
an agreement that lead to war just to free Crete for Greece. Bulgaria placed negotiations 
with Greece on hold in order to consummate a secret agreement with Serbia's King Peter 
(1908-1921) and Serbia's client state Montenegro on 13 March 1912 .128 " ... to each other's 
assistance with all their forces in the event of any Great Power attempting to annex or 
ever temporarily to invade any part of the Balkan territories which are today under 
Turkish rule, if one of the parties considered this as contrary to its vital interest and as a 
casus belli. 129 
Upon securing Serbia's support, Bulgaria solicited Greece once more. Venizelos 
feared that if Bulgaria and Serbia were successful in a war with a weakened Ottoman 
Empire, the real loser would be Greece territorial expansion. The agreement with 
Bulgaria was signed on 30 May 1912 and dated 29 May 1912. 130 The forces of the 
Balkan allies complemented each other exceptionally well. The forces also show the area 
of concern for each nation. The Bulgarians possessed an army of 400,000, and Serbian 
and Montenegran forces amounted to 250,000. 131 The emphasis Bulgaria, Serbia and 
Montenegro placed upon land forces indicates a goal of seizing adjacent territory. Greece 
128A copy of the treaty can be found in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., 
British Documents on !he Origins ofrhe War: 1898-1914, Vol. IX, Part II (London: 
H.M. Stationary Office, 1934), 781-784. 
129Darkin, 192. 
130Ibid., 194; Dickinson, 311-313; and Christ Anastasoff, 771e Tragic Peninsula 
(St. Louis: Blackwell Wielandy Co., 1938), 177-194. 
131 Cassavetti, 26. 
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had a standing army of 28,000 men and capabilities to expand to 200,000. 132 • The Balkan 
allies individually could not compete with the 400,000 Ottoman forces in the Balkans. 
The Balkan allies stood a good chance of winning if the Ottomans were denied follow on 
forces and supplies. Denying Ottoman follow on forces from Anatolia proper required a 
mobile fleet of small combatants and Athens had such a force in place with additions 
found in Table 6. 
Greek naval forces were adequate not only to seize islands, but to block follow on 
forces. I.M. GuesohofC Bulgarian prime minster, when questioning M. Panas, Greek 
War Minister, over forces available for theater action, was given the reply, "We can place 
an army of 200,000 men in the field and then our fleet will stop about 400,000 men being 
landed by Turkey upon the southern coast of Thrace and Macedonia, between Salonika 
and Gallipoli 1" 133 
The Greek navy had grown in Jess than twelve years from coastal defense to a 
modern force capable of extended bluewater operations in less than twelve years. The 
build up of forces can be attributed to concerns over Crete and the potential action the 
Ottomans might embark upon to reestablish complete control over the island. Future 
interdiction of Ottoman forces from Anatolia, along with seizing Greek populated islands 
in the Aegean still under the control of the Sultan, necessitated mobile forces capable of 
operating in the littoral regions in and around the Sea of Crete. 
132Jbid., 60-61. 
133Cassavetti, 3 l . 

































































Source: D.J. Cassavetti, Hellos and rhe Balkan Wars (London: T. Tisher Unwin, 1914), 
26-31. Greek naval personnel activated during the wars would number 11,232. 
In October 1909, the Greek navy experienced a brief mutiny. Reforms and 
modernization were needed and the result was the establishment of the British Naval 
Mission in J 91 J. British Rear Admiral Lionel G. Tufnell was sent to assist and 
reoroanize the Greek fleet. Additionally, ten Greek sublieutenants were sent to Britain 
0 
for the purpose of attending gunnery, torpedo, and navigation courses The British First 
Sea lord, Prince Louis of Batten berg, openly supported Greek sea power and advocated 
the removal of British Naval Mission and calling the Ottoman navy hopeless. 134 
Greek leaders were not satisfied with the most capable and modern force in the 
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eastern Mediterranean Sea. Additional purchases of warships indicate Greek intentions to 
expand into "Greater Hellena," or Anatolia proper. The precursor of such actions is 
echoed by D.J. Cassavetti in 1914. Cassavetti states the goal of Greek unification will 
not be complete until "Asia Minor falls under the control of Athens." 135 Greek warship 
orders still under construction at the outbreak of the Balkan Wars can be found in Table 
7. The Greek naval additions complemented each other and provided for a maintainable 
balanced and workable force capable of sea control and power projecting . The Greek 
cruiser Averojf was capable of inflicting damage which could lead to the sinking of 
Ottoman capital ship but the Greeks possessed only one of this class. The close-aboard 
duel necessary to inflict such damage would be an unacceptable risk unless less 
134Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 324; and see Arhtur Jacob 
Marder, From The Dreadnought To Scapa Flow The Royal Navy In The Fisher Era 1904-
1919 ,Vol.I (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) 303. 
135fbid., 356-358. 
TABLE 7 
GREEK WARSHIP ORDERS 
AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE BALKAN WARS 
Laid Nation 
Cruisers Dimensions Armaments Down 
Antinauarkos Condouriotis" 446x50 



















"Seized while under construction in England in 1914. Renamed HMS Birkenherd. Note 
in Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1923), 556. 
bLaid down as Fei Hung for China. Purchased by Greece in 1914 while still at the New 
York shipbuilders. Note in Francis E. McMurtrie, ed. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1935 (New 
York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.), 247. 
ccancelled upon outbreak of war by the French government. 
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dLaid down in Vulcan Yard at Stettin, Germany. Guns ordered from Bethlehem Steel 
Works, USA. Mr. Schwab of Bethlehem offered the sale of 14" guns ordered for Salamis 
to England. England purchased the Salamis order and placed the guns on monitors in 
July 1915. See Memorandum by Mr. Churchill, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
on the State of the Navy, May 1915, found in Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 
Vol. II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), 554. 
expensive assets could be brought to bear in conjunction with the cruiser. Greek ship 
purchases provided such inexpensive assets. 
All the ships acquired by the Greek navy from 1900 to 1912 possessed torpedo 
tubes. British-made Whitehead torpedoes provided the punch capable of sinking capital 
ships by inflicting damage below the armored belts. Torpedoes allowed less expensive 
assets to confront capital ships and thus not risk irreplaceable resources. The 
proliferation of torpedo-carrying ships neutralized the armor capital ships possessed. 
Torpedoe evolution along with mine warfare maturation, doomed existing capital ships. 
The cost of protection from torpedoes and mines financially prohibited retrofitting 
existing capital ships. . 
77 
By May 1912, the Balkan allies agreed to support each other in Macedonia and 
left the apportionment to a later date. Greece seems to have been content with the hope 
that areas inhabited with Greek nationals would become Greek. Venizelos anticipated 
only the full release of Crete along with the acquisition of several islands.In spite of 
apprehension on the part of Venizelos, the Balkan allies agreed to proceed. The timing of 
the vvar was influenced by four issues: Italy's success in North Africa, constitutional 
struggles in Istanbul, internal revolts in Albania, and the fear the Austria would seek 
compensation. Adding urgency to the situation, Austria had delivered a note on 13 
August 1912 which requested the Ottomans decentralize their empire and allow a large, 
independent Albania. The fear of a large Albania encompassing territory coveted by 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece, and protected by Austria, prompted the Balkan allies 
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to accelerate war preparations. 136 
The Ottomans found themselves in a no-win situation. The German ambassador 
to Istanbul, Baron von Wangenheim, commented as follows: "If now the Powers advise 
the Turks to carry on with decentralization, it will be taken by the Albanians as an 
invitation to persist in their resislance." 137 Yet instilling civil authority brought 
condemnation from the same Powers since reinstating central governmental control 
meant subduing Albanian, Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian Christians as well as revolting 
Muslims.The Great Powers--England, Russia, Germany, and Austria--presented a note 
requesting the Sublime Porte discuss reforms provided for in Article 23 of the Treaty of 
Berlin and the law of 1880, which conformed to the expressed intention of implementing 
such reforms. 138 The Ottoman government made an attempt to accommodate the request 
and stated that the matter would be presented to Parliament. 
The Great Powers of Europe did I ittle to promote peace in the regions around the 
Balkans. Italy was at war with the Ottomans and was shelling towns in Asia Minor and 
Arabia. France had seized Algeria and Tunisia and forced a protectorate in Lebanon. 
England had seized Egypt and attempted to force a protectorate over Kuwait. Austria had 
annexed Bosnia and Russia actively persecuted Muslims in the former Black Sea 
Ottoman territories. Russia also staffed the army of Montenegro. 139 England had 
1
,
6Darkin, 194-195; Massey, 374-376. 
rnougdale, Vol. IV, 111. 
138Darkin, 134-135. 
139Massey, 3 77. 
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provided a naval mission to Greece and sold the very fleet necessary for a successful 
outcome against the Ottomans. The only Great Power not to prey upon Muslim territory 
was Germany and because of treaty obligations with Austria and Italy, Berlin could not 
intervene on behalf oflstanbul. 
fn order 10 ensure sea control, in September 1912 Venizelos requested from 
England and received an expert destroyer officer, Commander Cardale of the British 
Royal Navy. Carda le would be responsible for the training and planning of destroyer 
tactics and amphibious operations. In addition to Cardale, Engineer-Commander Watson 
of the British Royal Navy was sent to Athens to keep the Greek-owned, English-built 
fleet in working order. When hostilities had begun, England designated Admiral Kerr, 
of the British Royal Navy, as Commander of British Naval Mission - Greece, replacing 
Admiral Tuffnell. 140 Tuffncll was on the Navy's retired list; however, Kerr reported 
straight from the active fleet. 
The Greek navy mobilized on I October 1912. 141 In response, the Ottoman 
government opted to demilitarize the Aegean island of Sisan and release fifty-five Greek 
merchant vessels anchored in the Sea of Marmara as a gesture of good will in the hope 
Greece would remain neutral. Ottoman military success depended upon transporting 
troops from Anatolia to Thrace, and the only Balkan country with a fleet capable of 
stopping such an operation was Greece. To further avoid a possible engagement, the 
14°Cassavetti, 33-35. 
141 Gi.ileryi.iz, 19. 
Ottoman fleet was withdrawn to the Sea of Marmara. The Ottoman naval authorities, 
seeing that the release of interned Greek merchants ships had no positive influence on 
Greece, seized Greek registered ships still in the Sea of Marmara. Table 8 lists ships 
seized for the duration of the conflict on 16 October 1912. 
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In September, the timing of the war became critical. Public opinion in the Balkan 
nations clamored for war, regardless of the ethical or moral justification and more 
importantly peace talks with Italy began to mature, opening the fear of a quick settlement. 
Ottoman mobilization of forces on 29 September 1912 demanded quick action on the part 
of the Balkan allies because The Porte could mobilize forces sufficient to defeat the 
Balkan allies if given time. On 30 September 1912, the Balkan allies mobilized. 142 
On 12 October 1912, Bulgaria, in the name of the three Balkan allies, sent a note 
to the Sublime Porte demanding: 143 
Proportional representation of ethnic groups in the Ottoman Parliament. 
• Appointment of Christians to all public offices in Christian districts. 
• Equality of Christian schools with Ottoman schools. 
No resettlement of Muslim refugees in Christian areas. 
Regional enlistment for military service; i.e., Christians in Christian 
compa111es. 
142Dickinson, 310 
143 Anastasoff, 1 89-191 . 
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Source: Ahmet GuleryUz and Bernd Langensiepen, eds., trans. by James Cooper, The 
0/loman Steam Navy 1828-1923 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 195. 
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• Reorganization of gendarmerie under Swiss and Belgian organizers. 
• A supreme council to be instituted with an equal number of Christians and 
Muslims to see that reforms were applied. 
The Balkan Allies' demands had no merit because the issues in question had been 
achieved by the reconstitution of constitutional government in 1909. The Ottoman 
Parliament was representative of population; loyal Christians were appointed to 
governmental positions; schools were equal; Muslim refugees had not been resettled in 
Ottoman Europe since 1878; Christians could and did serve in the Ottoman army; 
gendarmeries had been reorganized with the assistance of France; and the Ottoman 
Parliament had overseen the progress of reforms. 
The Ottoman government sent no ans\ver to this note. The C.U.P. government 
stressed reforms and objected to foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Empire. 
With the war with Italy still unresolved, the Ottoman government hoped to settle the 
status of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica by placing a Muslim prince in control. 
The Ottoman Grand Vizer, Kiamil Pasha, realized that command of the sea was 
imperative in order to win and initiated discussions with Greece over Crete. Kiamil was a 
holdover from the deposed Abdul Hamid's court and was a master of intrigue. Kiamil 
offered to release Crete from the Sultan's suzerainty and grant substantial privileges to the 
Greeks throughout the Empire if Greece disavowed Bulgaria and Serbia. This offer 
Greece refused. 144 Before the Ottomans could conclude a peace treaty with Italy, 
144 Cassavetti, 11-12. 
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Montenegro's King Nicholas (1910-1918) and the kingdom's Russian-staffed army 
declared war on 8 October 1912. 145 The Porte, fearing being in the unenviable position of 
waging two wars at once, concluded a hasty agreement with Italy on 18 October 1912 at 
Lausanne, Switzerland. 1~6 
The status of the Ottoman naval assets compared to the Balkan allies can be found 
in Table 9. The disposition of Ottoman naval forces is found in Appendix 4. 
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Source: Fred T. Jane, ed. All rhe World's Fighting Ships, 1907/08 (London: Sampson 
Low Marston, 1909; reprint, New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1969), 403, 352-
355, 356, 358. 
On paper, the forces appear even but the Greek navy, which comprised the bulk of 
the Allies' naval assets, was modern. The Greek forces were for the most part English-
built and the enlisted men and officers were English-trained. The Greek commanders 




needs. Also, Greek ships possessed radios that allowed over-the-horizon communication 
and intelligence. Ottoman naval units for the most part did not possess radios, forcing 
Ottoman units to employ visual identification and communication. The requirement of 
relying on visual identification and communication negated the larger caliber naval gun 
and the safety distance such weapons provided. 
The German-built battleships Torgud Reis, Barbaros 1-Jayreddin and the 
Schechau-built destroyers Demirhisar and 1-Jamidabod were ready for action. Morale 
remained high in the fleet throughout the war, even with the scarcity of fuel and 
ammunition. The battleships looked impressive; however, the ships were too 
complicated and logistically were not up to European standards. Rangefinders and 
ammunition hoists were absent, telephones did not work, pump piping was corroded, 
watertight doors could not be closed, and the boilers needed extensive work. 
Because of the lack of naval bulk transport, the Ottoman navy sequestered thirty-
three freighters and thirty-eight tugs and steamboats in Istanbul's harbor. The Ottomans 
would also charter ships from the United States, Romania, and Austria in order to ferry 
supplies and troops. The use of such foreign-flagged vessels provided security of the 
registered ship's flag. Greek warships would fire only on one foreign-flagged ship during 
the conflict. Any inconvenience a foreign-flagged vessel may have caused to the war 
effort would be insignificant compared to the uproar of an international incident 
Foreign naval power immediately began to flex once the war began in earnest. 
Britain dispatched warships to Salonika to protect English ships, lives, and property. 
Germany sent the SMS Loreley to Salonika in order to return the ex-sultan Abdul Hamid 
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to Istanbul. 147 Foreign warships vacated Ottoman ports only if the fighting spread to the 
ship vicinity. The presence of foreign warships prevented large-caliber naval gunfire 
bombardment of Greek ports and facilities. 
The only secure route for military supplies for the Ottomans was through 
Romania. The use of Romanian and Austrian flagged vessels insured delivery. However, 
supremacy in the Black Sea was never a question. Bulgaria possessed few naval assets 
that could challenge the Ottoman fleet. The Balkan allies utilized western European 
armament manufacturers, predominantly English and French, and had full use of Greek 
ports. Bulgaria utilized indigenous production of small arm ammunition with plants in 
Sofia. Importation of arms from Russia was minimal. Russia did not overtly want a 
conflict in the Balkans in 1912. The military upheavals originating from its defeat in the 
Russo-Japanese War, along with internal unrest, ruled out an adventurest foreign policy. 
Additionally, Russia did not desire any change of status for Istanbul unless the 
Dardanelles fell under Russian control. 
The naval theaters of the Balkan War were the Ionian, Aegean, Black, Marmara, 
and Red seas. 
The first battle for the Ionian coast took place in the Arta Gulf. The Ottoman 
navy's only assets were gunboats at Preveza, used in peacetime to combat smuggling .. 
On the opening day of the Balkan War, Greek torpedo boats under Captain Damianos of 
the Greek Royal Navy entered the Arta Gulf and caused the Ottoman gunboat Antaya and 
147F.O. 46600/33672/12/44, No. 468, Goschen to Grey, Berlin, l November 1912. 
Gooch and Harold Temperley, Vol. IX, Part II, 73-74. 
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motorboats No. 9 and No. l Oto be scuttled. Ottoman naval forces at lskodia comprised 
of the steamer Gura, an old ex-Bosporus ferry; the lake steamers lskodia and Kizonuyos; 
two motor boats, Filiyo and Kilsnya, purchased in 1912; and the steam pinnaces from the 
A/fesudiye and Asar-i Tevfik. There were also a large number of civilian sailing craft and 
barges. Iskocha was attacked by Montenegran forces on 15 October 1912 but Iskodia 
did not fall after the initial attack. Political rivalry between Montenegro and Serbia 
spared the Scutar region until January 1913. Under Essad Pasha's leadership, Scutar and 
Iskodia held out until 23 April 1913 .148 
The naval assets at Selanik were commanded by Ottoman Capt. Aziz Mahmut 
Bey. The base was protected by four 210 mm shore batteries and two 24-mine barrages 
which had been laid prior to the ,var with Italy. Aziz Mahmut also was the commanding 
officer of the Fethi-i Bu/end, a former steam corvette. At the outbreak of the 
Italo-Ottornan War, the crew and guns of the Feth-i Bu/end were removed from the ship 
to augment the shore batteries. This gave Aziz Mahmut an additional four 150mm, four 
75mm, and four 57mm guns. Also at Aziz Mahmut's disposal were the tugs Surat, 
Teshilat, Katerin, and Selanik. The Se!anik was fitted out as a rninelayer, and all the tugs 
had a single 37mm gun. 
On 31 October 1912, the Greek torpedo boat No. 11 departed Leftehois for 
Selanik. It slipped past the searchlight batteries at Vardar and Karaburnu and the mine 
barrages. The Greek warship fired three torpedoes at the Feth-i Bulend. One ran wide 
148Gilleryilz, 20. 
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and hit the coaling pier, causing serious damage, but the other two hit the target between 
the foremast and the funnel. The Feth-i Bulend capsized and sank with the loss of seven 
crew, including the ship's Iman. 
The Greek forces surrounded Selanik, and the Ottoman garrison surrendered on 9 
November. Before the garrison surrendered, Aziz Mahmut disarmed the Teshilat, Surat, 
and Selanik and transferred the ships to French registry. The Greek attack on a "French" 
ship led to an immediate protest from the French naval commanders present. The tugs 
left port under a French flag, and through the Greeks tried to delay the ships at Limni, the 
tugs made it to the Dardanelles. The three tugs changed registry again, back to the 
Ottoman registry.After the surrender of Selanik, the Greeks seized the royal yacht Fuad, 
which had been utilized as a hospital ship under the Red Crescent. The only Ottoman 
merchant ship lost to the enemy was the Trabzon which was attacked while underway 
from Ayvalik to Midilli, on 9 November 1912. 149 
The Greek commanders utilized the Greek registered vessels to ferry troops across 
the Atra Gulf to seize the province of Yan ya. The use of the overwhelming waterborne 
transportation the Balkan Allies possessed enabled the rapid deployment of troops from 
Yan ya and Salonika to Thrace.After the fall of Salonika on 9 November, a fleet of 
twenty-seven Greek transports was able to move an entire Bulgarian division east to 
Dedeagatch under the protection of a Greek squadron. At the same time, the Greek 
Admiral Kountouriotis established a base at Mudros Bay on the captured island of 
149}/Jid. 
Lemnos in order to entrap the Ottoman fleet should it appear in force at the opening of 
the Straits. 150 
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The Black Sea operations witnessed the deployment of Ottoman warships in the 
roles of naval gunfire support and convoy duties. Naval gunfire support is imperative for 
troop transport in a combat theater and for landing on a hostile beach. The battleships 
Barbaros Hayreddin and Torgud Reis, along with the destroyers Muavenf-i Milliye and 
Tasoz, shelled Bulgarian positions at Galata Burnaon 19 October 1912. Further gunfire 
support roles for the battleships were limited due to the availability of targets and 
ammunition. The cruisers Hamidiye and Mecidiye, assisted by the destroyers Yadigar-i 
Mille! and Numune-i Hamiyet, conducted gunfire support up and down the Bulgarian 
coast. With few exceptions, such as lack of ammunition or the inability to identify targets 
independent of friendly troops, the Ottoman naval gunfire support suppressed Bulgarians 
troop movements. 
The readiness of ships capable of operations of some sort indicates that the 
morale of naval forces was excellent. The battleships and cruisers experienced boiler 
problems that restricted speed. However, the distance traversed and the Bulgarian naval 
opposition did not demand full speed.Readiness became paramount when the cruiser 
Hamidiye was torpedoed by the Bulgarian torpedo boat Stogi. The attack left the 
Hamidiye with a blast hole six feet square and a seam tear forty feet long. The crew 
reacted very well. Damage control parties began to stabilize the tear and seal the hole and 
15°K.L. Rankin, "The Battle of Hell es and Lem nos," Proceeding (l\1ay 1940, 693-
694). 
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pump crews diminished the flooding, and counterflooding righted the ship to an even 
keel. Speed during this casualty dropped to five k11ots. Considering the extent of the 
damage, five knots would have been maximum to prevent further structural damage. The 
reaction to the damage by the crew, along with the structural soundness of the ship, 
reflects well on the Ottoman navy. The ship was saved and was able to continue to fight 
even though severely darnaged. 151 
Romania provided material support to the Ottomans throughout the war from the 
port of Constanza. Due to the lack of Ottoman registered ships, Romanian and Russian 
flagged bottoms along with Greek war prizes transported supplies. Greek control of the 
Aegean Sea lanes prohibited the landing of additional troops and supplies to Ottoman 
provinces in the Balkans. Where men and material did get through, Ottoman forces held 
their own. Tab! e 10 shows the vessels chartered in September 1912 as troop transport in 
the Black Sea. The listed vessels, \,vhen not transporting troops, were utilized for other 
wartime needs such as colliers, bulk transport, civilian ferries, and dry cargo. 
The Sea of Marmara naval action defended Istanbul and allowed for the 
utilization of naval gun fire support. The Bulgarians broke through to Gelibolu on 30 
October 1912 but the Ottoman navy could not provide meaningful gunfire support until 6 
November . This \Vas because of the need for preventing the Greeks from forcing the 
Dardanelles, thus requiring a blocking force at Kaleb Sultaniyeh in addition to operations 
along the Bulgarian coast. Had the Greeks forced the Dardanelles into the Sea of 
111 Anastasoff, 192-193. 
TABLE IO 
BLACK SEA TROOP TRANSPORTS, 1912 
Name Built (if known) Tonnage 
On Temrnus 1891 2132 gt 
Seyyar 1893 3338 gt 
Guzel Girit 1891 1232 gt 
Necat 1870 1523 gt 
Selamet 1853 1692 gt 
Kiyos 540 gt 
Kesendere 1902 438 gt 
Aryos 510 gt 
Gulcemal 1874 5071 gt 
Marmara 1872 2472 gt 
Halep 1881 3684 gt 
Akdeniz 1890 5062 gt 
Mithat Pasa 1901 4455 gt 
Mahmut Sevket Pasa 1886 2690 gt 
Inebolu 1888 233 gt 
Source: Ahmet Guleryuz and Bernd Langensiepen, eds., trans. by James Cooper, The 
Ottoman Steam Navy 1828-1923 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 195. 
Marmara, Istanbul would have been lost, failure to check the Bulgarians coming along 
the Black Sea could have jeopardize supply shipments from Romania. 
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Table 1 I shows vessels chartered in September I 9 I 2 as troop transports in the Sea 
of Marmara. The listed vessels, when not transporting troops, were utilized for other 
\vartime needs such as coalers, bulk transport, civilian ferries, and dry cargo. 
The battleship Torgud Reis and the destroyer Basra began to provide gunfire 
support on 7 November. The cruisers Hamidzve and Mecidiye rushed from gunfire 
support along the Black Sea coast on 13 November. The gunfire support provided by the 
TABLE 11 
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Source: Ahmet GUleryliz and Bernd Langensiepen, eds., trans. by James Cooper, The 
Oltoman Steam Navy 1828-1923 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 195. 
warships had a minimal effect on the Bulgarians because forward observation needed to 
achieve accurate targeting was not available. Communications between ground forces 
and naval gunfire ships \Vas non-existent. The lack of ammunition for the battleships 
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hampered the use of the 280mm guns ,but the battleships' very presence dictated the route 
the Bulgarians used to assault the Catalca line. The Bulgarians avoided large troop 
concentrations within the effective range of the battleships' main guns of eight to twelve 
miles. 
The Ottomans fell back to the Catalca line where a heroic stand prevented the loss 
ofJ stanbul. An armistice was agreed upon by the belligerents on 3 December 1912. The 
war for Ottoman Europe had been lost. The Sultan's forces held only Adrianople 
(Edirne), Janina (Yanya), Setari, and the area east of the Catalca line. At the insistence of 
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the Balkan Allies, the armistice excluded Greece. Greece was occupying islands in the 
Aegean and had not completed the operation. Distrust that the Ottomans might transport 
troops from Asia precluded the allies from securing naval action in the Aegean while 
Greek transports were used to ferry Bulgarian forces from Salonika to Chios and from 
Salonika to Piraeus. 
The conflict in the Aegean began in earnest on 20 October 1912 and would 
continue through the First and Second Balkan Wars until the cease fire of30 May 1913. 
A map of the Aegean Sea is found in Appendix 5. 
On 20 October, Greece notified the foreign powers of a blockade of the Ottoman 
coast. The chief object of the Greek navy was to bottle up the Ottoman navy in the 
Dardanelles in order to seize islands in the Aegean and prevent follow-on forces from 
Asia and Anatolia. Greek seizures of major Ottoman Aegean islands are found in Table 
12. 
On 26 November 1912 Mr. Gerald H. Fitzmaurice, Chief Drago man of the 
British Embassy at Istanbul, discussed privately \Vith Jemil Pasha, Prefect and Vali of 
Istanbul, the naval situation. Jemil Pasha offered to have the Sultan cede Egypt to 
Britain in exchange for English help in stopping the Balkan Allies' advance on Istanbul. 152 
Britain declined the offer, leaving the Ottomans without a meaningful naval presence in 
the Aegean. The lack of opposition allowed the Greeks to seize territory deemed 
"Greater Hellena." The British Consul-General in Cairo, Lord Kitchner of Khartum, 
112F.O. 5 l 112/42842/12/44, No. 1000, Fitzmaurice to Corey, Istanbul, 26 
November 1912. In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, 210. 
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TABLEI2 
GREEK SEIZURES OF MAJOR OTTOMAN AEGEAN lSLANDS 
Name of Island Date Seized 
Imroz 20 October 1912 
Boca Ada 20 October 1912 
Lemnos 21 October 1912 
Mitylene 21 October 1912 
Tenedos 21 October 1912 
Thasos 31 October 1912 
Strati 31 October 1912 
Imbros 31 October 1912 
Samothrace I November 1912 
Psara 4 November 1912 
Icaria 17 November 1912 
Lesbos 21 November 1912 
Chios 24 November 1912 
Samos 11 April 1913 
Source: F.O. 45625/43461/12/44, No. 78, Grey to Kitchner, London, 29 October 1912. 
Found in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperly, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the 
lf/ar 1898-1914, Vol. IV, Part II (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1934), 59. 
fearing Muslim sentiment tO\:vards defending the Sultan and Islam, decided that Egyp-
tians' neutrality should be followed up \Vith the complete expulsion of Ottoman influence 
in Egypt and the Sudan. Kitchner tried to suppress any expression of Muslim support for 
the Ottoman cause. 153 
The Thrace theater stabilized in December 1912, and Ottoman naval action 
against the Greek fleet operating in the Aegean Sea began. On 14 December, the 
151 f .O. 45625/43461 /12/44, No. 78, Grey to Kitchner, London, 29 October 1912. 
In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, 59. 
Ottoman fleet, reconfigured into an armored ship division, two destroyer divisions, and 
an independent operational unit, began to pursue the Greeks in and around the 
Dardanelles. Table 13 shows the fleet organization after 20 December 1912. Ottoman 
RADM Ramiz Naman Bey was an aggressive sailor, but insuffeient material support 
hampered operation tempo. The morale of the sailors was excelJent, and the fleet 
performed well considering the scarcity of ammunition and fuel. 
The Ottoman cruiser Mecidiye entered the Aegean Sea on 14 December 1912 in 
order to duel with the Greek cruiser Avera.ff The Greeks responded by rushing at the 
Mecidiye with destroyers. This action, the frenzied attack with destroyers and torpedo 
boats, was a precursor of future Greek tactics. The Ottoman navy, divided in order to 
protect convoys in the Black Sea and to provide gunfire support at the Catalca line, now 
had to meet a numerically superior force. The key to any Ottoman victory lay in a 
defensive strategy using shore batteries in conjunction with naval units. 
The Battle of Helles commenced on 16 December 1914 and became the first 
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major sea battle since Tsushima. On paper, the opposing sides were relatively balanced. 
Greek forces included the.Averoff; R.C.S. Hydra, R.G.S. Psara, and R.G.S. Spetsai. 
Ottoman forces were made up of the Barbaro.1· Hayreddin, Torgud Reis, Mesudiye, and 
Asar-i Tevfik. Greek Admiral Kountouriotis had his flag on the Averoffand Ottoman 
Admiral Ramiz on the Barbaro.1· Hayreddin. Al 08:30 the Ottoman fleet sortied out the 
Straits past Cape Hell es on a track of west by north. The Greek fleet responded with a 
converging course from Lemnos, and at 09:22, while 12,000 meters apart, the Ottomans 
opened fire. Greek forces returned fire, resulting in the Mesud1)1e receiving three hits and 
TABLE 13 
OTTOMAN FLEET ORGANIZATION, 20 DECEMBER 1912 








Resit Pasa (hospital ship) 





Destrover Division II - Commanding Officer Commander Hakki Esref 
Berk-i Satvet Tasoz 
Yarhisar 
Basra 
Operational Division III - Commanding Officer Captain Ismail 
Asar-i Tevfik (destroyer) 
Samsum (destroyer) 
Tirimujgan (workshop ship) 
lnibah (salvage tug) 
Samsum (tug) 
Source: Ahmet Gi.ileryUz and Bernd Langensiepen, eds., trans. by James Cooper, The 
Ol!oman Steam Navy 1828-1923 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 196. 
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falling out of line (see Appendix 6). 
Kountouriotis took advantage ofAveroffs superior speed and engaged the 
Ottoman line independently, while the Hydra, Psara, and Spetsai turned south on a 
parallel course with the Ottoman fleet. The independent action of the AveroJJ; along with 
the parallel passing engagement necessitated by the older Greek ships, forced Ramiz to 
fall back to the Dardanelles. By 10:50, the Averojfhad closed within 3,000 meters and 
scored seven hits on the Barbaros Hayreddin.The Ottoman ships retreated in bad order, 
and Greek pursuit was only stopped when shore batteries began to weigh in. 154 
The battle illustrates the dominant view of naval warfare in the early twentieth 
century: battleships slugging it out to determine the winner. Since no decisive blow was 
struck, the battle was a draw. The smaller warships, destroyers, torpedo boats, cruisers, 
and submarines played no role in this action. The Greeks possessed and had in theater 
smaller assets that could have delivered torpedos capable of sinking Ottoman battleships. 
The Ottomans had destroyers along \.Vith the cruisers Hamidiye and Mecidiye, but for 
unknown reasons they did not bring the ships out to fight. The addition of the two 
Ottoman cruisers could have tipped the scales in Ramiz's favor, for the Greeks had no 
assets capable of dueling with the two ships.The Ottoman fleet set an example of courage 
and determination in a time of few successes on the battlefield and political tension in 
Istanbul. This was also the first time since 1877 that the fleet had seen ship-to-ship 




The first submarine torpedo attack in naval history occurred on 22 December 
1912. The Ottoman cruisers Mecidiye and the Berk-i Satvet were dueling with six Greek 
destroyers when the Greek submarine Dolphin launched a torpedo at the Mecidiye. The 
torpedo, launched beyond the effective range meters, missed. The action of the Mecidiye, 
turning into the torpedo, decreasing range, and bearing between the submarine and target, 
would be the preferred method of anti-submarine warfare in the coming wars. 
Decreasing range and bearing increased the odds the torpedo would miss. Also, since a 
torpedo must travel a pre-set distance before arming, decreasing that distance might 
reduce the odds of the warhead becoming armed. 
Ottoman fleet operations against Greek units became difficult due to logistics. 
Fuel and ammunition was increasingly in short supply and yet, when the chance arose, 
Ottoman forces picked opportune times to engage the Greeks. By choosing the time and 
place to engage, Ottoman forces utilized what resources were available for possible 
maximum benefit. This logistically driven tempo served also to delay the Ottoman ships' 
wear and tear. The pressing need for naval gunfire support at the Catalca line along with 
combating Greek forces limited availability of the battleships and cruisers. 
The relationship between the Ottoman army and navy was not amicable. Strategy 
for the Ottoman navy was not clear, indicating divided directives. Army demands to 
retake lost islands and transport troops lacked planning and coordination. An army plan 
to retake the island of Bozca Ada failed due to lack of communication because the troops 
assigned to the assault \Vere not notified, and thus they were not in place for 
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embarkation. 155 Ottoman naval commanders had serious doubts about the army's 
logistically mounting a landing. Naval planners also had concerns that there were no 
naval gunfire platforms available to protect such a landing. The balance of power in the 
Aegean dictated the Ottoman use of every available platform to confront Greek offensive 
action. 
The last major action in the Aegean came on 18 January 1913, the Battle of 
Lemnos. Commanding the Ottoman forces was Admiral Ramiz, who wanted to pull the 
Greeks into a decisive battle. The plan was to advance towards Limanli and seek contact 
with the Averoff; forcing the decisive battle envisioned by Mahan, and get a " ... definite 
conclusion with Greeks." 156 
The Ottoman fleet left the Dardanelles at 0820 hours on course 253 and sped at 
eleven knots. The flagship Barbaro.1· Hayreddin led with the Mecidiye, Torgud Reis, 
Berk-i Scttvet, Basra, and Yarhisar in a spearhead formation. The fleet tugs Sam.sum and 
Jntibah stood ready to assist in salvage operations. 
Since September 1912 the Greeks had maintained a guard ship at the mouth of the 
Dardanelles in order to reconnoiter Ottoman fleet movements . The Greek destroyer 
Leon, along with the torpedo boat Aspis, radioed the Ottoman sortie and the Greeks 
responded with the cruiser Avera[/, Hydra, and Psara, along with five destroyers. 
Admiral Kountouriotis was commanding officer with the Averoffflagship. The opening 
111Gulerytiz, 22-23. 
156F.O. 2653/1/13/44, No. 28, Lowther to Grey, Istanbul, 17 January 1913. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, 421. 
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salvo came from the Barbaros Hayreddin at 1155 hours at a range of 8,000 meters. 
Tactics dictated use of the superior gunfire range of the battleship. The 280mm shells 
blanketed the Avera.ff The Averoff, armed with 240mm guns, held fire in order to reduce 
range and increase accuratcy. Once in range, the two forces proceeded south, dueling 
port to starboard. The Ottoman battleship Mesudiye received numerous hits, reducing her 
speed and thus pulling the ship out of line (see Appendix 7). 
The ensuing battle witnessed the Greeks' attempt at naval maneuver called 
"crossing the T." This is when one force comes across the course of the opposing force. 
This allows one force to bring broadsides to bear upon the opposing force, which is left 
with only the front gun mounts to bear. The Russian squadron was destroyed by 
Japanese Admiral Togo at the Tsushirna Straits on 14 May 1905 using this maneuver. 157 
The Greek maneuver failed when the Ottomans altered course north, however, the Greeks 
did hit the Mesud1j1e on the front 150mm gun mount and the Barbaro.s· Hayreddin on the 
center 280mm turret. Hits to the Barbaros Hayreddin's superstructure caused fires that 
forced the ship to slow to five knots. The engagement broke off when the Greek fleet 
passed into range of the shore batteries at Kumkale. 158 The damage to the two ships 
destroyed any hope of regaining command of the Aegean Sea for the Ottomans during the 
First Balkan War. 159 
157S.G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power r~f the State (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1976), 91. 
158 Rankin, 699. 
159F.O. 2808/8/13/44, No. 32. Lowther to Elliot, Istanbul, 19 January 1913. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, 430. 
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Greek destroyers, torpedo boats, and sulbmarines played no role in the actual battle 
except to provide early warning of the Ottomarn sortie. Athens had demanded the 
warships from the builders ahead of schedule, and time did not allow for delivery of the 
required size of torpedo. The Ottoman destroyers and torpedo boats had ordnance but 
they \Vere not utilized. After the Balkan wars were over,Ramiz would be replaced, court-
martialed, and retired. 16° Further surface action was sporadic and led to few exchanges. 
The Ottoman army proposed landings on Midilli and Sakis but because of the uncertainty 
of the Averoff, the attempt was dropped. Surface action tapered off until the peace 
agreement was signed on 30 May 1913. 
Red Sea operations were conducted by the Hamidiye on an extended deployment 
that began on 13 January 1913 and lasted till 7 September 1913. 161 The commanding 
officer of the Hamidiye was the Ottoman Capt. Hussin Rauf Rauf would later head up 
the planning department that would oversee the capital ship construction in Britain. 162 As 
a young man, Raufjoined the C.U.P, and remained politically active during his military 
career. After the wars, Rauf would embark on a career that would last until his death on 
16 September 1964. 
The Hamid1j;e embarked upon the cruise with the attempt to entrap the Avera ff 
Having just been repaired from the Bulgarian torpedo attack, the cruiser was in fine shape 
but would experience radio problems the entire journey. Plans called for the Hamidiye to 
160Rankin, 697. 
161 Dakin, 197. 
162GU!eryUz, 25-26. 
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raid commercial vessels and island villages until the Averoffleft the Dardanelles. 
Removing the Greek cruiser would open the Aegean to Ottoman warships. Greek 
Admiral Kountouriotis refused to withdraw the A verofj; owing to the danger of undetered 
Ottoman seapower, and the plan failed. 163 
The J-Jamidiye sank the Greek auxiliary Makedonia in Sira on 15 January before 
recoaling in Beirut and Port Said. The British government refused to allow Rauf enough 
coal to raid the Greek islands actively, so the Hamidiye passed through the Suez Canal to 
the Red Sea and showed the flag off Arabia. Hamidiye's action brought foreign power 
involvement and Great Britain and Italy shortly afterwards each sent two ships to Besika 
Bay, arriving on 28 January. France also sent one ship to Smyrna and another to 
Salonika to be held in readiness if required. The British warships HMS King Edward and 
HMS Zea!andia arrived in Besika Bay on 28 January 1913. The exact mission the 
dispatched ships is not clear. The cruise of the Hamidiye and the success of the ship's 
raids bolstered the Ottoman spirit. The belief that the Hamidiye could tilt peace 
negotiations in favor of the Ottomans concerned the Great Powers. The war fronts had 
stabilized everywhere except in the Aegean Sea. 164 
The dispute as to the future of the Aegean islands of Thasos and Samothrace 
began to surface. Bulgarian Foreign Minister Dr. Daneff began voicing Bulgarian views 
that if the Ottomans were allowed any islands, Bulgaria should receive Thasos and Samo-
163Cassavetti, 53; Guleryiiz, 26-27. 
164 F.O. 371 l/3535/13/44, No. 56, Grey to Lowther, London, 25 January 1913. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, 447. 
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thrace. Greek expansion plans included both islands. 165 The Hamidiye foray also created 
questions regarding the Italian occupied South Sporades, or Dodecanese, islands. The 
Halo-Ottoman peace treaty required Italy to evacuate the islands once Ottoman troops 
were removed from Tripolitania. Italy requested English assistance in awarding the 
islands to Greece and not retroceding Mitylene, Chios and Samos back to the Ottoman 
government. Italy feared France might acquire the islands for a forward naval base, 
placing the Italian commercial trade with the Levant in jeopardy. Sir Edward Grey, 
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, suggested the Italian and Greek 
ambassadors sound their opinions in London " .. .if it could be done without giving 
guarantees to Turkey." 166 Italy would not relinquish control of the Dodecanese islands 
and would ultmately receive sovereignty with the Pact of London on 26 April 1915. 167 
In February 1913 Rauf returned to the Mediterranean and pursued coal for 
Hamidiye's bunkers. Rauf acquired coal at Beirut from the Hejaz Railway and made for 
the Albanian coast. The cruiser shelled the Greek training camp at Durazzo and attacked 
a Greek convoy at Singin, damaging six vessels on 12 March 1913. Low on fuel, the 
cruiser headed to Alexandria, but British officials blocked coal purchases. Hamidiye 
passed through the Suez Canal again and by 6 April 1913 visited at Cidde, Yemen. 
16SF.O. 534/106/13/44, No. 2, Grey to Bax-Ironside, London, 3 January 1913. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, 249. 
166F.O. 2209/106/44, No. 15, Grey to Rodd, London, 13 January 1913. n Gooch, 
Vol. IX, Part II, 403. 
167A copy of the Pact of London is found in Elliot Grinnell Mears, Modern Turkey 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1924), 612-613. 
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Hamidiye's stayed in the Red Sea until the cease fire came into force on 30 May 1913. 
The ship would return to Istanbul on 7 September 1913 after an eight-month cruise. The 
fact the ship embarked upon the deployment so soon after the battle damage is a 
testament to the professionalism of the crew. The hurdles Rauf overcame, such as fuel, 
ammunition, and British reluctance, gives proof of the ingenuity of the Hamidiye's officer 
corps. 
The new year witnessed the Ottoman government accepting the European 
territories as lost. By 23 January the general sense in the Porte favored a peaceful 
solution but a coup brought Enver Pasha to power when Osm Nizami Pasha, Minister of 
War, and two others were shot dead during a cabinet meeting. Mashmoud Shefket 
became Grand Vizier, Mehmed Izzet Pasha, Minister of War, and Talaat Bey, Minister of 
the Interior. Enver claimed the action was instigated by the army defending the Catalca 
line and the new cabinet took a hard line of continuation of the war. 168 
The Second Balkan War (3 February to 30 May 1913) found the Ottomans 
stalemated on the ground and lacking logistically on the water. In February Enver Pasha 
ordered landings at Sorkoy in order to relieve pressure on the Catalca front. The 
operational commander, General Ahmet Izzet, had reservations as to the timing of the 
landing. Despite concerns, Izzet assembled two divisions of the X Army Corps at Izmit 
and Bandirma. The navy chartered twelve ferries as transports and provided naval 
gunfire support, but the entire operation was covered in Istanbul's foreign language 
1
"
8F.O. 3535/3535/13/44, No. 39, Lovvther to Grey, Istanbul, 23 January 1913. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 438. 
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papers, and the element of surprise was lost. 169 On 8 February and 9 February, the X 
Army Corps landed at Sorkoy. The landings, over pontoon bridges, met little resistance 
at first, but Bulgarian counterattacks forced the X Army Corps back to the beaches. The 
situation around Gelibolu had deteriorated and the redeployment of troops from Gelibolu 
in order to conduct Enver's Sorkoy landing threatened to collapse the front, opening up 
Istanbul to the Bulgarians. Table 14 shows ammunition consumption during the Sarkoy 
landings of 8-11 February 1913. The numbers indicate the lack of resistance in the initial 
landing zone. The large 280mm guns of the Barbaro Hayreddin and the Torgud Reis 
were not fired. 
The Ottoman navy used some destroyers in the landings at Sarkoy. This use of 
shallow-draft destroyers in the amphibious role of troop transport provided naval gunfire 
support close aboard. The rapid delivery of troops via destroyers in a landing zone were 
the first use of such vessels in an amphibious operation. The Japanese would repeat such 
operations in the battle to retake Guadalcanal thirty years later. 170 The Ottomans also 
utilized French-built Deperdussin monoplanes in the role of aerial observation, gunfire 
correction, and intelligence. Such information, interpreted correctly, allowed for the 
successful defense of Istanbul. French, English and German citizens flew under contract 
to the Ottoman "Administration for War Flying." 171 Additional landings at Sorkoy failed 
169Gi.ileryi.iz, 25. 
110John Costello, Pacific fflar, 1941-1945 (New York: Rawson Wade, 1981), 330-
331. 
111 Lee Kennett, The First Air War, 1914-1918 (New York: The Free Press, 1991 ), 
19; and Brian P. Flanagan, "The History of the Ottoman Air Force in the Great War," 
TABLE14 
AMMUNITION CONSUMPTION DURING THE SAR.KOY LANDINGS 
150mm 120mm 105mm 88mm 
Barbaros Hayreddin 250 180 
Torgud Reis 22 156 
Berk-i Satvet 84 
Source: Ahmet GUleryi.iz and Bernd Langensiepen, eds., trans. by James Cooper, The 
Ottoman Steam Navy 1828-1923 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 196. 
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because the Ottoman navy was not informed of the landings. The operational tempo of 
the Ottoman fleet in the Sea of Marmara wound down to just patrols of the gunboats 
A1usul and Drac. Supply difficulties dictated that Aegean operations get priority. The 
Ottomans could not afford to allow Greece uncontested access to the Greek populated 
Anatolian coast. 
The battle of the Catalca line and the specter of the Bulgarian forces seizing 
Istanbul stirred the Great Powers to action. Bulgaria had reneged on accepting the Enos 
to Medea line, a proposal Sofia put forth in November 1912. 172 Fear that Bulgaria would 
capture Istanbul spurred the Russians to advocate a naval force to "protect" Christians 
from retreating Ottoman forces or advancing Bulgarian troops. There was no need for 
such action except to create a pretense to invade. Western European powers began to 
station ships at Besika Bay on the Aegean side of the Dardanelles while Russian ships 
Cross and Cockade Journal, XI (Summer-Winter 1970), 98, 119, 103. 
172F.O. 47049/42842/12/44, No. 412, Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburg, 5 
November 1912. In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 99. 
loitered outside of the Bosphorus. Russia had raised objections to Bulgarian advances 
upon Istanbul in November 1912. 173 With the resumption of fighting around Istanbul 
during the Second Balkan War, Russia again warned Bulgaria not to enter the city. 174 
The Bulgarians were not the only Balkan ally that worried the Great Powers. 
King Nicholas of Montenegro refused to end the siege of Scutari in Albania. Nicholas 
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wanted financial compensation from Russia or Austria for not taking Scuarti. Scutari had 
been assigned to Albania by the Great Powers, and Austria and Italy agreed Albania 
should be secure within the agreed borders and resented the extortion.In addition to 
Montenegro aggression in Albania, Greece desired to seize the southern Albanian coast 
adjacent to Corfu and to accomplish the subjection, eighteen Greek transports with 
11,000 Serbian troops sailed from Salonika. 175 
In order to get the Balkan Allies to respect Albanian borders, Sir Edward Grey 
proposed a naval demonstration in Montegrin waters. The King Edward and HMS 
Dartmowh were dispatched to Antivari, Corfu, to be joined by the German cruiser SMS 
Breslau, along with French, Austrian and Italian warships.With the fleet assembled, 
British VADM, Sir Cecil Burney, in conjunction with the other Powers' military 
representatives, issued an ultimatum to Montenegro to abide by the Great Powers' wishes 
173 Sir A. Nicolson to Sir G. Buchanan, 5 November 1912. In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part 
II, 103. 
17"F.O. 14865/9564/13/44, No. 84, Grey to Bax-Ironside, London, 28 March 1913. 
In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 619. 
175German Ambassador Jagow to Prince von Lichnowsky, 15 March 1913, found 
in Dugdale, Vol. IV, 167. 
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over Albania. 176 The ultimatum would go into effect in six hours and would result in 
Montenegran waters being blockaded unless Nicholas ceased the assault on Scutari. For 
political reasons in France, the deadline was relaxed to 10 April. 
Greek Prime Minister Venizelos, not wanting to become a target of a military 
blockade, suggested to Sir F. Elliot that Greek ships en route to Albania with Serbian 
troops be prevented from landing. Greece had to abide by the Balkan Treaty and support 
Montenegro by assistin with troop movements, but Greece did not want to see a war with 
a Great Power over Scutari. 177 On the night of 22 April, Essad Pasha, the commander of 
the Ottoman forces defending Scutari, surrendered after taking a Montenegran bribe and 
the prospect of becoming King of Albania. 178 From Nicholas, Essad received generous 
terms for surrender, allowing the Ottomans to keep field guns, ammunition, and supplies, 
and march out with colors raised. The scheme was for Essad to be proclaimed Prince of 
Albania under the suzerainty of the Sultan and then cede Scutari to Montenegro. 179 The 
fear of Austria moving against Montenegro and the complete abandonment of the Balkan 
Allies encouraged Nicholas to leave Scutari by 5 May 1913. 180 Essad's actions seem 
116F.O. l 5752/15876/13/44, Enclosure, Admiralty to Foreign Office, London, 5 
April 1913. In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 656. 
177F.O. 15756/13/44, No. 48, Elliot to Grey, Athens, 6 April 1913. In Gooch, Vol. 
IX, Part I, 657. 
178Albertini, 443. 
179F.O. 19807/135/13/44, Count de Salis to Grey, Cettinje, 29 April 1913. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 734. 
18°F.O. 20974/135/13/44, No. 151, Grey to Goschen, London, 5 May 1913. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 772; and Dugdale, Vol. IV, 176. 
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ignoble and selfish, but the surrender left a Muslim army intact in Albania, preventing 
the total dismemberment of the country, and perhaps preventing the wholesale slaughter 
of Muslims witnessed in other theaters of action once Moslem military power became 
impotent. 
Peace agreements came quickly once an armistice was concluded on 20 April 
1913. The armistice did not include Montenegro because of the Albanian situation. The 
final agreement, the Treaty of London, signed 30 May 1913, brought the war between the 
Balkan Allies and the Ottoman Empire to a close. The Ottomans lost all the Aegean 
islands to Greece and Bulgaria. This demand was hotly denounced by Mahmud Sherket 
Pasha, the Ottoman Grand Vizier. The islands were indispensable in order to protect the 
Dardanelles and Anatolia. The Ottomans also lost all European territories west of the 
Enos-Midia line and any influence in Crete. 
The Second Balkan War was still being contested when Greece and Serbia agreed 
to support each other diplomatically, and if need be militarily, in order to extract border 
concessions from Bulgaria. The agreement, signed 22 April 1913, followed concerns 
about Bulgarian claims on lost Ottoman territories. 181 The Treaty of London, signed 30 
May 1913, forced the Ottomans to cede territory to the victors, however, the victors did 
not trust each other enough to allovv the Russian Czar to mediate the disputed territory. 
The mediation clause did not include Greece, leaving that portion of Macedonia occupied 
by Greek forces unresolved. 
181 A copy of treaty can be found in Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, 1019-1021 . 
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The first week after the First and Second Balkan Wars were officially ended, the 
Bulgarians fired upon the Greek cruiser Averqff while the cruiser was sailing off the coast 
tmvards Salonika. 182 The Bulgarian batteries had been brought up towards Salonika 
during the lull leading up to the London negotiations.Greece anticipated such aggressive 
actions from Bulgaria, resulting in the agreement of 22 April with Serbia. Greece ap-
proached the Ottomans about Bulgaria, but discussions with Greece were halted when the 
Ottoman Grand Vizier, Mahmud Sherket Pasha, and his naval aide-de-camp, Captain 
Ibrahim Pasha, were killed when unknown persons fired at their car on 12 June 1913. 
The Egyptian prince Said Halim Pasha became Grand Vizier on 13 June, and talks with 
Greece were never resumed. 183 
Bulgaria had become brazen enough in its territorial demands in such a manner as 
to alienate former allies Greece and Serbia. The Ottoman political scene was fluid, with a 
power grab involving elements in the army. Italy did not wish to surrender the Aegean 
islands as agreed to in the Treaty of Lausanne and Bulgaria wanted to claim those islands 
as a territorial concession from the Ottomans. Surrendering those islands to the Ottomans 
jeopardized Italian ambitions in Asia Minor. It would place another international player 
in the Aegean theater--Bulgaria--and also interfere with Greek expansion, which included 
the Dodecanese. 184 The issue of the islands concerned Greece intensely. The islands of 
182Cassavetti, 317. 
183 F.O. 27102/26816/13/44, Nicolson to Grey, Istanbul, 13 June 1913. In Gooch, 
Vol. IX, Part II, 841. 
184F.O. 25532/9564/13/44, No. 118, Grey to Cartwright, London, 30 May 1913. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part I, 825. 
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Tenedos and Imbros could return to Ottoman control, where Thasos might go to Bulgaria. 
If another power received the Dodecanese, Greeks who inhabited the islands in question 
might never be united with Athens. 
In all aspects, the naval war was over. In the subsequent war, Ottoman and Greek 
naval forces did not collaborate on operations. The speed of the war did not necessitate 
naval landings or naval gunfired support. Ottoman naval losses for the First and Second 
Balkan Wars can be found in Table 15. 
The Third Balkan War began in earnest on 29 June 1913 when Bulgarian General 
Savo ff attacked the Greeks at Radovista and the Serbians at Gevgeli in Macedonia. The 
timing of the attack and the positions attacked--a salient between the Greeks and the 
Serbian forces--was chosen to separate the opposing forces. 185 In the face of Savoff's 
attack, Greece and Serbia moved quickly into the offensive. Greece announced that a 
state of war existed but did not decline war. Romania mobilized on 3 July 1913 and on 
July 8, Serbia declared war against Bulgaria. 186 Romania launched an attack on Bulgaria 
on 11 July. 187 
On 1 July the Greeks overcame the Bulgarian garrison in the region of 
Thessalonika and advanced to occupy Drama, Serres, and Kavala. On 8 July following 
isscassavetti, 318-319. 
186Mears, 588; and Sir H.O. Bax-Ironside to Sir A. Nicolson, 30 June 1913. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part JI, 876. 
187Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir A. Nicolson, 11 July 1913. In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part 
II, 905. 
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Source: Ahmed Guleryliz and Bernd Langensiepen, eds., trans. by James Cooper, The 
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their victory at Bregalnetsa, the Serbs entered Ishtip. On I l July Romania occupied the 
Dobrudja quadrilateral without opposition. From the beginning of this war, Bulgaria had 
voiced a desire for an armistice. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria contended that Savoff acted 
without approval, a statement later proven false. 188 Since April there had been numerous 
frontier incidents between Greek and Bulgarian troops and the creation of a neutral zone 
did not prevent altercations. The reports of Bulgarian atrocities soon proved true, and 
Greek propaganda fanned emotions against their former ally. The Bulgarians committed 
murder, rapes, and forced conversion to exarchate Christianity for both Muslims and 
patriarchists, and ethnic cleansing of non-Bulgarians. The removal of non-Bulgarian 
civilians and the refugee crisis it created was instrumental in the swift defeat of Ottoman 
forces in Thrace. The Bulgarians began to use the same tactics on Greeks and Serbians in 
disputed regions of Macedonia. Once treatment received under the Bulgarians became 
common knowledge, emotions flared and the warfare became merciless. 189 
Bulgaria was encircled by Serbia, Greece and Romania. Bulgaria had alienated 
Russia by not being more flexible in territory division with its former allies. On 13 July, 
Ottoman forces under Enver began to advance beyond the Enos-Midia line established by 
the Treaty of London. 190 Sir Edward Grey, English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
188For a complete revie\V of Bulgarian intrigues, see George E. Mylonalas, The 
Balkan Wars (St. Louis: Eden Publishing House, I 946), 88-96. 
189Cassavetti, 336-340; and Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic 
Cleansing o[Ot!oman Muslims, 1821-1922 (Princeton: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1995), 
135-164. 
19°F.O. 32784/32304/13/44, No. 111, Grandville to Grey, Berlin, 16 July 1913. ln 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, 914. 
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warned the Ottomans that the risk of war was serious if movement beyond the Treaty of 
London border continued. The Grand Vizier, Mahmoud Shefket, informed the English, 
that the "chauvinistic elements of Committee have decided on forward policy." 191 The 
goal of the Ottomans was Adrianople. Lord Granville, charge d'affaires at the British 
Embassy in Berlin, voiced London's view that a Russian suggested naval demonstration 
would be "inefficacious and dangerous in view of possible eventualities." 192 The English 
would not commit troops and would not provide ships in order to inject Russian troops, 
thus making a naval demonstration little more than an expensive regatta. The Germans 
refused to participate in any coercion of the Ottomans. 193 Enver recovered Adrianople on 
22 July, and Ottoman forces also entered Kirk Kilisse on the same day. By 26 July 
London had accepted the reality that Thrace was going back to Ottoman control. 194 
On 30 July 1913 a peace conference met at Bucharest and arranged a five-day 
truce. This led to the Treaty of Bucharest on 10 August 1913. 195 Bulgaria's former 
Balkan allies, along with Romania, agreed to pull back to assigned borders and demobi-
lize. However, the Ottomans were not party to this agreement. Ottoman security 
191 F.O. 33024/32304/13/44, No. 344, Marlin to Grey, Istanbul, 17 July 1913. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, 924. 
192F.O. 33829/32304/13/44, No. 117, Grandville to Grey, Berlin, 22 July 1913. In 
Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, 929. 
193 F.O. 33990/32304/13/44, No. 273, Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburg, 23 July 
1913. In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, 931. 
19"F.O. 34385/32304/13/44, No. 352, Grey to Marlin, London, 26 July 1913. In Gooch, 
Vol. IX, Part II, 939. 
195 A copy of the treat can be found in Gooch, Vol. IX, Part II, I 068-1070. 
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concerns, which necessitated the retaking of Adrianople, were not addressed in the Treaty 
of Bucharest. The Bulgarian massacre of Muslims in and around the Maritz River region 
tempted the Ottomans to declare war officially but the English warned such official 
sanction of the war already in progress 111 ight invite Great Power (Russian) intervention. 
No war was "officially" declared. 196 
Disregarding warnings from London, Enver pushed beyond Maritz and to 
Mustapha Pasha by 18 August 1913. This move brought additional warnings of 
intervention by the Great Powers but forced King Ferdinand to accept the inevitable in 
regard to Thrace. Bulgaria accepted a peace treaty with the Ottomans on 17 September 
1913 with the new frontier starting at the mouth of the Maritsa River and ending north of 
Midia on the Black Sea. The peace treaty gave the Ottomans twice the territory awarded 
under the Treaty of London and had the peculiarity of being a peace treaty between two 
countries who were not officially at war. The Ottomans regained lost territory as a result 
of her own military effort and in defiance of the decisions of the British. "The 
Independent Government of Western Thrace," the governing organ of territory ceded by 
Bulgaria, was required to demobilize by the peace treaty but with the continual reports of 
Bulgarian massacres of Muslims, such action did not materialize .. 
The loser in the Third Balkan War on the ground was Bulgaria who lost much of 
Macedonia and Thrace. But the real loser was Russia. Russian influence failed to prevent 
a falling out between victors in the First and Second Balkan wars. The attempt to 
196F.O. 37649/32304/13/44, No. 302, Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburg, 14 August 
1913. In Gooch, Vol. IX, Part JI, 982. 
mediate a workable armistice through St. Petersburg never materialized and Russian 
schemes to intimidate Istanbul failed when no other Great Power would support such 
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action. In the end Czar Nicholas was not committed to fight over that Balkan issue, and 
the Ottomans recognized it. 
Enver won back much of Thrace, and political rewards followed. The Ottomans 
now found themselves back in charge in Thrace and assured of financial backing from the 
Great Powers. The success of the C.U.P. increased the group's prestige in the country, 
but it also led to chauvinism and xenophobia. 
The naval lessons of the Balkan Wars were not lost on the Ottomans. The 
Ottoman fleet performed well, but it lacked the resources to fight in both the Black and 
Aegean seas at the same time. The need to fight a two-sea conflict necessitated fleet 
expansion that led to an Ottoman naval buildup. Funding for Ottoman fleet operations 
for 1912 increased to $7,733,250, up from an estimated $3,000,000 in 1909. 197 The 
modest increase of the Ottoman naval budget is dwarfed by other regional powers. Table 
16 lists the budgets and changes from 1912-1914. 
The lessons gleamed form the war such as use of airplanes, need for seagoing 
destroyers, some amphibious capabilities, and targeting of naval gunfire, influenced all 
three naval commands to rethink expansion plans. The naval race by Greece began is 
earnest once the war was concluded. But first Greece publicly paid tribute to the British 
naval mission in general and Admiral Tufnell specifically for the remarkable progress of 
197Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1930), 94. 
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TABLEI6 
REGIONAL NA VAL BUDGETS AND CHANGES, 1912-1914 
1912-1913 1913-1914 % Change 
Italy $42,162,672 $49,909,575 +16% 
France 82,285,384 90,526,029 +10% 
England 223,313,559 234,899,322 +5% 
Russia 85,930,666 118,960,586 +28% 
Austro-Hungarian 28,300,766 29,090,574 +3% 
Source: Viscount Hythe, ed., 771e Naval Annal 1913 (Portsmouth, UK: J. Griffin and 
Co., 1913; reprint, Nevv York: Arco Publishing Co., 1970), 482,476, 458-459, 484,474. 
the Greek fleet. 198 The Russian Duma reacted to the war by increasing funds for the Black 
Sea Fleet. The Porte could not compete with Russia in ship construction. Ottoman yards 
\Vere not sufficient for dreadnought building, and the Izmet Arrangement, which gave 
British shipbuilder Armstrongs the authority to erect a navy yard at Golcuk, along with 
management control of the Tersane-i Ami re, had not been in effect long enough to show 
potential. 199 Had this agreement matured in 1900, the Ottoman fleet could have been 
better equipped to counter threats to the Empire. The Ottoman fleet could not expand 
sufficiently using indigenous resources and had to compete with other non-producers of 
dreadnoughts in the open market. This led to diplomatic intrigue, inflated prices, and a 
naval race to World War I. 
198Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 328. 
199Gi.lleryliz, 17-18. 
CHAPTER IV 
OTTOMAN BATTLESHIP ACQUISITION 
The account of the battleship acquisition by the Ottoman government from 1900-
1916 has been viewed as a result of the naval race gripping the industrial world prior to 
World War I. But unlike industrial powers, the Ottoman Empire attempted to maintain 
territory coveted by Western Europeans and not subject a foreign populace. Prior to the 
Balkan wars, Istanbul pursued ship purchases more in common with coast guard and 
revenue duties than power projection. This policy served Istanbul well. However, with 
the injection of one battleship, the naval purchases of three countries--Greece, Russia and 
the Ottoman Empire--changed. 
The arms race in the Aegean region began in earnest when the Greek millionaire, 
Georgios A veroff, bequeathed £280,000 towards an armored cruiser from the Italian 
shipbuilder Orlando in October 1909. Orlando had begun to build the Pisa class cruiser 
under speculation, since no buyer had been contracted prior to commencement of 
construction. Construction of warships via speculation allowed for constant employment 
at shipyards and favorable rates for steel, ordnance, and engineer. Speculation also 
allowed for a ship to be sold to the highest bidder, leased to friendly foreign governments, 
or, if no successful customers comes forth, marketed to the home government at 
favorable prices. During this period, in addition to the cruiser, the Royal Greek Navy 
acquired four destroyers built originally for Argentina, along with two German models. 
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Also, two submarines and six torpedo boats were ordered. Added to this, nine 
merchantmen were converted into auxiliary cruisers. Moreover, the three old Hydra class 
fcoast defense ships were rearmed with modern English quick-firing guns. Finally, in 
order to better utilize this force, a British Naval Mission was requested and in place by 
191 1. 200 
In order to counter the Greek threat, the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Sadrazan Osman 
Pasha, discussed with Major von Stremple, German military attache, the desire of the 
Ottoman navy to purchase an armored cruiser and a number of destroyers. The Ottomans 
complained that London refused to sell a modern ship, and Admiral Williams instead 
wanted the Porte to bid on the HMS Triumph and HMS Swifisure. The two battleships 
were originally built for Chile and purchased by the Admiralty during the Russo-Japanese 
War to forestall acquisition by Russia, but London would only offer two old Royal 
Sovereigns class pre-dreadnoughts. 201 Williams advocated a large flotilla of destroyers 
and torpedo boats in order to achieve the maximum coastal coverage for the funds 
available and small ships would allow for more responsibility to younger English-trained 
officers. Nevertheless, the Porte demanded battleships and considering the dominant 
view that naval power required such platforms, Williams' views were inconsequential. 
200 Robert Gardiner, ed., Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1906-1921 
(London: Conway's Maritime Press, 1985; reprint, London: Conway Maritime Press, 
1992), 328. 
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119 
The concern of the Ottoman government in countering the naval threat imposed 
by the Greek cruiser can be derived by the haste placed upon this purchase. The Porte 
acted as if the time for normal negotiations did not exist and since a large modern cruiser 
was needed now and none existed in England, Istanbul looked to Germany. The request 
for the four destroyers was quickly agreed upon. On 30 January 1910 the German 
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz agreed to sell S 165-S 168. The Schichau A.G.-built vessels 
would become the Mauvenli-i A1illiye-class. The ships would prove to be excellent craft, 
inexpensive, durable, and a good match for repair facilities in the Ottoman Empire. 
Istanbul's use of German torpedoes ensured future German armament purchases and thus 
Germany would have influence in Ottoman naval affairs. 
Acquiring the cruiser-type vessel would be more complicated. German Secretary 
of State Schoen informed the Porte that the newly completed SMS Bliicher would be the 
ship transferred. German naval commanders quickly squelched the possibility of the 
Blacher being delivered to the Ottomans without full restitution. The reasoning behind 
full restitution lay in the Navy Law Admiral Tirpitz maneuvered through the German 
Parliament. This legislation fixed the number of ships and provided for their automatic 
replacement after 25 years of service. This "iron budget" prevented parliament from 
forestalling the timely replacement of ships by making the ships' replacement a matter of 
law. Any deviation from this program would necessitate full restitution or a change in 
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the Navy Law.202 Compounding the situation, a ship such as the B/ilcher could receive 
proper shipyard work only in Germany, because the Ottoman yards lacked facilities 
capable of supporting such a ship. Before the Blucher could be transferred, the Porte 
would have to agree to full restitution along with all future ship orders through German 
yards. Ottoman finances prohibited such an agreement and behind the scenes, fear of 
another round of Ottoman extortion demands, as experienced in 1900, negated any 
thought of builder financing. 
The German Foreign Ministry revised the discussions with the Ottoman 
government and offered the nearly completed Von Der Tann for$ I 0,500,000. However, 
the Ottomans still desired the Bhicher. Germany's Kaiser decreed on 8 April 191 O that 
both the Von Der Tann and the 13/iJcher could be purchased for $10,466,960 each.203 This 
was an amount well out of the question for the Ottoman Empires. As discussions over 
ship purchases continued, the Greek cruiser Averoff was completing its fitting out phase 
at Italy's Livorno shipyard. The Porte contacted Krupp and Blohn & Voss to inquire 
about the unfinished Moltke, still fitting out at Hamburg. The Moltke did not have the aft 
two turrets installed. However, with a main armament of six 280 mm guns to the 
Averofls four 240 mm, and a sea speed of 25 knots to the Greek ship's 22 knots, the 
.Moltke was more than a match. If an agreement was reached, the aft two turrets would be 
202Gary Weir, Building the Kaiser's Navy: The Imperial Naval Office and German 




fitted in Istanbul after delivery. 
All the discussions over which battle cruiser would be sold to the Ottomans came 
to a halt on 15 July 1910. Tirpitz stopped all negotiations over new ship transfers and 
offered four pre-dreadnought battleships of the Brandenburg-class for sale at ten million 
marks, or $2,378,854 each. The Ottomans selected the SMS Kurfurst Friedrich Wilhelm 
and the SMS Weissenburg and the sales contract was signed on 5 August 1910. Both 
ships were in active fleet status. The Ottoman crews boarded the ships at Wilhelmshaven 
and began takeover while in transit to the Ottoman naval base at Canakkale. Official 
transfer was completed by 1 September 1910 and the two ships were renamed Barbaros 
Hayreddin (the former Kurfin·st Friedrich Wilhelm) and Torgud Reis (the former 
Weissenburg). 204 
In order to counter the Ottoman battleship purchase, the Greeks attempted to buy 
two old French battleships, the Brennus and Bouvet. However, the French Minister of 
Marine, Admiral Lapeyere, refused to sanction the sale, citing fear of diminishing the 
fleet by two old but still capable warships. 205 
The naming of the Brandenburg battleship Barbaros Hayreddin is an excellent 
indication of the direction the Porte intended to take the Ottoman navy. Barbaros 
Hayreddin had been an Ottoman admiral who had been master of the Mediterranean in 
204 Fred T. Jane, ed., Jane's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1911 (London: 
Sampson Low Marston, 1911 ); reprint, New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1969), 
452. 
205 Lapeyere to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 8 December 1910, cite in 
Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 324. 
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the seventeenth century, at the height of the Ottoman Empire. 206 Payment for the two 
battleships and the four destroyers amounted to $5,947,136, or 25 million marks. The 
funds for the ships came from the Ottoman Naval Society. German General van Stemple 
had suggested to the Porte that a foundation similar to the German Flottenverein, or 
Naval Society, could be helpful in fostering national unity and pride. The German Naval 
Society was by far the largest in Europe and had been very successful in gathering 
support from the middle class.207 The Donanna-i Milliye Cemiyetti (National Help Fund 
for the Fleet) was founded in Istanbul on 19 July 1910. The main objective of this fund 
was to restore the naval balance in the Aegean. 208 
The Naval Society contracted for the ships and then proceeded to raise funds by 
public subscription. In addition, the Deutsche Bank held $3,092,511 on account for the 
deposed Abdul Hamid and these funds were not discovered until after he had been 
deposed. 209 The Naval Society used this account at the Deutsche Bank and funds 
garnered from public subscription to pay off the ships by August 1911. 
Opposition parties in Istanbul protested that the price paid for the two battleships 
was too high because the ships had been built in 1891 and were pre-dreadnoughts. They 
206Ernle Bradford, The Sultan's Admiral: The L{fe a/Barbarossa (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), 193-200. 
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157; cited in Paul G. Halpern, A .Naval History of World War One (Annapolis: Naval 




had been modernized in 1902-1904 and had come straight from the active Germany fleet. 
But The New York Times described the ships as "rattletraps," unusable in hot climates 
and little more than "old crocks." 210 The purchase of the former German battleships also 
created a political uproar within the government between nationalists and Anglophiles. 
Hoping to quiet the uproar and keeping with the policy that armament purchases be 
spread around, the Ottoman government approached London concerning the Brazilian 
ships Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. The discussions went nowhere due to financing 
difficulties. German banks, the Dresdner and the Deutsche, refused to finance 
non-German ship construction or purchases. However, Vickers shipyard at 
Burrows-in-Furness, England, agreed to carry some debt. As a result, the battleship 
Resad(ve was ordered on 6 August 1911. Not to be left out of Ottoman naval purchase, 
from Armstrongs came the battleship Mehmet Resad V.211 All construction was halted 
during the Balkan and Italian wars. The Mehmet Resad V and the Resadiye had a length 
of 567 feet, beam of 93 feet, main armament of 10x13.5", secondary armament of 16x6", 
a gross tonnage of23,000, and a speed of21 knots. Following the outbreak of the Balkan 
War, Armstrong demanded better guarantees of payment, and work was suspended. 
Subsequently, the contract was canceled on the Mehmet Resad V. 
Athens responded to the Ottoman contracts by placing orders with Germany's 
Vulcan shipyard for a battle cruiser to be named Salamis. The Greek complaint of British 
2wThe New York Times, 14 August 1910. 
211 Gardiner, 391. 
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shipyard prices and delays in delivery, coupled with favorable German financing, caused 
great concern in London. In spite of a British Naval Mission and a French Army 
Mission, the Germans walked away with the naval contract. 
The growth of German influence in Istanbul disturbed the British naval mission 
and made the task of securing naval contracts difficult. In order to increase British 
influence Admiral Limpus suggested that London do two things: sell Istanbul two pre-
dreadnoughts after the Balkan wars; and agree to train thirty Ottoman naval officers in 
England. First Sea Lord Battenberg opposed the sale of any pre-dreadnought and 
questioned the value of the Ottoman naval mission. Churchill took the opposite position 
and supported the sale in order to use the proceeds to buy planes. The British Admiralty 
Board decided to support Limpus and offered Istanbul two Royal Sovereign-class pre-
dreadnoughts but \.vith the removal of Shefket Pasha as Grand Vizier in June 1913 all 
talks ceased. m 
During the initial phase of the Balkan wars, the Porte made approaches to 
Argentina concerning the possible sale of the Moreno and the Rivadavia, which were 
being fitted out in the United States. The Moreno, built by the New York Shipbuilding 
Company in Camden, New Jersey, and the Rivadavia, by the Fore River Company in 
Quincy, Massachusetts, were not "officially" for sale. But the Ottoman ambassador in 
London, Tewfik Pasha, requested British advice on the condition of the ships. The 
British Admiralty declined to express an opinion on ships building in foreign yards. The 
212Marder, 303. 
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French ambassador in Istanbul, Maurice Bompard, also rep011ed that the Porte \Vould 
purchase one of the Argentine battleships and that Buckman Pasha, an American engineer 
created admiral by the former Sultan, Abdul Hamid, was supposed to be involved in the 
transaction. The French also reported that the purchased ship would be crewed by 
mercenaries and would soon sail for the Dardanelles.213 The report of the pending sale 
and crewing by mercenaries was also relayed by the French Admiral Dartige du Fournet, 
commander of the French naval forces in the Levant. Fournet reported that the 
Americans had supposedly offered to sell a battleship and some destroyers, fully armed 
and crewed, out to Istanbul, fighting the Greek fleet and bombarding the Greek fleet at 
Piraeus on the way. Fournet also reported that the Porte approached Berlin on the 
availability of the SMS Goeben. 214 The Porte was not successful in acquiring warships to 
confront the Balkan allies' aggression. But the Porte's action indicated a strong desire to 
obtain such platforms in the belief that doing so would provide a level of security surely 
needed. Security other nations found questionable. 
The South American republics had been experiencing a naval race since 1908 and 
in Brazil a political coup was the result. The Brazilian battleship Minas Gerais 
experienced a mutiny in 1910. This action motivated the Brazilian government to 
reconsider having the Rio de Janeiro and the Minas Gerais at the same time. The 
Brazilian battleship Sao-Paulo was not directly involved in the Minas Gerais mutiny, but 
21 JBompard to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 7 December 1912, Mae, Turquie-
Politique, cited in Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 332. 
2141-Ialpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 332. 
the specter of all three dreadnoughts actively engaged in rebellion convinced the 
Brazilian Minister of Marine to offer the Rio de Janeiro for auction. 215 
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The fear of mutiny was not the only reason compelling Brazil to sell the Rio de Janeiro. 
British businessmen had smuggled out of Brazil wild rubber plants and had succeeded in 
transplanting the plants in Malaya. The fall in rubber exports caused by the British-
sponsored Malayan rubber plantations cut the export revenue for Brazil to a level making 
the battleship unattainable. 216 
The Porte, reacting to reports that Greece was inquiring into purchasing the Rio de 
.Janeiro, began to search out Armstrongs officials in order to consummate the sale to 
Istanbul. Admiral Limpus had asked the British ambassador in Istanbul to inquire about 
London's buying the ship to avoid Athens acquiring the vessel. London did not foresee a 
need for the ship, nevertheless, the Admiralty informed the French naval attache that the 
Italians were interested in the ship. Paris was concerned that Italian ownership of the Rio 
de Janeiro would upset the Mediterranean balance of power into Rome's favor. 
French Prime Minister Pichon did not want the ship because of the financial 
burden French naval orders had placed on the budget. But Pichon was open to 
renegotiating a Greek loan in order to allow Athens to purchase the ship. The French 
needed time in order to formulate the agreement with the Greeks, but London needed to 
21 sRichard Hough, History of rhe .Modern Battleship: Dreadnought (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1964), 74. 
2 16Richard Hough, The Grear Dreadno11ghr: The Story of the Hlvf.S Agincourt, 
the .Mightiest Battleship o.f World War 1 (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), 
62. 
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know the status of the Greek talks because past discussions between Athens and 
Armstrongs seemed to be aimed solely at preventing the purchase of the ship by Istanbul. 
The First Lord of the Sea, Winston Churchill, informed Paris that it was most 
important that Greece and not Italy acquire the ship. Italy was still a member of the 
Triple Alliance and thus a potential threat. Greece wanted the ship, but the negotiations 
required time, and Pichon once again requested the British Admiralty delay 
Armstrongs's selling the vessel.217 In the end, Italy did not aggressively pursue the 
purchase, and the entire notion that Italy wanted the ship may have been the result of a 
bitter rivalry between the Italian shipbuilding yard Ansaldo against the group including 
Orlando, Vickers-Terni, Armstrongs, and the Banca Commerciale.218 
The Greek government continued negotiating with Paris in order to consummate a 
loan sufficient to cover the Rio de Janeiro and ship orders already placed in French yards. 
Paris suspected Athens of using French concerns over the vessel in order to obtain better 
conditions for the loan. The French charge d'affaires in London also suspected 
Armstrongs and Vickers of conniving in order to escalate the price of the vessel and 
ultimately of receiving the concession of reorganizing the Ottoman dockyards. The 
preceding fall, Sir Vincent Caillard, formerly an English representative on the Ottoman 
Debt Commission and currently a director of Vickers, and Rear-Admiral Ottley, a retired 
naval officer who was a director of Armstrong, had been successful in reaching an naval 
217 Pichon to Cambon, Paris, 22 November 1913, cited in Halpern, The 
.Mediterranean Naval Situation, 340. 
218See note in Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 340. 
agreement with the Porte. British firms would modernize the Ottoman shipyard at 
Istanbul and construct an arsenal with a floating dock in the Gulf of Ismid.219 
Istanbul received the loan for the battleship through the French banker Perier, 
with Armstrongs guaranteeing the loan. The transfer of funds took place 29 December 
1913 despite last-minute appeals from Greek Prime Minister Venizelou. 220 The French 
bank, Perier, also received the concession for providing electricity to Jerusalem and 
constructing an electric street car line from Jerusalem to Bethlehem.221 With the loan 
secured, the Porte proceeded in submitting a bid for the ship. 
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With several bids submitted for the ship, Armstrongs decided to auction the ship 
outright. The participants of the auction are unknown, but reviewing the economic and 
political realities at the time of the auction rules out countries that could have constructed 
such ships for their own use or foreign sales. Using the premises that dreadnought 
construction benefits a nation's infrastructure eliminates all the major European powers 
and Japan. This leaves only nations which wanted and could afford a dreadnought but 
could not construct one, Greece and the Ottoman Empire fit this category. The auction 
date was 9 January 1914, and the final price was $13,625,000. 222 Renamed Sultan 
Osman-i Evvel, the ship was the largest battleship afloat. With a length of 671, beam of 
21°F.O. 371/1846/50485, Mallet to Grey, 6 November 1913, Istanbul, found in 
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89, main armament of 14xI2", secondary am1aments of20x6", gross tonnage of27,500, 
and a speed of 22 knots, the Sultan Osman-i Evvel would restore balance in the Aegean 
Sea region. 
The Ottoman government fulfilled the agreement to acquire future ships from 
Armstrong. by placing orders for two scoutt cruisers, two submarines, and four 
destroyers. Further orders were placed to Francis Schneider & Cie. in Nantes, France, 
for destroyers in 19 I 4, with six more planned in I 9 I 7. Rounding out Ottoman naval 
purchases, Italy's Ansaldo & Cie received orders for four destroyers of 700 tons each to 
be delivered in 1917. 223 Ordering warships from an Italian firm so soon after the 
Tripolitania war suggest possible political payback to Rome for not biding on the 
battleship. 
The efforts to pay for the ships out of a treasury still recovering from two recent 
wars were daunting. The Minister of the Imerior, Talaat Bey, was tasked to provide 
$ I 7 ,0 I 0,000 from an agrarian society still reeling from wars, internal migration from 
Balkan atrocities, and political infighting. lfalaat arranged an advance on the annual 
sheep tax from the Ottoman Bank in the sum of $1,215,000, from a fund known as the 
public debt $486,000, and the tobacco tax $243,000. The civil service and municipal 
workers' December 1913 pay was expropriated, and a bread tax levied upon the general 
populace. 
221 Jane, Jane's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1914, 409-419. 
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Talaat and the C. U .P. generated a battleship fundraising program bordering on a 
spiritual crusade. In large cities, collection boxes marked "for our fleet" gathered small 
change. Ferry boats on the Bosporus gathered collections from passengers, and women 
donated hair to be sold for the fleet. Former Grand Viziers Khazi Mukhtar Pasha and 
Kutchuk Said Pasha both became targets for large "contributions" from the C.U.P. The 
rich became targets of the C.U.P.'s pamphlet campaign demanding donations. Such 
action created a personal attachment to the ships. The standing of the Ottoman fleet had 
risen along with the donations, and the populace began to embrace the notion of a 
powerful fleet capable of projecting power .224 In April 1914 the Porte was able to 
arrange a $155,520,000 loan from France. This amount allowed for liquidating the 
floating Ottoman debt, settling back pay for civil servants, providing $1,944,000 for a 
railway line and enough for the entire outstanding balance on the Sultan Osman-i 
Evvel_22s 
In October 1913 the British naval attache in Rome reported the possible sale by 
the Italian navy to Istanbul of the large armored cruiser of the Pisa class and the small 
cruiser Libia, the former Ottoman cruiser Drama.226 The Italians had shown concern over 
the deal to modernize Ottoman yards by Vickers and Armstrongs, especially the 
possibility a naval base could be erected in the Bay of Giova or Marmaritza. Italy 
rnI-Jough, The Great Dreadnought, 97-99 
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considered both regions in Rome's sphere of influence, regardless of the treaty ending the 
halo/Ottoman War, which reaffirmed no such sphere existed. 
The purchase of the Rio de Janeiro by the Ottoman government preempted the 
sale of the ship to either Greece or Italy. Italy offered to exchange two Pisa class cruisers 
to the Ottomans for the contract. ln order to entice the deal, Italy offered to sell two 
submarines for $13,219 each to the Ottomans.227 Istanbul declined. 
Rounding off Ottoman acquisition of dreadnoughts would be the Faith Sultan 
A1ehmed. The ship was ordered on 29 April 1914 and was a carbon copy of the Vickers 
ordered Resadiye, with completion scheduled in twenty-two months. The Ottoman 
Naval Minister, Ahmad Djemal Pasha, hoped to have two fleet units: one consisting of 
three dreadnoughts, two light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and four submarines, and the 
other consisting of the old battleships and torpedo boats. 228 In order to facilitate this 
program, Djemal ordered the Ottoman yard representatives Reuf Bey and Wassif Bey to 
refrain from demanding or allowing shipyard changes. Djemal suspected the English 
yards were intentionally delaying turning over the ships. 229 In addition to the 
dreadnoughts ordered, Armstrongs, the provider of ordnance for all three ships, was to 
provide projectiles and propellant for both fleet units and the forts overlooking the 
Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. 
227Gtilerytiz, 17. 
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Contemporary writers on naval fleets in the twentieth century have implied the 
names of the Vickers and Armstrong battleships were changed. Ahmet GU!eryliz and 
Bernd Langensiepen, authors of The Otloman Steam Navy 1828-1923, write that the 
Mehmet Resad V was changed to Resadiye. This belief is also reported in Fred T. Jane's 
All The World's Fighting Ships, 1914. However, from "builder" identification expressed 
in Guleryliz's and Jane's works, along with Robert Gardiner's Conway's All The World's 
Fighting Ships 1906-1921, it can be shown that the Vickers battleship, Resadiye, was not 
canceled and was completed only to be seized by the Royal Navy in 1914. Construction 
on the Armstrong battleship Mehmet Resad V, ordered in June 1911, was halted and 
subsequently canceled in 1912. There is no evidence the canceled Armstrong battleship 
was ever named Resadiye, nor do records show a reference to either name. However, 
both names are a reference to the reigning Sultan, Mehmet Resad V. Sultan Mehmet 
Resad V's family name was Resadiye. 
American involvement in the naval race between Greece and the Ottoman Empire 
centered around two relatively new but under-powered battleships. The USS Idaho 
(BB-24) and the USS Mississippi (BB-23) were both laid down in 1905 and launched in 
1908. The ships were in general designed similarly to the Kansas-class, but displaced 
only 13,000 tons. This reduction was effected by reducing the speed to seventeen knots 
and the normal coal supply to 750 tons. Additionally, the number of seven-inch guns was 
reduced to eight versus twelve on the Kansas class and the freeboard aft was one deck 
lower than in the Kansas. The reduction in size, speed, and coal capacity of these vessels 
was contrary to the naval principle that "for the best efficiency, ships that are to operate 
] ~~ .).) 
together should possess the same tactical and strategically qualities." The ships were built 
because the shipbuilder, William Cramp & Sons, Philadelphia, Pa., did not have a dry-
dock long enough to construct a standard Kansas size battleship. Senator Hale of 
Pennsylvania used his influence on the Naval Affairs Committee, to insure Cramp 
received the contract. The construction of the two battleships was allowed over the 
objections of naval authorities as a consequence of a curtailment in the appropriationsY0 
The difficulties faced by American admirals was how to use battleships that were 
fairly new but too slow to steam with older ships. The ships also did not have adequate 
range because of smaller coal bunkers and the low freeboard and reduced weight greatly 
diminished the sea-keeping abilities of the two battleships. The combination of slow 
speed, reduced range, diminished sea-keeping abilities, and decreased secondary 
armament condemned the Idaho and Mississippi to ancillary roles of reserve ship and 
midshipmen cruises. 231 
The Greek government wanted warships to counter the Ottoman purchase of the 
Rio de Janeiro. The New York Shipbuilding Company's representative, Fred J Gauntlett, 
offered to arrange the acquisition of five old battleships from the United States navy and 
immediately to sell three to Greece on the understanding that Athens would place an 
230William Hovgaard, Modern History of Warships (London: Unwin Brothers, 
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order for a super-dreadnought. These ships in question would be the USS Kersage, 
US.S. Kentucky, USS. Indiana, US.S Mossachuseus, and USS Oregon. All the ships 
were at the end of operational service, pre-dreadnought, and of little value to the 
American fleet. Greek Prime Minister Venizelos reviewed the offer and declined to 
buy.232 Venizelos still desired battleships and found favorable financing in France. By 
the spring of 1914, Athens had a dreadnought building, another on order from France, 
and a battle cruiser building in Germany. Greek naval power would be on par with the 
Ottomans by the summer of 1917. Additionally, four destroyers being fitted out in 
Germany were released to Greece by 16 January 1914. 
In May 1914 President Wilson of the United States informed the Greek legation in 
Washington that the United States Navy might be prepared to sell the Idaho and 
Mississippi if the sale were sanctioned by Congress. Venizelos instructed the Greek 
Minister in Washington to accept the offer, sight unseen, and to speed the deal , 
Venizelos sent his Marine Minister, M. Vouros to negotiate a price with Adm. David 
Tay !or, Chief of Construction, United States Navy Department. 233 On 20 May 1914 
United States Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels appeared before the Senate Committee on 
Naval Affairs advising acceptance of the Naval Appropriations Bill amendment 
providing for the sale of the two battleships. The amendment offered by Senator Lodge 
of Massachusetts, did not name the country or minimum acceptable price. The 
232Hough, The Great Dreadnought, 76. 
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amendment passed without alteration or debate. The House of Representatives on 16 
June debated Senate Amendment 71 to the Naval Appropriation Bill. In the House, a 
small but powerful group of representatives, dubbed "the small navy" advocates, viewed 
the proposed sale as a means of circumventing regular navy appropriations at the expense 
of Greece. The fight over the proposal lasted into the night. 
The fact that Greece openly desired to redeem the Aegean islands and the 
Anatolian mainland was no diplomatic secret. Greek navy purchases consisted of ships 
that could seize territory via the Aegean Sea: thus the need for a large navy capable of 
operating in the littoral regions of the Aegean. This course of action had proved prudent 
during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, when Greek warships seized the majority of 
Ottoman islands in the Aegean and Crete seas. Greek desires to complete the redemption 
of the Ottoman Greek community was so prevalent that the United States ambassador in 
Istanbul, Henry Morgenthau, insinuated such action would launch the next war. 234 
On 11 June 1914 the Ottoman Minister of Marine, Ahmad Djemal Pasha, 
confronted Ambassador Morgenthau over the rumored American sale of the two 
battleships. Djernal noted the friendly, evenhanded approach the United states had 
exhibited towards the Ottomans and expressed a willingness to see future relations with 
the United States remain good. The United States President, Woodrow Wilson, openly 
desired to stay neutral in any European hostilities, but selling the warships to Greece, 
with Athens boastino the desire to redeem Ottoman Greeks, made the sale of the ships an 
b 
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unneutral act. Morgenthau noted that the Ottomans had purchased the Sultan Osman-i 
Evvel from Brazil and that Greece had as valid a right to acquire warships from the 
United States. Djemal noted that if the sale of the battleships were strictly a commercial 
sale, the Ottoman government was willing to bid for the ships. Morgenthau advised 
Djemal that the Porte should contact the Ottoman ambassador in Washington and 
address President Wilson directly. 235 
The Porte found some relief in the "small navy" minority in Congress. Rustem 
Bey, the new Ottoman ambassador to Washington, presented his credentials to President 
Wilson on 22 June. At this meeting, the proposed battleship sale was mentioned. 
President Wilson informed the ambassador that Athens had given assurances the warships 
were wanted for peaceful purposes. Ambassador Rustem issued an official statement as 
following: 
The contention that the sale of the two battleships will restore the naval 
balance between Turkey and Greece and would prevent the explosion of 
hostilities is faulty. If the two American battleships came into possession 
of Greece before Turkey gets the two battleships now under construction 
for her, they \Vill add to the considerable superiority she [Greece] already 
enjoys over Turkey. If she [Greece] gets them after Turkey gets hers, 
which are super-dreadnoughts, she [Greece] would fall into a state of 
distinct inferiority. The American action would miss its very honorable 
object and in reality \vould amount to taking sides with Greece against 
Turkey in the naval rivalry betv-.'een the powers.236 
The House debated the amendment again on 23 June. Presidential pressure 
encouraged House members to pass the bill as quickly as possible. The New York Times 
2310aniels, 384-385 .. 
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quoted an unnamed navy official who said, "Greece would not have been willing to pay 
the price unless her needs were urgent." The Greek authorities had agreed to pay three 
times the real market value of the two pre-dreadnought battleships and the financial 
aspect had been used to support the President's cause. Opposition was voiced by 
Representative Stafford of Virginia, who stated, "Because Turkey may be a despised 
nation, it is no reason why our [U.S.] government should tinge its own policy by 
becoming a party to the difficulties existing between Turkey and Greece .... "237 The 
Naval Appropriation Bill was passed by 175 votes to 89 with the final asking price for 
the ships $11,500,000. 238 The New York Times, citing ambassador Rustem's concerns, 
suggested Istanbul make an offer for the warships exceeding the asked price. 239 On 22 
June 1914, at 2:00, Commander P. D. Tsouklas of the Royal Greek Navy called upon the 
President and arranged the sale. As Commander Tsouklas left the office of the President, 
the Ottoman ambassador Rustem entered, fifteen minutes too late to make a counter 
offer. 240 The Louisville Courier-Journal of l July 1914 reported upon the sale, "There 
will be no direct dealing between the United States and the Greek government involved in 
the sale of the battleships Idaho and Mississippi. Navy Secretary Joseph Daniels said the 
vessels were to be sold by the Navy Department to private firms, which would transfer 
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title to the Greek Government." The Courier-Journal reported on 3 July 1914, just prior 
to the sale, that "the Greek government not in talks, the ships are to be sold to an agent of 
an American shipbuilding company." 
The sale of the Idaho and Mississippi was formalized on 8 July 1914. The buyer 
was Fred J. Gauntlett, now a representative of the Newport News Shipbuilding 
Company, and the sale price was $12,535,276.98. Congress voted to expend the proceeds 
from the sale on a third battleship of what was originally a two-ship order of New Mexico 
class. Subsequently two of the three battleships would be christened BB 41 Mississippi 
and BB 42 Jdaho. 241 
Both ships were relatively new, having been commissioned in 1908. The 
armament and machinery were in excellent shape, and the vessels working in tandem 
could hold their own in a duel with whatever the Ottomans had or would have, including 
the Sultan Osman-i Evvel. Additionally, the Greeks possessed smaller ancillary ships in 
quantities sufficient to dominate battle space. During the Balkan conflict, Greek de-
stroyers, with superior numbers, had dominated battle space while the Avera.fl had dueled 
with the Ottoman battleships. Even \Vith the possible addition of the Sultan Osman-i 
Evvel, the Ottomans could face a Greek naval foe having two powerful squadrons 
separated sufficiently so that a diluted Ottoman force risked defeat. 
The Mississippi was decommissioned on 21 July 1914 and turned over to the 
Royal Hellenic Navy the same day. Renamed Lemnos, the ship would stay in Norfolk, 
241 Gardiner, 117. 
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Virginia for several weeks in order to facilitate turnover. The Lemnos had a length of 
382', beam of77', main armament of 4x12", secondary armament of8x8" and 8x7", gross 
tonnage of l 3,000, and a speed of seventeen knots. 242 The Lemnos (the ex-Mississippi) 
and the Kilkis (the ex-Idaho), by virtue of being acquired while still in American active 
service, ,vere battle-ready. Both ships were fully armed and coaled. The Ottomans now 
faced the threat that the Greeks might strike first before the Sultan Osman-i Evvel could 
be conveyed into the Aegean theater. The Lemnos sailed for Greece the last week in July 
and arrived for transit through the Mediterranean the second week in August 1914. The 
Kilkis was turned over to the Royal Hellenic Navy at Villefranche, France. Djemal feared 
the Greek battleships could converged and, along with Greek submarines, overwhelm the 
Sultan Osman-i Evve/. 243 
Admiral Kerr, head of the British Naval Mission in Greece, was highly critical of 
the transaction and characterized Greek Prime Minister Venizelos as "penny-wise and 
pound foolish." Kerr described the two battleships as worn out and obsolescent, totally 
unfit for military service. The British Admiral preferred small ships for the Greek fleet 
but, just as importantly, English-built ships. German and French shipyards had received 
the bulk of Greek orders, and the British shipyards were concerned. The British Greek 
mission, just like the Ottoman mission, had the primary directive of securing contracts for 
British shipyards. 
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The fear of Greek attack upon the Sultan Osman-i Evvel was not a view the 
Ot1omans held solely. In May 1914 the British Commander-in-Chief of the 
Mediterranean fleet, Admiral Michael de Robeck, warned Istanbul that Athens would 
140 
attack the Sultan Osman-i Evvel with submarines as the ship transited the Straits of 
Gibraltar. Additionally, King Constantine of Greece alluded to a "preventive" strike prior 
to the ship's arrival in talks with German and British ambassadors. 244 On 13 June 1914 the 
Ottomans declared a state of emergency in the Gulf of I21nit and the Dardanelles because 
of Greek naval maneuvers reinforcing the need to acquire the Sultan Osman-i Evvel to 
prevent a possible Greek preemptive strike. 
In July 1914 Armstrongs delayed releasing the ship and Djemal appealed to the 
French to intervene with London to release the battleship.245 The warnings given to 
Djemal by Robeck and the endless delays from Armstrongs added to the perception that 
London did not want to release the ship. Djemal wrote that he believed the warning was 
an attempt to frighten the Ottomans into leaving the Sultan Osman-i Evvel in English 
custody until Resadiye was ready in late 1914.246 
Djemal consulted with the British advisor to the Ottoman Navy, Admiral Limpus, 
and with written confirmation from the Armstrongs for a delivery date, decided to send 
the prospective crew of the Sultan Osman-i Evvel to England. The crew embarked on the 
24"Djernal, 96; and see Elliot to Grey, Athens, 28 May 1914, found in G.P. Gooch 
and Harold Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. X, 




Reschid Pasha with Captain RadufBey, the prospective commanding officer of the 
battleship."'17 Captain Raouf earned the position of prospective commanding officer of the 
Sultan Osman-i Evvel by the exploits of the cruiser Hamidiye in the Balkan Wars. The 
Hamidiye was well crewed, disciplined, and professional, all due to Raoufs leadership. 
Preceding Raouf would be the engineers, Captain Hassan, Lieutenant Arrif, Lieutenant 
Mazmi, and others. Hassan was tasked with ensuring the Sultan Osman-i Evvel met 
Istanbul's requirements. Among the physical alterations required were the complete 
separation of engineering from line officers, both dining and sleeping quarters. 
Plumbing fixtures were required to be lowered in order that feet, hands, and face could be 
washed in the oriental, or crouched, position. Water closets were removed in favor of 
cones sunk into the deck for squatting, with water taps placed for the left hand. The 
cultural specifications did delay the warship but shipyard conduct suggest intentional 
delaying tactics. 248 
The builder of the Su/ran Osman-i Evvel, Arms!rongs, had all the ordnance except 
the last turret installed, even though two guns had been finished for some time. 
Additionally, the gunsights had been completed but not installed. Finally, brass 
instruction plates or "tallies," UJsed to provide direction, instruction, or information for 
communication, electrical, hydraulic, and ordnance equipment, were etched in Turkish 
with an English translation on the reverse. While the ship was the Rio de Janeiro, the 
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Portuguese tallies had no such English etching on the reverse. 249 The Sultan Osman-i 
Evvel commenced sea trials on 7 July with turnover scheduled for early August. Further 
sea trials provided proof of the speed. On 17 July, on a measured nautical mile, the ship 
achieved 22.42 kts, well above the designed speed. But for unexplained reasons the ship 
did not return directly to the shipyard at Tyneside, but instead steamed north to Leith 
Harbour in Scotland for three days of idleness. While the ship was at sea, Europe found 
itself on the eve of World War I. The ship returned to Tyneside on 22 July. 
In early June, the British Admiralty quietly suggested to Armstrongs and Vickers 
to decelerate judiciously the final stages of construction of the two Ottoman battleships. 
Though the Reshadieh was six months away from completion, the Sultan Osman-i Evvel 
needed only the fitting of gunsights, ammunition, and the final two guns to be completed. 
Captain Raouf had arrived on 22 July, and the crew on 27 July aboard the Neshid Pasha. 
Raouf voiced displeasure over the delays with Armstrongs officials and received 
assurances of delivery on 2 August. 
On 31 July Germany sent an ultimatum to France and Russia concerning 
mobilization of troops and border violations inflicted upon German soil. Churchill 
decided to seize the Ottoman ships without consulting England's Prime Minister Lloyd 
George or the Cabinet. Instead he made his decision after talking with military leaders 
.




210E. David Cronon, ed., The Cabinet Diaries ofJosephus Daniels 1913-1921 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 153. 
143 
Armstrongs should be informed that they [Armstrongs] must understand that in view of 
present circumstances, the Government cannot permit the ship to be handed over to a 
Foreign Po\ver or to be commissioned as a public ship of a Foreign Government, or to 
leave their juriscliction." 251 On 31 July the Ottoman government paid the last installment 
of $3,402,000 on the Sultan Osman-i Evvel. 252 The prospective crew and captain had 
arrived at pier side to "officially" accept the ship, but English First Lord of the Admiralty, 
Sir Winston Churchill, ordered the ships requisitioned on 2 August. The Grand Vizier, 
Said Halim, along with the Interior Minister, Talaat Bey, confronted the British charge 
d'affaires at Istanbul on how unfriendly an act seizing the warships had been. Addition, 
Talaat Bey reminded Beaumont that Churchill had waited until the last installment had 
been paid on the loan: a Joan from English shipbuilders at twenty percent interest.253 
Resentment over the requisition of the two ships is evident in the Sultan's declaration of 
\Var: " ... England complains that Turkey without any preliminary notice bought two 
warships from Germany [Goeben and Breslau]. It should be borne in mind, however, 
that before \,var was declared, the English government ordered the seizure of two 
dreadnoughts that were being built for Turkey in British yards and that one of these 
dreadnoughts, the Sultan Osman, was seized half an hour before the appointed time when 
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the Turkish flag was to have been raised over the ship; and that finally no indemnity was 
paid for these confiscations ... "254 Resentment over the loss of the Sultan Osman-i Evvel 
and the Resadiye did not immediately lead to war with England or the feared attack from 
Greece. But the British action did remove any objections Anglophile in Istanbul had to 
the Ottoman-German alliance. 
The political intrigue surrounding the Goeben and SMS Bres!au began in mid-
July 1914 and not upon the arrival in Istanbul of the two warships on 8 August. On 22 
July the German ambassador to the Ottoman court, Baron von Wangenheim, 
recommended to the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Said Halim, and the War Minister, Enver 
Pasha, that Istanbul should not conclude an alliance of any kind. The Ottoman Empire 
faced the difficult task of implementing internal reforms and needed peace to be 
successful. Wangenheim urged Said Halim to explore support from one of the Great 
PO\ver groups and not a military alliance. Istanbul was not prepared to conduct military 
operations and would have been a drain and not an asset.255 The belief that the Ottoman 
Empire would be a drain and not an asset was also voiced by the Austrian ambassador, 
Margrave Pallavicini, on 23 July. However, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany disagreed, 
stating, "Under no circumstances at all can we afford to turn them [the Ottoman Empire] 
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away. 11256 The Kaiser's views prevailed, and a Treaty of Alliance was agreed upon on 2 
August J 914. The treaty provided for the protection of the Ottoman Empire from 
Russian aggression and gave the German military mission full control over the Ottoman 
ground forces. 257 
On 1 August 1914 Ambassador Pallavicini informed Said Halim that intelligence 
reports implied that Russia planned to attack the Bosporus, conduct an amphibious 
landing against Bulgaria, and sever communications with Austria by cutting the cables 
through Romania. Wangenheim suggested the Goeben be dispatched to Istanbul to 
reinforce the Ottoman fleet and check potential Russian aggression.258 
The fighting commenced when Russia declared war on 2 August 1914. The 
German General Lim an von Sanders, head of the military mission at Istanbul, along with 
Ottoman War Minister Enver Pasha, wanted permission from the German Foreign Office 
to seize three Russian merchant ships at anchor in Istanbul. The Grand Vizier refused to 
consent for fear the British would seize the two dreadnoughts building in British yards. 259 
Said Halim was hesitant to aHow German or Austrian-Hungarian warships permission to 
transit the Straits, fearing it could antagonize Russia and complicate treaty negotiations 
2
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with Bulgaria. 2c,o Said Halim did have real concerns. Russia mobilized military units in 
western Russia on 31 August, along with naval units in the Black Sea. The Black Sea 
was neutral, and neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary had naval forces in the Littoral. 
The Ottomans faced Russian naval mobilization against a neutral Ottoman Empire; a 
buildup of Russian ground forces in the Caucasus; seizure of the Sultan Osman-i Evvel 
and the Resadiye by England; and a shortage of armaments for the defenses of the Straits. 
All this, coupled with the warning of an impending Russian invasion, placed Istanbul in a 
precarious position: how to keep neutral until the slow mobilization had progressed 
enough to be successful and how to protect the Empire from real threats. 
Said Halim also faced the threat that Greece would attack immediately. The 
seizure of the two Ottoman battleships and the arrival in mid-July of the two American 
purchased warships gave Athens a considerable advantage in naval strength. Greek 
Prime Minister Venizelos still coveted Asia Minor and "Greater Bellas." Only at the 
expense of Istanbul could Greek aspirations be achieved. In mid-August, Venizelos 
favored an immediate attack on Thrace and a rush towards Istanbul. The Entente reacted 
unfavorably to this suggestion because of Russian desires for physical control of the 
Straits. Additionally, Greece's King Constantine, Kaiser Wilhelm's brother-in-law, 
desired neutrality. 261 
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Ambassador Wangenheim requested sortie of the Goeben to Istanbul was rejected 
by the Kaiser on 2 August. 262 But once Churchill seized the Sultan Osman-i Evvel and 
the Resadiye on 2 August, German Admiral Tirpitz ordered the Goeben and the Breslau 
to Istanbul. Tirpitz did not deploy the Mediterranean squadron to the DardanelJes just to 
protect the Ottoman Empire. Istanbul had agreed to the Treaty of Alliance on 2 August 
1914 and Berlin wanted to show tangible support for Enver. Tirpitz also suggested 
offering Souchon's services to Istanbul along with additional naval personnel because 
since hostilities had commenced on 2 August, the prospects of the two ships transiting to 
secure waters were slight. Tirpitz had three choices: attempt to rush to Germany and risk 
encountering Entente naval units; flee to the Austrian base at Cato; or dispatch the 
vessels to Istanbul as requested by Wangenheim. 
It appeared that the final decision was taken by Souchon himself. According to 
Tirpitz, on 3 August news was received of the Alliance with the Ottoman Empire, orders 
were sent to Souchon to attempt to break through to the Dardanelles.263 On 5 August the 
German Embassy at Istanbul reported that in view of the situation there, it was 
undesirable for the ships to arrive for the present. Thereupon, orders for the Dardanelles 
were canceled and Souchon, who was then coaling at Messina, Sicily, was directed to 
proceed to Pola or break out into the Atlantic. Later in the day, Austria, in spite of the 
pressure that Berlin was applying, refused to declare war on France or England and thus 
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could not help Germany's Mediterranean Squadron. Under the circumstances ·t 
, 1 ,vas 
decided to give Souchon liberty to decide for himself which line of escape to attempt. 
The Porte on 6 August, looked to strengthen the military position and clarify the 
relationship between Istanbul and the Alliance. In exchange for the Ottomans' allowino 
b 
German and Austrian warships access to the Straits, Wangenheim agreed to abolition of 
the capitulations; support of Istanbul when dealing with Romania and Bulgaria; 110 peace 
while Ottoman territories were occupied by Entente forces; siding with Istanbul if war 
with Greece ensued; securing the lower Caucasus Region for Pan-Islamic goals; and 
ensuring appropriate war indemnity. 264 Wangenheim accepted the agreement that 
formally assured the Ottomans tangible gains after victory if Istanbul entered the war 011 
the Alliance side. 
The Goeben and the Breslau arrived outside of the Dardanelles on 8 August I 914. 
Captain Hamann, Naval Attache of the Germany Embassy in Istanbul, requested and six 
thousand tons of coal from the Ottoman Naval Minister, Djemal Pasha. Djemal agreed 
and was led to believe the coaling would take place outside of Ottoman territorial waters. 
The actions of the ruling junta in Istanbul concerning the arrival of Goe bin and Breslau 
indicates that the ships were not expected. Djemal was made aware of the impending 
arrival of the Goeben and the Breslau while dining at the Grand Vizier's home. Enver 
granted permission for the warships to enter Ottoman waters without discussing the 
situation with the Council of Ministers, the nominal ruling body of the C.U.P. and thus 
264 Trumpener, 28. 
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the Ottoman Ernpire.2c,s 
According to the rules of neutrality, the Ottomans were bound either to return the 
ships to the Aegean within 24 hours or to disarm and intern the ships and crews.266 The 
triumvirate ruling the Ottoman government--War Minister Enver Pasha, Minister of 
Marine Djemal Pasha, and Interior Minister Talaat Bey--along with Grand Vizier Said 
Halim, did not desire to send the two German warships to certain destruction by returning 
the ships to the Aegean. The alternative, that the ships be disarmed and the crews 
interned, was denounced by Ambassador Wangenheim. The dilemma the Ottomans 
faced was not wanting to antagonize the British into war when Istanbul was not prepared 
but not wanting to perturb an ally, Germany.267 
The triumvirate decided that the ships would be disarmed and the crews interned. 
Talaat Bey and Ottoman Foreign Minister Hali! Bey informed Ambassador Wangenheim, 
who refused to consent regardless of the consequences. When informed by German 
Chief of Staff Admiral von Pohl that the Goeben and Breslau were trapped and Kaiser 
Wilhelm instructed Souchon to use his ownjudgment.268 
The plot to purchase the Goeben and Breslau seems to have been formulated at a 
meeting once Germany's position on the ships' fate was clear. On 12 August 1914 
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Ambassador Wangenheim was presented with the suggested sale. Wangenheim then 
communicated with Berlin and received a favorable response. The "sale" was ao d :::,ree 
iso 
upon with the stipulation that Souchon be accepted into the Ottoman Navy. But no 
mention of the impending sale is found in ADM Georg Alexander von Muller's diaries. 
Such an event, the sale or transfer of Germany's Mediterranean Squadron to the Ottoman 
government, would have warranted at least a mention unless it had been planned ahead of 
time, or unless Souchon acted upon his own with the German foreign services' blessing. 
The theory that the sale was planned ahead of time is unsubstantiated. The 
principal characters in both the Ottoman and German political and military circles have 
never alluded to such a scheme. The "sale" violated Article Fifty-six of the London 
Maritime Declaration of 1909, which declared that the transfer or sale of merchant 
vessels after declaration of hostilities was null and void. Germany had agreed to the 
treaty but the Ottoman Empire had not ratified or adopted the declaration.269 The answers 
may lie in the choices open to the Admiral and in the Kaiser's instructions to Souchon to 
use his judgment. All options for Souchon were negative. Internment would mean loss 
of ships and having to sit out the war. Returning to the Dardanelles meant certain defeat 
unless the Austrians came into the Aegean Sea to assist in the battle with the British fleet 
waiting at the mouth. Movement into the Black Sea would mean a short deployment and 
ultimately failure due to lack of refueling and rearming facilities. "Selling" the ships 
allowed Souchon the opportunity to fight another day when the odds were more 
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favorable. Finally, any decision the Ottomans made had to take into account th t G 
a ennan 
sailors still commanded the guns of the Goeben and the Breslau, and an unfavorable 
outcome could result in the shelling of Istanbul.270 
The Goeben was a first-generation dreadnought capable of doing battle with 
anything the Russians possessed or would construct during the duration of the war. The 
Goeben had a length of 610', a beam of 97', main armament of IOx 11 ", secondary 
armament of 12x5.9" and 10x3.4", with a gross tonnage of22,640 and a speed of27 
knots. 271 German naval engineers reviewing the results of Port Arthur and Tsu-Shima in 
order to increase survivability, added a 4,000-ton girdle and shifted coal bunkers to 
minimize damage from mines and torpedoes. 272 The Breslau, a protected cruiser, had a 
length of 461 't, a beam of 45', main armament of l 2x4. l ", a gross tonnage of 5587, and a 
speed of25 knots. 273 The two ships operating in tandem with support from other Ottoman 
fleet units could project sufficient power to duel with the Russian Black Sea fleet. 
HO\vever, the supporting Ottoman units were in marginal states of readiness. Inadequate 
ancillary support from Ottoman capital ships prevented Souchon from achieving battle 
space domination in the Black Sea after 1916. 
270 Walder, 28. 
271 Guleryliz, 141-142. 
212Dan van der Vat, The Ship That Changed the World (Bethesda, MD: Adler & 
Adler, 1986), 39. 
273/bid., 150-15]. 
152 
The Ottoman government on 11 August 1914 informed the Allies of the purchase 
and of the reasoning behind it: the need for bargaining with Greece on equal terms.274 
Dealing with Greece tended to be the underlining drive for warship possession, either 
purchased and built in England, as in Sultan Osman-i Evvel and Resadiye, or acquired 
from Germany, as in the Brandenburg-class battleships. Control of the Goeben and 
Breslau and makeup of the crews seems to have favored the Allies and not Germany. 
Grand Vizier Said Halim had requested Admiral Limpus and his staff to stay. Djemal 
agreed to remove the German crews in favor of sailors selected by Lim pus and Djemal 
noted the two ships would not leave the Sea of Marmara so as not to provoke England or 
Russia. 275 
Admiral Ebergard understood that the strategic situation was unfavorable to 
Russia. The two German warships were in neutral waters and not interned. Ebergard 
proposed to exercise similar right of entry with the most powerful units the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet could muster. Russia could then demand that Istanbul order the German ships 
south to the Aegean Sea and the waiting English fleet or fight at point-blank range of the 
Bosporus. Such a fight would negate the long-range capabilities of the Yavaz, and the 
numerically superior Russian Fleet would have an advantage. Ebergard prepared the fleet 
at the same time informing the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry. France and England 
refused to agree to the action, and the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry scrapped the plan 
274 Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey, l I August 1914, found in Lumby, 433. 
275Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, 18 August 1914, Istanbul, found in Lumby, 445. 
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in the hope that lstanbul would remain neutral. 276 
Istanbul did not fully control the Goeben or the Breslau, as is evident from the 
behavior of the two ships' crews. On 11 August the German crews boarded French and 
English merchant ships interned in the Dardanelles and destroyed communications 
equipment and seized supplies. 277 The German crews' actions throughout August 1914 
indicated Istanbul had little or no control whatsoever over Souchon or the warships and 
may have feared antagonizing the Germans by pressing the need to uphold neutrality 
laws. 
The situation concerning the Goeben, renamed the Yavuz Sultan Selim (Yavuz), 
and the Breslau, renamed Midilli, became less favorable to the Allies when, on 14 August 
Limpus submitted a report to the Grand Vizier. The report concerned not only the 
manning of the Yavuz and the MidWi, but the political course that the Ottoman Empire 
should proceed to observe strictest neutrality. Limpus overstepped his authority by 
suggesting Ottoman political procedure and bypassed his civilian authority, the Ottoman 
Minister of Marine, Djemal. Additionally, the report was written in English. The Grand 
Vizier could read English; Djemal could not. Djemal reminded Limpus that his position 
in the Ottoman Empire was to assist the Minister of Marine and not offer unsolicited 
political opinions. Limpus apologized for exceeding his authority and requested leave to 
visit his daughter in Therapia. Djemal agreed to Limpus' appeal for leave but also 
276George Nekrasov, North ofGal!ipoli: The Black Sea Fleet at War, 1914-1917 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 20-21. 
277Giers to Sazonoff, 12 August 1914, Istanbul. In Scott, Vol. II, 1393. 
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pointed out that to avoid misunderstanding between the British advisors and Ottoman 
crews, the Admiral's staff should work out of the Marine Ministry while Lim pus was in 
Therapia. 278 
On 16 August 1914, all the British advisors to the Ottoman Minister of Marine 
departed because Limpus removed his officers from Ottoman ministerial service.219 
Djemal did not remove the British naval mission in favor of Souchon. Souchon became 
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Ottoman Fleet only after Limpus removed himself. 
The Germans filled the vacuum that the British created. Had Limpus stayed, he would 
have been the German Admiral's superior. Limpus was highly respected by Sultan 
Mehmet V, \vho regretted deeply England's decision to remove him.280 
Germany now controlled the armed forces of the Ottoman Empire. General 
Limon von Sanders directed the army, and Admiral Souchon the fleet. Wangenheim 
understood fully that with Germans in charge of Istanbul's armed forces, the Porte would 
have to fulfill any treaty obligations and not renounce agreed upon commitments. 
\Vangenheim's implied scheme to enforce Ottoman compliance was stated in a telegram 
to German Foreign Minister Jagow before the war commenced.281 
218 Djemal, 12 l. 
279Mr. Beaumont to Sir E. Grey, 15 August 1914, found in Lumby, 437. See also 
Giers to Sazonoff, 31 August 1914, Istanbul, found in Scott, Vol. II, 1412. 
280Scott, Vol. II, 1123-1124. 
281 Wangenheim to Jagow, No. 371, 27 July 1914, Istanbul. In Montgelas, 242. 
London underestimated the reaction to the seizing of the battleships and moved 
quickly to correct Churchill's blunder. In order to ease Istanbul's concerns Churchill 
' 
proposed on 19 August an arrangement in which the Ottomans would have received at 
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the end of the war either the two requisitioned dreadnoughts, fully repaired, or else their 
full value; and in either case Britain would pay Istanbul $4,860 a day in weekly 
installments for every day the ships were kept. This arrangement would have come into 
force on the day when the last officer and man belonging to the Goeben and Breslau had 
left and would have continued as long as the Ottomans remained neutral.282 The Porte 
rejected the offer as being too little, too late. Souchon was appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Fleet on 17 August 1914.283 
The offer from Churchill was not in the best interest of the Ottomans. England 
removed Lim pus and, if Souchon left, the Ottomans would not have the technical 
expertise needed to manage such a diverse fleet. Also, unless some German specialist 
stayed, the Yavuz and the Midilli would quickly deteriorate, as witnessed by the two 
Brandenburg.•;. Removing Souchon and without some leadership for the first line of 
defense, would have invited aggression from a rapidly improving Russian Black Sea 
Fleet or the British-advised Greek fleet. 
Any difficulties London had with Istanbul were created in London. The Ottomans 
desired to enter into a military agreement with London and Paris only to be rebuffed in 
282 Lumby, 427. 
283 0jemal, 122. 
favor of St. Petersburg. The Porte wished only to maintain the status quo and to have 
reaffirmed Ottoman sovereignty in the questionable regions of Egypt and the Aegean 
islands. The foreign policy of London towards the Ottomans and Islamic reofons in 
b 
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general created ethical dilemmas for any Anglophiles in the Young Turk government. 
British naval officers still staffed the detested Greek navy. The seizure of the two 
dreadnoughts and the desperately needed ammunition for the Dardanelles forts, all paid 
for in advance, shifted public opinion away from anything British. The general belief 
was that England could have stopped Italian and Greek seizures of Ottoman territory and 
the subsequent massacre of Muslims if London had wished. Additionally, England 
refused to remove warships from the Shatt-el Arab waterway after the Porte provided 
copies of the Turco-British Declaration of 29 July 1913, which specified the delineation 
of Ottoman sovereignty. The Porte wished only to maintain neutrality and the status 
quo.2&4 
Religion is also believed to have been a part of Britain's foreign policy towards 
the Ottoman Empire. England controlled India and Egypt, both with large Muslim 
populations. The Ottomans believed that England wished to control the personage of the 
"Chalif of lslam. "285 The British Admiral Fisher knew that England need the Ottoman 
Empire in order to supply Russia and because of the influence of Islam. He preferred to 
284Sir L. Mallet to Sir E. Grey, Istanbul, 12 October 1914. In Scott, Vol. II, 1126-
1127. 
285 Djemal, 112. 
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have the Ottomans on England's side ai1d ·d 1. . J avo1 a re 1g1ous fight.-86 
With Souchon in control of tl o 
· 1e ttoman navy, German specialists replaced 
Fnglish advisors, and operational control be 1 G ~ came most y erman. On 30 August 1914 
Admiral Guido von Usedom arrived and began the rebuilding of the Dardanelles 
defenses. German shipyard workers arrived and repairs were started on fleet units. The 
dismal state of readiness was highlighted in Ottoman papers. The blame was placed 
squarely upon the British. Anti-British propaganda became rampant throughout Istanbul, 
and Anglophiles became scarce. 
On 27 September Sir Louis Mallet, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, was 
reported to have gone to the Sultan himself to offer the return of the two ships. The 
British \Vere slow in realizing the level of discontent that materialized in the Ottoman 
Empire over the two popularly subscribed ships.287 The two dreadnoughts were needed 
by the Royal Navy, but future delivery of new construction could allow the warships' 
return to Ottoman control. Returning the ships could diminish the uproar over the seizure 
and remove the major grievance used by Enver to incite the Ottoman populace against the 
Entente. Restoration of the two ships could also encourage Djemal and the Grand Vizier 
to advocate a proactive neutrality. Sultan Mehmet V, being a constitutional sovereign, 
could not comment on the Mallet suggestion, opting to consult with the government. 
Suggesting to return what was rightfully Ottoman property, and requiring complete 
m Marder, 26. 
2s1Frank G. Weber, Eagles on !he Crescent: Germany, Austria and the Diplomacy 
of I he Turkish A fl iance 1914-1918 (London: Cornell University Press, 1970), 79 · 
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neutrality, was not in Istanbul's interest. Th 
e Ottomans recognized that for the Empire to 
be protected from schemes of partition the E · . h . . . . 
, mpne ad to ms1st on mtervenhon. A 
successful conflict could redraw the map in ti B lk . 
1e a ans and eastern Anatolia. Being on 
the winning side could also protect Muslims . ·ct· · · · d' 
1es1 mg m temtones a Jacent to the 
Ottoman Empire. A military triumph over a Elti·opean Ch · t· t' b · h 
~ ns rnn consor lllm, e 1t t e 
Entente or the Alliance, would reaffirm Ottoman leadership in the Islamic world. The 
Porte declined the offer from Ambassador Mallet. By late September Souchon began to 
conduct Black Sea interdiction sorties, hoping to encounter the Russian Black Sea fleet 
and creating the causation for war. 
The desire for dreadnoughts was not just an Ottoman lust for supremacy against 
the Empire's enemies. Supremacy over both Russia and Greece was hopeless, but parity 
was not. A review of dreadnought acquisitions in the Ottoman region from 1909 to 1917 
shows clearly that Jstanbul sought out capital ships to offset its traditional enemies, 
Greece and Russia. Had Athens and St. Petersburg not acquired such assets, Ottoman 
ship acquisition patterns indicated Istanbul would not have expended such funds.Ottoman 
shipbuilding and overseas purchases prior to 1910 favored coastal craft rather than 
capital ships. The acquisition of smaller ships allowed for coastal defense and protection 
of an empire under creeping territorial violation. Smaller ships also doubled for 
smuggling interdiction and revenue enforcement. Finally, smaller ships could be serviced 
in existing Ottoman yard facilities. Capital ships were too expensive an asset to hazard in 
battle, to operate in peace, and to use for revenue protection. Table 17 clearly shows that 
Ottoman capital ship acquisitions were fueled by adversarial procurement of such assets. 
TABLEJ7 





]-Dann Zlatous (Russia) (June) 
Evasta/U (Russia) (June) 




Greece attempts to buy Argentine 
battleships (September) 
Salam is ordered (July) 
l 913 
Greek attempts to buy Rio de Janeiro 
(November) 
1914 
Russia negotiates to purchase 
Chilean and Argentine battleships 
(January) 
Greeks order Lorraine class from 
France (March) 
The Ottoman Empire 
Barbados Hayreddin/Torgud Reis 
(September) 
Resadiye ordered (June) 
Mahmud Resad V (June) 
Mahmud Resad V (canceled) (June) 
Rio de Janeiro bought (January) 
159 
TABLE 17 (CONTINUED) 
American shipbuilder negotiates 
10 sell five battleships to Greece 
(April) 
Jdahol Mississippi bought (Greece) 
(July) 
1915 
Jmperalrica Mar[ja (Russia) (July) 
Faith ordered (April) 
Goeben!Breslau arrived (September) 
Jmperatrica Ekaterina Velikcy·a (Russia) (October) 
1916 
]9]7 
Volvo (ex-lmperator Aleksandr 111) 
(R~ssia) (June) 
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Fueling the race for capital ships were R · B 
. ussian lack Se l 
a P ans drawn up bv 
Russian Vice Admiral Ivan K. Grigorovitch Rus · M" . · 
16] 
' . sian mister of Mar1·ne. I A 
n. pril 191 I 
Grigorovitch had laid clown a naval budget callin for a Bl 
g ack Sea fleet one and one-half 
times the combined forces of Bulgaria, Romania and tl , 0 . , 1e ttoman Emp1re. Additionallv . ' 
the Russian Duma approved funds for an accelerated Black S . 
ea construction program in 
Aprn J '1 t '+ w u1 uc1 tu cuumer rne two Uttoman dreadno alt. b ·ict· . 
ub 1 s ui mg m England. 
The accelerated Russian Black ~P::i {'f\nc-1,-,,n,:n., .. I .••• , ,;_,;,, ·, :1 l I 
---··, ... ~ .. s ,-vw1 u1e vreeK acquisition 
of the two American battleships, found the Ottomans surrounded by well-armed 
belligerents. To counterbalance the threa_ts. two mnrlPn,. r1,.,.,,r1",, .. -1 •• _ ,__,, 
o---~ ................ uvv11 
painstakingly purchased via public subscription: not for offensive but defensive pur-
6r1 .,,ntn.l,n,-,n nnn,•npc5ses. 1i\lelmei,..CJ1"e-eC~T1or 1Rliss1a had legitimate fears from the Cup rneD:1-'n'1,.e,..,~H~ ,,,,,,. .. ~0 • ,,,~Al, 6 ,,I, 
· · · b . owever, 
territory from both Russia and Greece, and thus it had genuine concerns. 
The acquisition of capital ships for most countries involved nationalistic 
...._,.\,\.'iJllll.4-J..\: l_..·Jt.JL.,\..;lJ.l) ~J'-'-'.111...l !Vl fvllV -,,H.LI!--'._., ••~ ,._llV ._,.....,,.,_...._ ._ .... -... ' .l 
ambitions more u1an actual security. !·or tl1e Uttoman Empire, capital ships were an 
assurance against unchecked waterborne aggression. Battleships provided a level of 
security not found with fixed fortifications. Enemies plan strategies to avoid or confront 
battleships, and having such assets can prevent wars if utilized correctly. The Ottomans 
needed the Sulwn Osman-i Evve/ and Resadiye to confront Greek aggression. The 
Ottoman citizenry paid for the ships in the belief the vessels would prevent future 
massacres of Muslims by Christians. The ships were not delivered, and the fear became 
reality. 
CHAPTER V 
NAVAL AVIATION AND SUBMARINES 
Ottoman Naval Aviation officially began in May 1915 by order of Enver Pasha, 
the Ottoman War Minister and acting Minister of the Marine. Using assets of the German 
naval unit covering the Dardanelles, a seaplane base was constructed near the Ottoman 
Army Air station of San Stefano on the shore of the Sea of Marmara. Six seaplanes were 
ordered, and six Ottoman naval officers were sent to Wilhelmshaven in Germany for 
instruction. Additionally, pilots and observers began to train at San Stefano in order to 
augment German naval units in-country. Ottoman naval assets made only token 
appearances during the Dardanelles battles because the pertinent tasks were carried out by 
the more established Ottoman Air Force.288 
The basic task of naval aviation during World War I was observation. The need 
for intelligence on enemy ship movements, concentrations, and operations and on seeding 
of new or established minefields was vital in order to protect both the coastline, and the 
waterborne commerce essential to waging war. 
The Ottomans were fully aware of the possibilities of aircraft in warfare. During 
the Italo/Ottoman War, Italian ground forces were served with good intelligence from 
airplanes, and the experience was not lost on the Ottomans. The Hague convention of 
288Cross and Cockade, 116. 
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1899 forbid bombing from balloons but Italy contended that planes were exempt and 
utilized Swedish grenades to attack the Senusi whenever possible.289 During the Balkan 
wars, the Ottomans utilized French-built Deperdussin monoplanes for intelligence and 
forward gunfire observation. The Ottomans did not have trained pilots and were forced 
to utilize the services of an international band of civilian pilots. The foreign pilots were 
employed by the Ottoman "Administration for War Flying."290 The use of air power 
against civilian targets accrued when the Buliarians dropped thirty bombs over 
Adrianople in one day and killed or injured six persons. 291 The Ottomans, in an attempt 
to limit the possible danger from Balkan allies' planes, let it be known that any enemy 
pilot captured would be shot regardless. This threat to shoot downed pilots seems to have 
been a factor in the practice of some Balkan pilots not to drop anything other than paper 
leaflets. 292 
Prior to World War I, the Ottoman Minister of Marine, Ahmad Djemal Pasha, 
contracted with the French government for Ntwport seaplanes and twelve instructors. 
This contract was canceled upon the outbreak of war.293 The French would use the 
2s9Bill Gunston, ed., Chronicle of Aviation (London: Chronicle Communication, 
Ltd., 1992), 28. 
29°Kennett, 18. 
291 The Times History of the War, Vol. II, 182. 
292Cross and Cockade, l 03. 
293Djemal, 162. 
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Ottoman purchased planes against Istanbul in the Dardanelles Campaign.294 Shortly afier 
the landing of the Anglo-French troops at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915, the Special 
Command of the Imperial German Navy in the Ottoman Empire requested seaplanes for 
the Dardanelles front. The mission of the aircrafi would be observation of allied fleet 
units and islands occupied by the Anglo-French forces. Ottoman Air Force planes had 
been concentrating on harassing flights over the beach head but lacked the technical skills 
of observation. The Rumpler and Albatross B-type planes initially pressed into service at 
the outset of war were inadequate for intelligence flights because of short operational 
range. 
The German Imperial Navy Department complied with the request and sent three 
100 h.p. Gotha seaplanes to Istanbul. Because Bulgaria was neutral, the planes were 
shipped via railway to Czernaheviz in Hungary, assembled, flown clandestinely to Lorn 
Palanka in Bulgaria, and reshipped by railway to Istanbul. By the end of July 1915, an 
independent seaplane unit of the German Imperial Navy in the Ottoman Empire was 
formed using volunteer civilian Gotha mechanics, Ottoman sailors, and mixed 
German/Ottoman plane crews. The commanding officer was Kaptain-Leutenant 
Liebmann who answered to the Governor General of the Straits, Admiral Guido von 
' 
Usedom of the Imperial German Navy. The headquarters of the unit was in Yesilkoy. 
The insignia used by Imperial German Naval seaplanes was the German Iron Cross. 
Ottoman naval seaplanes utilized not the Star and Crescent, as found on Ottoman 
294R.D. Layman, B~fore the Aircra} Carrier: The Development of Aviation 
Vessels, 1849-1922 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1989), 18-19. 
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contracted planes in the Balkan wars, but a black square with a white border. The 
rationale for the change is not clear. 
The German naval seaplane unit became the mentor for the Ottoman naval unit. 
The future Ottoman naval pilots "cut their teeth" shadowing German naval pilots. 
Ottoman sailors worked with German naval plane crews until a sufficient number of 
planes arrived to allow for all-Ottoman units. The Ottoman/German naval air units 
developed active and successful operations during the Dardanelles battles in spite of 
limited numbers and the technical defects of the aircraft. The aircraft transferred to the 
Dardanelles theater were stationed at Chanak-Kale on the south shore of the Sea of 
Marmara. Once operational, the units were still under the overall control of Usedom. 
The first operational flights revealed that the I 00 h.p. Gotha seaplanes were 
unsuitable for long-range reconnaissance. Seaplanes were heavier than land based planes 
because of the pontoons and the additional weight increased wind resistance and reduced 
speed. Also, the 100 h.p. Gotha seaplane was woefully underpowered and had a 
maximum altitude of 1000 meters. The combination of slow speed and low ceiling 
resulted in severe gunfire damage. To avoid further casualties and unnecessary damage, 
naval reconnaissance during the Dardanelles campaign was limited to night operations.295 
Reconnaissance undertaken during moonlit nights yielded usable information with 
less danger to the pilots. Ships could be counted, identified and located with little real 
threat of harm. As proficiency improved among both German and Ottoman crews, night 
295Cross and Cockade, 111. 
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295Cross and Cockade, 111. 
166 
bombing raids using twenty-two-pound bombs manufactured in theater were dropped on 
enemy airfields on Imbros and Tenedos. Bombing runs over ground targets invited 
indiscriminate rifle and machine gun fire and the slow speed and low altitude necessitated 
for night vision allowed Allied forces the opportunity to fire on the sound of the engine. 
This resulted in gunfire damage to the seaplanes and injuries to pilots. 
The typical "unit" of the Ottoman Air Force and Naval Aviation was comprised of 
six pilots. Small "sections" of four pilots were also formed. Fighters comprised most of 
the "units," while seaplanes made up many of the "sections." At the start of the Gallipoli 
campaign, the Ottoman Air Force and Naval Aviation was badly outnumbered. Table 18 
shows the balance of air assets at noted dates. The German-Ottoman air assets ( air force 
and naval) were always outnumbered but not out-fought. By November 1915 four 
German Fokker aircraft had arrived via the "Orient Express" now that Bulgaria had joined 
in with the Central Powers. The Fokker fighters were far superior to anything the Anglo-
French air units possessed. The superior aircraft would result in Captain Shakir Feyzi of 
the Ottoman Air Force, also the Chief of Staff of the Ottoman Air Force, achieving "ace" 
status prior to his death on 5 May 1916. 296 
The aggressive nature of the Ottoman pilots in both the Air Force and Navy may 
be attributed to the threat posed by the British Short Type 184, twoseater seaplane. On 
12 August 1915 a British Short from the HMS Ben-My-Cherry, piloted by Lieutenant 
C.H. Edmunds sank the stranded Mahmul Sevket Pasa off Dogan Asian in the 
296Gii I eryiiz, 5 8. 
TABLE18 
AIR ASSETS IN THE OTTOMAN THEATER 
English 
1 short seaplane 
2 Wight seaplanes 
2 Sopwich seaplanes 
2 Sopwich tabloids 
TOTAL: 5 
18 Sopwich tabloids 
1 short seaplane 
2 Wight seaplanes 
2 Sopwich seaplanes 
8 Maurice Farmans 
1 Kite-balloon 
TOTAL: 32 
6 Morane Parasols 
6 B.E. 2c biplanes 
6 Caudron biplanes 
4 Bristol Scouts 
2 short two-seater seaplanes 
2 Wight seaplanes 
2 Sopwich seaplanes 
8 Maurice Farmans 
18 Sopwich tabloids 
TOTAL: 54 
Ottoman 
18 March 1915 
4 Mav 1915 
6 August 1915 
I unarmed Albatross 
TOTAL: 1 
3 Gotha seaplanes 
3 Albatross 
TOTAL: 6 
17 Albatross ( combat) 
3 Gorth seaplanes 
TOTAL: 20 
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Source: Bryan P. Flanagan, ed., "The History of the Ottoman Air Force in the Great War: 
The Reports of Major Erich Semo," Cross and Cockade Journal, Vol. II, No. 2 (Summer 
1970), 116. 
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Dardanelles with the first-plane delivered torpedo in history .297 British plane-delivered 
torpedo attacks occurred until Ottoman air assets could combat the Shorts.298 Anglo-
French land planes flew from ships and bases on Imbros and Tenedos, which 
necessitated a round trip for the Anglo-French planes and reduced the lingering time over 
the beach head. British Shorts carrying torpedoes had even less lingering time because of 
the weight and drag of the weapon. Ottoman pilots combating both torpedo-carrying 
planes and ground-attack aircraf1 flew from relatively close bases, allowing quick 
response to attacks with minimum use of fuel. When Allied planes had to return to 
Imbros or Tenedos because of fuel consumption, the flight to base presented an ideal 
opportunity for Ottoman attacks, for Allied planes could not waste fuel dueling. 
The English utilized several ships for seaplane operations. The French also 
utilized seaplanes from both French and English ships. Unlike Ottoman naval seaplanes, 
the Anglo-French seaplanes were utilized in the combat mode more of1en than the 
reconnaissance or gunfire support aspect. English seaplane tenders are found in Table 
19. 299 
With Bulgaria allied with the Ottomans, delivery of delayed aircraf1 accelerated 
and newly trained Ottoman Navy pilots were directed to fly Gotha seaplanes back to 
Istanbul via the Danube River. The flight facilitated pilot training and sped 
297Gunston, 128. 
298Kennett, 201-2 02. 
299Parks, passim; and Gardiner, 64-67. 
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TABLE19 
ENTENTE SEAPLANE TENDERS IN THE DARDANELLES 
Name Built Tonnage Speed Planes 
(UK) Ben-My-Chree 1908 3888 24 4 
(UK) Empress 1906 2540 21 6 
(UK) Raven 1882 4678 10 2 
(UK) Anne NA 7000 11 2 
(UK) Ark Royal 1914 7450 11 6-8 
Source: O.J. Parks and Maurice Pendergast, eds., Jane's Fighting Ships, 1919 (London: 
Sampson Low Marston, 1919; reprint, New York: Arco Publishing Co., 1969), passim; 
and Robert Gardiner, ed., Conway's All The World's Fighting Ships 1906-1921 (London: 
Conway Maritime Press, 1985; reprint, London: Conway Maritime Press, 1992, 64-67. 
seaplane delivery. 
Combat operations for the Ottoman Naval Air Service consisted primarily of 
reconnoitering of known Allied assets. As the Allies began to press the offensive at 
Gallipoli, the English and French submarines infiltrated the Sea of Marmara. Repeatedly, 
enemy submarines were tracked down and attacked with bombs and small arms fire. Up 
to July 1915 Allied submarines had free reign over the Sea of Marmara. Submarine 
tactics in World War I dictated surface cruising even in daylight, with underwater attacks 
only when stealth was required. Allied attacks upon commercial shipping were in most 
part gunnery practice since torpedoes were expensive and unreliable, the use of deck guns 
was the preferred method of attack. With Ottoman Air Force and later Naval Aviation 
Gotha WD2 flying reconnaissance over the Sea of Marmara, the Allies' nonchalance 
crmsmg was over. 
170 
In order to facilitate anti-submarine flights, a airbase was established in October 
1915 near Rodosto on the northern shore of the Sea of Marmara, halfway between 
Chanak-Kale and Istanbul. A fueling and munitions depot was set up on the Marmara 
island of Kuteli. 300 The overflights harassed Allied submarines so that by January 1916 
Anglo-French commanders suspended submarine operations in the Sea of Marmara.301 
The success Ottoman Naval Aviation had at frustrating Allied submarine attacks 
is remarkable considering the Ottoman planes lacked radios to coordinate attacks and 
munitions adequate for combating submarines. However, the twoseater Gotha provided 
small arms fire and a relatively reliable platform for offensive action. The fear of 
unacceptable losses along with diminishing returns brought the Anglo-French underwater 
offensive to an end by December 1915. 
During the Gallipoli operations, Russian Black Sea ships and aircraft harassed the 
Bosporus Strait and Ottoman naval commanders erected a seaplane base at Anatoli 
Kawak to provide reconnoitering of Russian forces. But with Gallipoli being contested, 
Ottoman Naval Aviation could only divert two 100 h.p. Gotha seaplanes to use for 
observation. The Russian Naval Aviation assets in the Black Sea consisted of seaplanes 
and flying boats. Flying boats have a longer range than seaplanes and can operate in 
inclement weather as well as rough seas. The Ottoman Navy had no flying boats. Russia 
also possessed seaplane tenders capable of projecting reconnoitering over the horizon. 
30°Cross and Cockade, 114. 
301 Gtileryuz, 44. 
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This capability allowed for advance warning of enemy movements, anti-submarine 
duties, offensive combat patrols, guidance through minefields, and forward gunfire 
observations. Table 20 lists the seaplane tenders utilized by the Russian Black Sea Fleet 
during the war. 
Russian seaplane tenders provided support service to flying boats and seaplanes 
while conducting operations at sea. They were utilized extensively for combat operations 
in and around the Ottoman coaling center of Zonguldak. But once Russian Army 
objectives ruled out a serious amphibious landing after the Gallipoli fiasco, and no feint 
towards Istanbul was planned, Russian seaplane tenders were left with shipping 
interdictions and coastal bombardments. 
In the summer of 1916 the German/Ottoman Naval Aviation assets began to 
concentrate on the Black Sea. With Gallipoli a success and the Dardanelles relatively 
secure, the Bosporus became the prime area of concern. The Ottoman naval assets for the 
Black Sea consisted of twelve 150 h.p. Gotha seaplanes with rearward firing machine 
guns. The greatest threat to the Ottoman Navy in the summer of 1916 was mines because 
The Russian Navy mined extensively during the war. Table 21 shows the Russian 
mining campaign carried out against the Ottoman coast. To counter fixed and floating 
offensive mines, Ottoman seaplanes were utilized to locate fields for minesweeping and 
to facilitate safe egress for Ottoman fleet units. 
To protect colliers from Russian mines laid at Zonguldak, a new Ottoman Naval 
air station was erected first at Zonguldak and then moved to Eregeli. Ottoman Naval Air 
assets were vital to protect the Istanbul-Zonguldak route for colliers and seaplanes 
TABLE 20 
RUSSIAN BLACK SEA SEAPLANE TENDERS 
Name Built Tonnage Sneed (knots) 
Sean lanes 
Aleksandr I 1913 9200 15 
Almaz 1903 3285 19 
Nikola} I 1902 3285 19 
Romanian flagged ships utilized seaplane tenders after Romania entered the war on 27 
August 1916. 
Regele Carol I 1898 2369 18 
Romania 1904 3159 18 
lmperator Traian 1907 3418 18 
Dacia 1907 3418 18 
Source: Rene Greger, The Russian Fleet, 1914-1917 (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 
Shepperton, Surrey, 1972), 77; and Robert Gardiner, ed., Conway's All The World's 
Fighting Ships 1906-19 21 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1985; reprint, London: 
Conway Maritime Press, 1992), 64-67. 
TABLE 21 
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE MINING FIGURES 
1247 58 2187 2186 
Source: Rene Greger, The Russian Fleet, 1914-1917 (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 










attacked and harassed Russian minelayers, blockaders, seaplane tenders, and submarines. 
This air protection would be extended to the Varna/Constanta theater area in late 1916. 
The Ottoman defensive positions in the Caucasian region along the Bejuk-Dere 
River proved to be essentially invincible to Russian ground attacks. In order to create a 
pincher movement, Russian troops disembarked at Atina on 4 March 1916. The landing 
was accompanied by two seaplane tenders utilizing twelve 11 Russian hydroplanes." The 
seaplanes also supported the follow-up Rize landing on 7 April that would lead to the 
fall of Trebizond on 18 April 1916.302 
Ottoman naval operational tempo in the Dardanelles wound down because of the 
decreased threat from the Anglo-French forces. In order to divert Allied warships away 
from the Palestine theater, on 20 January 1918 the Yavuz and Midilli sortied down the 
Dardanelles channel. The task of searching for a safe route through the minefields and 
identifying enemy contacts fell to the Ottoman seaplanes. The Yavuz and Midilli attacked 
and sank the British monitors M28 and Raglan at Kusu Bay.303 During the return trip, the 
Midilli ran into a minefield and sank. While return to the Dardanelles, the Yavuz was 
attacked by British land planes from Imbros and was damaged by two contact mines. 
302/bid, 53-54. 
303The Raglan was armed with two 1411 /45 caliber Bethlehem guns originally 
designed for the Greek battleship Salamis. The three other twin turrets for the Salamis 
would be utilized on the British monitors Abercrombie, Havelock, and Roberts. All four 
monitors would take part in shelling Ottoman positions on the Dardanelles. Churchill 
originally named the monitors General Grant (Havelock), Admiral Farragut 
(Abercrombie) and Stonewall Jackson (Roberts), and Robert E. Lee (Raglan) to 
commemorate their U.S. origins. However, political concerns over a flagrant breach of 
American neutrality necessitated the changing of names. See Gardiner, 43-44. 
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Ottoman seaplanes, along with Ot1oman Air force units, held off the British air attack 
while the Yuvaz hobbled to port. On the return trip, the Yavuz ran ground at Nara Bank 
and was subjected to five days of relentless air attacks. The British launched 276 flights 
against the grounded Yavuz, marking the first deliberate air attack upon a battleship.304 
But an aggressive Ottoman air counterattack successfully prevented all but two bombs 
from hitting the Yavuz. 305 The Yavuz freed itself on 26 January 1918 and made for 
Istanbul. 
Ottoman Naval Aviation began to expand from mine clearance to bombing 
operations in the spring of 1918. On 2 April 1918, five 200 h.p. Friedrichshafen 
seaplanes, armed with 60 kilogram bombs, mounted a night mission to Tenedos. Another 
raid occurred on 26 May 1918 against the flying field at Imbros. A daylight raid on 1 
June 1918 by six seaplanes with bombs and incendiaries on the radio station and military 
complex on the island of Mavro was also successful. From July to September, Ottoman 
seaplanes attacked military objectives on Lemnos, Imbros, and Thasos using both day 
and night time attacks. The up-tempo of operation indicate the expertise of Ottoman 
pilots had increased to a level where the traditional defensive role of Naval Aviation was 
supplanted by offensive bombing.306 
In the Ottoman theater of combat, ancillary units existed that supported Ottoman 
aviation or the general war efforts. Such units included German "Pascha" units, weather 
304I-Iuvgaard, 241. 
305Cross and Cockade, 346-347. 
306Cross and Cockade, 357. 
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service and balloon units. The German Army in Palestine requested air assets from Berlin 
and received support in the form of "Pascha" units. Unlike the Ottoman Air Force, 
German Air Force, or the Ottoman Naval Aviation-German Naval Aviation, where 
Istanbul had some control, "Pascha" units were completely under Germany control. 
Since these units were outside Ottoman control, "Pascha" units are not included as 
Ottoman assets. 
In order for planes to be fully utilized with the greatest possible chance of success, 
a weather service was erected in Istanbul. The service was run by Professor Dr. 
Weichmann with stations dispersed over the entire Ottoman Empire. However, because 
of the incomplete telegraph system, the weather service could not deliver the expected 
reports. The Ottomans also utilized dirigibles for offensive and defensive action. The 
Germans ordered airship number ten, stationed in Jamboli, Bulgaria, to support a 
bombing raid on Batum. The airship was dependent on weather service from Istanbul but 
because of mechanical problems, the airship was unable to receive weather notices. The 
airship never bombed Batum, and the exact cause of the loss of airship number ten is 
unknown. 307 The Ottoman Air Force did utilize balloons for both observation and 
weather. The balloons were stationed on the Bosporus, the Dardanelles, and at Istanbul. 
By 1 January 1917, the Ottoman Naval Air arm consisted of one full squadron of 
eight planes, all manned and crewed by Ottoman Naval personnel stationed at Izmit. 




Attrition from constant warfare since 1911 had depleted the resources of the 
Ottoman Empire so that by September 1918 the end was near. Lack of parts, fuel and 
replacement aircraft limited the Ottoman air assets, both Navy and Air Force, to 
infrequent flights of little military value. But war provided the Ottoman Navy pilots and 
crews with valuable knowledge and experience gleaned from almost five years of air 
warfare. In that five years, the Ottoman Navy Air Service utilized some thirty seaplanes, 
maintained bases at Eregli , San Stefano, Kuteli, Chanak-Kale, and Anatoli Kawak, and 
held the major industrial Allied Powers at bay. 
This action could not have happened without German assistance. The total aid 
from Germany to the Ottoman air forces, both Air Force and Navy, is found in Table 
22.309 
During the war, Ottoman-German pilots downed twenty-eight enemy aircraft, 
sixteen in the Asia Minor-Dardanelles theater of operations. The tempo of the war 
exhausted the Ottoman Army but not the air services. Had parts and resources been 
available, the facts indicate that the pilots and crews would have continued prosecuting 
the air war. 
The Ottoman air services resembled German air service because of the efforts of 
German Captain Erich Semo, who created the infrastructure and support services in 
308Cross and Cockade, 364. 
309Cross and Cockade, 365. 
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TABLE 22 
GERMAN AID TO OTTOMAN AIR ASSETS 
Planes Pilots Technicians 
Air Force ')'10 _j 100 220 
Navy 30 25 80 
Pascha 155 l2_Q 1,440 
TOTAL 415 315 1,740 
Source: Ryan P. Flanagan, ed., "The History of the Ottoman Air Force in the Great War: 
The Reports of Major Erich Semo," Cross and Cockade Journal, Vol. II, No. 2 (Summer 
1970), 364. 
order to facilitate the growth of Ottoman air assets. He found local Turkish craftsmen to 
augment German technicians and created parts. It was Semo who requisitioned Austrian 
air force mechanics and then found Anatolian Bazaar craftsmen skilled enough to 
fabricate propellers. The resolution of Semo, coupled with both Ottoman and German 
assistance, created air forces second only to the most advance industrial powers. The 
Ottoman Naval Aviation Corps during the war was always outnumbered, outgunned, and 
outspent, but not outfought. Innovative tactics and aggressive zeal overcame all but the 
complete exhaustion of the Sublime Porte. 
Submarines 
The Ottoman Navy had no submarine assets from 1889 until the capture of a 
French submarine in October 1915. However, the attempt to create a submarine force 
was evident when Ottoman naval authorities experimented with cutting-edge first-
generation submarines in 1886, several years before the United States Navy took 
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undersea warfare seriously. Naval plans drawn up directly after the Balkan wars called 
for a submarine force of four craft. Revised naval programs drawn up during the world 
war envisioned a submarine force of twelve craft. 
The acquisition of submarine forces capable of defending the empire was not 
beyond the scope of Ottoman planners. The Porte followed naval plans drawn up by 
British advisors and submarines were not called for in any plan put forth by admirals 
Gamble or Williams but the first submarines acquired Ottoman Empire was driven by the 
British. The first submarine that the Ottoman Navy acquired was a Nordenfeld-designed 
craft. Thorsten W. Nordenfeld, a Swedish gun expert, designed a submersible craft in 
1885. He built upon a design by the Reverend George Garrett. Garrett was by profession 
a priest in the Church of England but also the father of British submarines. 
Garrett's craft utilized a coal-fired, steam-driven engine on the surface. For 
underwater propulsion, hot water was stored in tanks forward. Heat exchange from 
mechanical energy was provided via a Lamrn's fire-less locomotive engine. In a Lamm 
engine, latent heat is siphoned off pressurized boiled water. The pressured boiled water 
was also utilized as reserve buoyancy. The use of a coal-fired boiler for surface 
operation, along with the latent heat exchange while underwater, gave the submarine up 
to five hours of operations and a top speed of three knots and a range of twenty miles. 
Nordenfeld improved Garrett's craft by installing two vertical propellers driven by 
a six h.p. steam engine that was automatically shut off by hydrostatic valves at a selected 
depth. The craft carried at first a locomotive torpedo but later two Whitehead 356 mm in 
external discharge tubes were added, along with two 35 mm Nordenfeld machine guns. 
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The Nordenfeld craft had three modes of operation. the first was fully on the surface, 
where the craft could use the coal-fired boiler for propulsion and the machine guns and 
torpedoes for attack. The second mode of operation was partially submerged. In this 
mode, all but the conning tower was under water. This allowed use of the coal-fired 
boiler for propulsion and the torpedoes for action, but, the machine guns were not 
available and sea conditions greatly influenced the success in the partially submerged 
mode. The last mode was the submerged mode. In this mode, propulsion was derived 
from the Lamm's latent heat exchange engine, resulting in speed sensitive to sea 
conditions. The use of machine guns was lost, but the torpedoes were available. In all 
three modes, stocking a coal-fired boiler and storing several tons of heated water in steel 
tanks created an internal environment quite hot. 
Nordenfeld's first craft was built in Sweden and sold to Greece in 1886. The 
Ottoman Navy acquired Nordenfeld's next two craft. The Ottoman Navy purchased from 
Des Vignes, Chertsey, England, two "Denizalti," or submarines of Nordenfeld design, on 
23 January 1886. The craft were delivered in sections and assembled by the Tersane-i 
Amire Naval Shipyard at Istanbul. Launching was 9 June 1886 for the Abdul Hamid and 
8 April 1887 for the Abdulmead. Abdul Hamids trials on the surface were successful, 
accumulating in a sixty N .M. trial run to Ismid but submerged tests proved the stabilizing 
system a failure. Abdulmead was nicknamed the "whale ship" and there were not enough 
volunteers for the crews, and both boats were laid up in the naval arsenal at Kasimpasa by 
1889 and allowed to deteriorate. The submarines were discovered by the Germans in 
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early 1915, but attempts to make the craft operational failed. 310 The pair would be 
scrapped by 1921. 
The Nordenfeld was a first-generation submarine with all the developmental flaws 
inherent in evolving technology. Additionally, the current in the Bosporus Straits (four to 
five knots) would make any craft unable to maintain at least five knots submerged 
inherently dangerous. A follow-on craft mounting internal torpedo tubes and an 
upgraded power plant were sold to Russia after an impressive demonstration at the Naval 
Review of 1887 but the craft foundered en route to St. Petersburg in 1887 and was later 
scrapped. 
The race to acquire submarines was initiated by Greece in 1885.311 • The 
Ottomans, possibly fearing Greek intentions, purchased two in order to combat Greece's 
one. This left the Russians, possibly fearing an imbalance of power in the Black Sea, 
purchasing the latest model on the market. The purchase of the first Nordenfeld by 
Greece set in motion the naval race in the Aegean-Black Sea region that would not end 
till the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. 
Ottoman naval plans after the Balkan wars called for a large force of surface 
ships. The naval force envisioned by Admiral Williams, British advisor to the Ottoman 
Minister of Marine, called for no submarines. Yet, four submarines were requested. 
Inasmuch that submarines were ordered indicated influence from some third party, 
310Gardiner, 160. 
31 'Hovgaard, 284. 
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possibly German Major von Stremple, an advisor to the Ottoman Army. Major Stremple 
was instrumental in creation of the Ottoman Navy League. The Ottoman Navy ordered 
two submarines from Vickers Ltd at Newcastle-upon-Tyne in England on 29 April 1914. 
An additional pair of submarines was ordered from Schneider and Cie at Chalons-sur-
Saone in France on 30 April 1914. With the commencement of hostilities, the French 
canceled the orders and cleared the blocks. England requisitioned the two submarines at 
the same time that London seized the Sultan Osman-i Evvel and Resadiye. The 
unfinished Ottoman submarines would be completed as the British submarines E-25 and 
E-26.312 
The Ottoman Navy did acquire a submarine during World War I when the French 
submarine Turquoise ran aground while being fired upon after surfacing in the Sea of 
Marmara. Built in 1907, the Turquoise was equipped with two 450 mm torpedo tubes 
and had a speed of seven knots submerged and eleven surface. It was a jinxed ship, 
plagued with electrical problems, and since it was French, no spare parts could be 
acquired. After capture, it was put to use as a propaganda tool but because of mechanical 
problems, it was laid up at Istanbul and used as a battery-charging station for German 
submarines working in conjunction with the Ottomans. The submarine's name was 
changed to Mustecip Onbasi in honor of the officer in charge of the shore batteries that 




Further navy plans envisioned by the German Admiral Souchon called for a 
submarine force of twelve craft and assorted surface combatants. This plan was 
contingent on a successful outcome of World War I and further plans envisioned a 
submarine force of thirty-six craft. 314 The Ottoman government did request and receive 
submarine assistance from Germany. To expedite this request, Germany requested 
Austria to send submarines from Pola to Istanbul. But Austria feared war with Italy and 
turned down the request. Germany did send U-21, captained by Lieutenant Commander 
Otto Hersing.315 Additionally, two small UBI class boats were sent by rail to Pola, 
Austria, where they would be assembled by German engineers and arrived in April at 
Istanbul. 316 The injection of submarines into the Gallipoli campaign altered the Anglo-
French plans. Germany would make several classes of submarines available to the 
Ottomans: UC, mine laying craft of 190 tons, speed 6 KTS; UB, coastal patrol 
submarines of 500 tons, speed 10 KTS; and U-boats or oceangoing submarines of 850 
tons, 16 KTS. 
When Italy entered the war on the side of the Entente in August 1916, Ottoman 
military planners utilized submarines to ferry supplies to the Senussi in Libya. German 
naval planners objected to the use of submarines for delivering supplies but the German 
Foreign Office promoted the venture. The use of UC-II minelayers UC-20 and UC-73 as 
3141bid., 28. 
315Lowell Thomas, Raiders of the Deep (New York: Garden City Publishing 
Company, 1928), 55. 
316Halpern, A Naval History of World War One, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1994), 69-70. 
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transports lasted until the war's end in 1918 and allowed the Senussi to tie down both the 
British and Italians. Submarines supplied Senussi attacks into Egypt in 1916 prevented 
British General Allenby from advancing into Palestine until 1917 .317 
Submarine action in the Black Sea was not as successful as Ottoman Naval 
planners had envisioned. The small UB U-boats were underpowered for the swift 
currents of the Black Sea and did not have the steaming radius necessary for long-range 
patrols. The need for submarines in the Black Sea was to protect merchant shipping, upon 
which the Russian Navy preyed upon. Because there were few developed roads and even 
less rail lines, almost all Ottoman commodity traffic was by ship. Protection of merchant 
shipping in the Black Sea dictated use of German submarines to counter Russian 
warships hunting such vessels. Supplies of coal and oil had come from Russia prior to 
the war. Once war had started, replacement for such commodities had to come from 
Germany by rail or from conquered Romania. In both cases, cargo had to transit by sea at 
some point, making an excellent target. Table 23 lists Russian losses to German 
submarines. 
The Russian losses to submarines were not great but caused Russian naval 
strategists to re-think offensive raids against Ottoman colliers. The possible threat to 
major Russian combatants from submarines dictated an aggressive anti-submarine 
program. The Russian anti-submarine program in itself was not successful. Only one 
German U-boat was sunk due to direct Russian action. However, four German 
317Evans-Pritchard, 140. 
TABLE23 
RUSSIAN LOSSES TO GERMAN SUBMARINES IN THE BLACK SEA 
Name Tonnage Date 
UC-15 
Zivucij 350 4 April 1916 
UB-7 
Patagonia 6011 15 September 1915 
UB-14 
Apseron 1850 8 October 1915 
U-38 
Cementkrug 1086 8Junel916 
Rackliffe NA 2Julyl916 
Vpered 858 8Julyl916 
Florida 3283 10Julyl916 
UB-33 
Teoskepasti 2481 5 February 1916 
UB-45 
Tevere 2666 31 August 1916 
Gioconda 3701 2 September 1916 
UB-42 
Petr Darsi 731 3 September 1916 
Carica 2891 19 October 1916 
Sirakuzy 1086 22 November 1917 
Russian losses to submarines: 13. 
Source: Rene Greger, The Russian Fleet, 1914-1917 (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 
Shepperton, Surrey, 1972), 66. 
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submarines were lost to mines. 
Russian action against submarines did relieve pressure on the Ottoman colliers. 
The shortage of coal in Istanbul hampered the war effort and affected civilian morale. 
Any relief afforded to the colliers had to be seen as positive. Submarine action in the 
Black Sea ceased once the Russian Revolution spread to the Russian Black Sea fleet. 
Russian naval action during the fall of 1917 had begun to wind down due to the political 
and economic situation. 318 Also German submarines had been restricted in operations 
because the economy of the Ottoman Empire was nearly prostrate. Submarine warfare 
had proven a success in the Black Sea. Had the Ottoman Navy possessed adequate 
numbers at the beginning of the war, the Russian offensives against the colliers and the 
amphibious landing in the Caucasus and on the Romanian coast may not have been 
successful. 
German officers also learned new submarine techniques from the Ottoman theater. 
Mines needed to be customized for submarines. Attempting to use ship-delivered mines 
had proven dangerous due to buoyancy difficulties. The use of multi-sub attacks caused 
the Russians to marshal the Black Sea fleet temporarily until suitable Russian seaplanes 
arrived to ferret out the U-boats. Delivery of supplies to the Senussi in Libya proved to 
be a legitimate role for submarines: a lesson not lost on a young German Lieutenant Karl 
Dornitz of the Yavuz. 
318David Woodward, The Russians al Sea (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1965), 
180-183. 
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Ottoman military use of advanced technology of airplanes and submarines is 
evidence of the forward thinking of naval planners in Istanbul. The Ottomans did not 
possess the ability to fabricate such weapons but utilized what was provided by Germany. 
The planes and submarines may not have been the "wonder weapons" hoped for by the 
Ottomans, but the presence of such technology in the theater forced the Allies to re-think 
offensive action, and such gave the Ottomans time to adjust. 
CHAPTER VI 
MANNING AND SHIPPING 
The term "naval asset" encompasses ships, bases, personnel, and infrastructure to 
support fleet operations. Naval warships require huge support backup in order to function 
away from port and not all naval assets are clearly identifiable. To crew ships, a 
dynamic pool of trained personnel are required. Crew turnover due to retirements, death, 
end of contract, seashore rotation, and differences in war and peace manning levels keep 
manning levels in flux .. This pool can be reserve or active, but the situation which 
demands naval action rarely allows for normal training cycles. Personnel demands can be 
immediate and the inability to properly crew a ship can lead to disaster. 
Ship-related industries, such as shipyards, steel fabrication, fueling centers, rail 
terminals, and commercial aquatic resources, all dictate the success or failure of a nation's 
naval base. Warships are maintenance driven, and without proper care, a warship 
becomes inoperative and it's life cycle can be reduced to one-fourth. Modern warships 
are constructed with steel and an indigenous steel industry frees a nation from 
importation difficulties. Coupled with adequate shipyard facilities, locally produced 
warships can become a catalyst for national economic activity. Remove either and a 
nation is open to extortion and economic stagnation from states that can produce 
warships. 
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The Ottoman navy at the beginning of the twentieth century had a bloated billet 
or job allotment of 32,000. A naval officer rank was little more than an additional source 
of income. Unlike an army commission, where the holder was likely to be called upon to 
fight, the low opinion of the fighting ability of the navy and thus the small potential of 
personal harm made a naval commission a luxury. Demand for a military stripped with 
slight risk resulted in little turnover. With little turnover, the upper ranks became bloated 
with career officers of little worth. When the upper ranks became bloated, young officers 
became trapped, unable to rise through the ranks. 
In 1907, the nominal strength of the Ottoman navy was six vice admirals, eleven 
rear admirals, 208 captains, 289 commanders, 228 lieutenants, 187 ensigns, and 30,000 
sailors. The typical contract for enlisted members was twelve years.319 In addition, Pears 
recounts a discussion with a young Ottoman officer who had one chance of promotion: 
wife's connection with one of the Palace ladies.320 
The British Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble became advisor to the Ottoman Minister 
of Marine on 18 September 1908.321 Admiral Gamble found the Ottoman navy had on 
the roles more than 5000 officers. At that time the country was in the pains of a 
revolution started by Fazil Niazi Bey in Macedonia. Revolutionary zeal in Istanbul was 
ignited by a shot from a 230 mm cannon aboard the Ottoman central battery ironclad 
319Monroe, 144. 
320Pears, 222. 
321 Giileryliz, 14. 
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Necm-i Sevket. 322 The shot was a signal for the "Young Turks" to seize the government 
of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. 
Between 1908 and 1911, the navy minister was changed nine times. Because 
each minister had a different view of the British/Ottoman relationship, Gamble's mission 
was difficult if not impossible. Gamble's instructions were to continue training to obtain 
orders for the English shipbuilding industry, and to protect British interests in the 
Ottoman Empire. Gamble started his tour as Naval Advisor by proposing that the average 
naval officer corps be reduced in size and rejuvenated by the promotion of younger, 
British-trained officers. The proposals proved to be impossible to implement fully . The 
stripped of a naval commission where promotion was dependent on the benevolence of 
influential contacts, was not to be relinquished voluntarily. A case in point was the 
stationary ship, lhsaniye. Under normal peacetime manning, a crew of thirty-five was 
sufficient. Of the thirty-five, thirteen were officers who had never seen the ship but drew 
naval pay. In addition to the reluctance to reduce the officer corps, Gamble had to 
contend with political rivalries between the Ottoman Naval Ministers and the Ottoman 
Foreign Office. The Naval Ministry tended to favor British views while the Foreign 
Office was influenced by Germany.323 
Gamble did have some success in reducing the officer corps, Ottoman naval 
personnel reported by Jane's All the World's Fighting Ships 1911 showed a reduction to 
322 Ibid, 13. 
323 Ibid., 14. 
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6,000 active service members. 324 On the surface, a reduction in force of 26,000 over a 
three-year period indicated extremely inflated personnel numbers. 
On the surface, such reductions tend to be positive. Younger officers and enlisted 
men would be able to exercise a greater responsibility and thus would become more 
proficient at warfighting. However, the reduction to 6,000 active navy personnel left 
little more than a skeleton force manning the fleet. Using ship-specific complement 
figures from Ahmet Gtileryliz's The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828-1923 and Robert 
Gardiner's Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921 reveals that the reduction 
left the Ottoman fleet badly undermanned. Table 24 lists ships on the active navy list as 
of 1 January 1912 and the required complement for minimum peacetime manning. The 
numbers do not include staff personnel at fleet headquarters in Istanbul, divisional staff 
at the assorted bases, or include base personnel involved in navy controlled shore 
facilities such as maintenance, armories, schools, or shipyards. Personnel working on 
naval bases and naval facilities may be civilian or military. Early twentieth-century 
military-industrial complexes doubled as both working repair facilities and training 
schools and were staffed with active-duty personnel. Additionally, ship crews typically 
performed the bulk of shipyard repairs utilizing the infrastructure not available at typical 
naval bases. However, even if the reduced fleet were more efficient, the total number did 
not allow for quick expansion or replacement crews. Two examples are the Barbarossa 
Hayreddin and Turgud Reis. When the two ships were acquired, each required a wartime 
324Fred T. Jane, All the World's Fighting Ships, I 9 I I (London: Sampson Low 
Marston, 1911; reprint, New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1969), 451. 
TABLE 24 
OTTOMAN SHIP BILLET REQUIREMENTS 
Ship Crew Ship Crew 
Barbaros Hayreddin 900 Kutahya 20 
Torgud Reis 900 Zuhaf 82 
Peyk-i Sevket 145 Nevsehir 52 
Berk-i Satvet 145 Tirimujgan 110 
Jvfecidiye 355 Hamidiye (gunboat) 20 
Hamidiye ( cruiser) 355 Mesudiye 665 
Gayret-i Vataniye 90 Asar-i Tevfik 350 
Berk Efsan 62 Yarshisar 91 
Peleng-i Derya 110 Hamidabad 20 
Drac 20 Akhisar 43 
Nurulbahir 45 Antalya 20 
Iclaliye 180 Tokat 20 
Basra 91 Feth-i Bulend 150 
Ertuorul b 22 Muin-i Zafer 200 
Yozgat 12 Timsah 17 
Taskopru 52 Izzeddin 35 
!s·tanbul 9 Trabzon 67 
Sogutlu 35 Beyrut 47 
Yadgar-i Mille! 111 Malatya 47 
Mwavenet-i Milliye 111 Kilid Bahir _£2 
Numune-i Hamzj;et 111 
Samsun 91 SUBTOTAL 6.308 
Tasoz 91 
Sivrimisar 20 Motorboats 1-25: 6 each 150 
Demirnisar 20 
Sultanhisar 20 TOTAL 6,458 
Musul 20 
Source: Ahmet Glilerytiz and Bernd Langensiepen, eds., trans. by James Cooper, The 
Ottoman Steam Navy 1828-1923 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 196. 
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crew of 1100. The crews had to be provided from the fleet by drawing a large proportion 
of the relatively trained ratings from active ships and many ships were reduced to 
skeleton crews. A similar problem occurred in the autumn of 1910, when the four 
Schichali-class destroyers were delivered.325 With the purchase of the Rio de Janeiro, raw 
recruits were conscripted from Ottoman maritime provinces. From this group, only 500 
were physically qualified to enter into the Navy, not enough for a skeleton crew. The 
British Navy agreed to provide retired technical ratings and deck petty officers in order to 
acquire a working crew for the battleship. 326 
Admiral Gamble's reduction left in question manning for ships on order from 
foreign shipyards. Ottoman ships ordered as of 1 January 1912 required a peacetime 
complement of 1600 men. The manning-levels that Gamble instituted also do not mirror 
the Ottomans' traditional rivals, Russia or Greece. Greece did not decrease manning, and 
Russia increased it seventeen percent. 327 The reduction in force enacted by Admiral 
Gamble jeopardized the manning of the Ottoman Navy, at the very time the Sultan's 
traditional enemies were expanding. The rationale for the reduction, weeding out over-
aged and non-productive naval service members, is understandable but questionable It is 
reasonable to expect Admiral Gamble to have known of Greek warship purchases and 
modernization and of Russian Black Sea expansion plans. It is inconceivable that 
53. 
325Viscount Hythe, The Naval Annual 1911 (Portsmouth: J. Griffin & Co., 1911 ), 
326Hough, The Great Dreadnought, 102. 
327Jane, All The World's Fighting Ships, 332. 
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Gamble could not have known of Italian-Greek imperialist aspirations for his 1910 naval 
expansion plan called for two battleships, three cruisers, and ten destroyers.328 The 
concern which prompted such a program originated in Athens, but yet, Gamble reduced 
the fleet to an anemic personnel level at the same time he requisitioned ships Istanbul 
could not crew. 
The British Mission found all responsibility rested with the Minister of Marine, 
and senior Ottoman naval officers would not deal with any request nor state opinions for 
fear of negative repercussions. The organization and provisions of the fleet was based on 
the supposition that the ships would be in touch with Istanbul and therefore that daily 
ration papers and monthly pay lists could be taken to the Admiralty for corrections. 
When Williams ended his tour of duty in the spring of 1912, there was still no provision 
for providing a bread and meat ration at sea, although such a ration was issued daily in 
harbor. Ottoman crews at sea had to rely on biscuits, olives, and bread.329 The Ottoman 
Training Station was on the island of Halki but With the influx of raw recruits for the 
Reshadieh and Sultan Osman-i Evvel an additional training school was set up in the 
Sultan's palace.330 
The career of an enlisted person in the Ottoman navy mirrors the prevailing 
material situation of most early twentieth-century fleets. In general, the enlisted member 
would spend the bulk of his career on one ship. Cruises were usually less than a week, 
328Gtilerytiz, 14. 
329Hythe, The Naval Annual 1911, 53. 
330Hough, The Great Dreadnought, 102. 
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three days being the average. Accommodations were sparse and in most cases the crew 
member slept in the workplace. In larger ships, sharing racks, called "hot bunking," was 
normal. Dining facilities on average ships were outside in good weather, in passageways 
or work spaces in inclement periods. To average sailors, the ship was home. Spartan by 
late twentieth-century standards, the creature comforts found on board the Sultan's ships 
were nevertheless considerably higher than found in ground units. That improved living 
standards and absence of long-term separations resulted in few desertions compared to 
those within ground forces. Typical enlistment were for five years active, seven reserve. 
However, the I tali an and Balkan Wars had disrupted the cycle, by extending contracts. 
This resulted in some mutinies from restlessness on ships anchored at Istanbul. 331 
The C.U.P. achieved power in 1909; and at once friction with British naval 
advisors began. Ahmet Gtileryliz writes that the underlining issue was foreign 
involvement in fleet expansion and German-inspired Foreign Office meddling.332 But 
diplomatic intrigue could not hide the fact that Gamble's reforms did not bring about 
Ottoman naval professionalism and may have intentionally hampered Ottoman national 
security. The C.U.P. Naval Minister Albey Mehmet Muktar refused to work with Gamble 
and refused to cooperate in any project because of the appearance of fraud. The two 
preceding Naval Ministers, Ali Pasha and Tlimamiral Halil Pasha, both attempted to 
enact Gamble's programs and found the "wheeling and dealing," typical of Abdul 
331 /bid. 
"?Jb'd ))_ l . 
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Hamid's regime and seemingly encouraged by English shipyards, unacceptable to the 
reform-minded Young Turks. 
At the request of Tumadmiral Halil Pasha, Admiral H.P. Williams, Gamble's 
replacement in April 1910, instituted Ottoman officer training in Britain. Between 1910 
and 1912 approximately forty Ottoman officers attended British naval schools and twelve 
at private shipyards. However, British concerns for English naval secrets led London to 
suspend foreign-officer training on British ships and in the yards. The British Foreign 
Officer Minister Sir Edward Grey agreed to pull all Ottoman officers, regardless of prior 
agreements with Istanbul. Admiral Limpus, Williams' successor, requested that a number 
of Ottoman officers be allowed aboard the H.M.S. Orion or Monarch, vessels similar to 
the two dreadnoughts ordered from British yards. The British Admiralty, following new 
instructions, refused to do more than allow the Ottoman officers to attend gunnery school 
on shore.333 A group of Ottoman officers did attend the British gunnery school at Whale 
Island and were provided instruction using twin twelve-inch dummy guns in turrets 
similar to Sultan Osman-i Evvel. 334 
With no outlet for training in Britain and assignment to British warships curtailed, 
Admiral Lim pus improvised by creating mockups of battle stations on the Ottoman 
warship Messudiyeh. The British Lieutenant Frank Elliott instructed Ottoman naval 
gunnery crews in firing discipline and the sighting of targets. Elliott created a five-week 
333Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 322-323. 
334Houah The Great Dreadnought, l 03. 
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school that provided the first basics of naval gunfire training and tailored the training to 
mimic the action required to load, aim, and fire the weapons found upon the Sultan 
Osman-i Evvel and Reshadieh. 335 However, the training was limited and resources were 
scarce. This resulted in little more than superficial knowledge and could not provide the 
level of competence needed to fully utilize weapon systems found upon the newly 
purchased destroyers or ordered battleships. 
Marines 
Marines are the premier fighting force that performs roles bridging armed naval 
detachments and army units. Traditional functions assigned to marines are shipboard 
security, pier sentry, and base security. Robert Gardiner, editor of Conway's All The 
World's Fighting Ships, reported the Ottoman navy possessed a marine force of 9,000 
troops in 1906 and Fred T. Jane, in All The World~s· Fighting Ships from 1907 through 
1919, lists a force of9,000 in 1907. But by 1918 a force of less than 4,000 were reported. 
There is no documentation as to the disposition of marine forces in Gamble's reduction in 
force program. But Ottoman marines reportedly mutinied in December 1906 over 
discharge orders and pay and fearing a repeat, the marine force may have been reduced by 
political orders.336 Photographs of Ottoman marines in action and in parade can be 
found in Holland Thompson's The World War, and the Times' History of the War, Vol. 
335]bid., 103-105. 
336The New York Times, 17 December 1906. 
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III. 337 
A plausible explanation for the reduction of the Ottoman marine force can be 
found in the Black Sea. Enver Pasha, the Ottoman War Minister and acting Navy 
Minister in the absence of Djemal Pasha, ordered three transports, Bahri Ahmir, Midhat 
Pascha and Bezmi Alem, to Trebizond. The transports were fully loaded with weapons, 
provisions, and reinforcements. A Russian squadron in search of Yuvaz and Berk-i Scttvey 
intercepted the unescorted transports and sank all three on 6 November 1914. 338 The 
exact number of troops each ship carried is not known. However, using the premise that 
combat loading for short duration could exceed 6,000 troops on the Ottoman transport 
Izmir, the author speculates the unescorted transports sinking could have resulted in a loss 
of 10,000 troops. The 11 November 1914 Louisville Times reported a Russian Black Sea 
source claim to have sunk three transports loaded with ammunition, guns, airplanes, 
cargo and troops. In addition the fully loaded Ottoman transport Beritel was sunk on 13 
December 1914.339 The sinking of four combat loaded transports and the loss of 
experienced combat troops would explain the reduction in the marine forces. 
Marines are sea-based soldiers, and it would be expected such troops would be 
first in any landing at Rize and the three transports sunk, Bahriye Amer, Bezm-i Alem and 
337Holland Thompson, ed., The World War, Vol. II (New York: The Grolier 
Society, 1921), 337; and The Times, Histo,y of the War, Vol. III (London: The Times, 
1915), 64. 
338Rene Greger, The Russian Fleet, 1914-1917 (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 
Shepperton, Surry, 1972), 46. 
339 Ibid., 68. 
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Mithat Pasha, were on the first run and would have been carrying sea-based troops, or 
marines. Unlike American sealift where the United States Navy controls all shipping, 
Ottoman troop transports were under the control of the army, not the navy. Souchon did 
not want convoy duties but he relented when confronted by Enver.340 However, the army 
did not keep to any reliable time schedule, resulting in underutilization of Ottoman ships. 
During the Balkan War, Enver controlled the troop transports and failed to keep naval 
commanders informed, resulting in missed opportunities and communication difficulties. 
Unlike the Balkan Wars, when the Sea of Marmara was secured, Russian Black Sea 
forces pressed every opportunity and miscommunication would prove to be disastrous. 
Merchant Shipping 
Ottoman waterborne break-bulk shipping had never been large. Large ships were 
not profitable outside of large Ottoman cities because the Ottoman Empire had few 
developed roads and even less rail development, transportation was via small, locally 
produced watercraft. Small shallow draft craft served the commercial needs of the 
Empire very well during peace but during wartime additional sealift is needed. The 
Ottoman mercantile marine or civilian vessels capable of being requisitioned for military 
use numbered 143 steamers of 69,333 tons net and 900 sailing craft of 180,000 tons 
net. 341 Shipping capabilities had expanded little from 1907, when the mercantile navy 
listed 107 steamers and 916 sailing vessels. In 1907, forty percent of the Empire's 
340Gtilerytiz, 45. 
341 Jane, All The World's Fighting Ships, 1914, 409. 
exports and imports were carried in English ships. Greek ships accounted for ten 
percent. 342 
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During World War I, The Russian Black Sea fleet targeted Ottoman merchant 
ships with some success. Exact tonnage loss is difficult to ascertain, for many Ottoman 
colliers thought to be sunk were refloated after "sinking." The significance of civilian 
colliers cannot be underestimated. The main Ottoman coal port was Zonguldak, roughly 
150 miles from the Bosporus Strait on the Black Sea and this open sea run to the safety of 
the Bosporus Strait made slow Ottoman colliers easy prey for the fast oil-burning 
destroyer the Russians had on hand. Protection of merchant shipping was at first a low 
priority to both Souchon and Enver but protection became top priority once the resources 
Russia provided prior to the war, such as coal, oil, and wheat, began to be imported from 
neutral Romania. Protection of merchant shipping would see German submarines, 
normally offensive in action, become shepherds to colliers. 
The Russia Black Sea fleet, though numerically superior to the Ottoman fleet, was 
in fact inferior where the Yavus was involved. Except when the Russians had 
numerically overwhelming firepower, Russian Admiral Ebergard, Commander of the 
Black Sea Fleet, concentrated on commercial interdiction. The Russians blockaded the 
coaling port of Zonguldak with both ships and mines and when intelligence confirmed 
Trebizond as an amphibious landing area for Ottoman troops, that region was mined and 
blockaded. The results of the relentless pursuit of Ottoman colliers and transports is 
342Monroe, 157. 
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found in Table 25. 343 
The commerce war was not one-sided and the Ottoman's attacked Russian 
auxiliary ships and merchants whenever the possibility arose. The number of ships sunk 
both sides peaked between September 1915 and September 1916. Russian losses 
accelerated once Enver's Caucasus fiasco was over and the naval assault upon the 
Dardanelles ceased. Ottoman fleet units, with help from transplanted German U-boats, 
made Black Sea sorties hazardous for both Russian military and civilian craft. However, 
Admiral Ebergard marshaled the Russian fleet, resulting in diminishing success for 
Ottoman surface ships and German U-boats. 
Russian success at merchant interdiction peaked in the spring of 1915. Much of 
the Russian success was due to Enver's haphazard use of transports in the Caucasus 
campaign. Russian success against Ottoman waterborne break-bulk and troop transports 
occurred only when scheduling conflicts left the craft unprotected. Once deployment of 
troops no longer demanded waterborne lift, thus releasing Ottoman naval forces to pursue 
Russian shipping, Ottoman losses decreased and Russian losses increased. However, 
Ottoman losses could not be replaced and when the pace of wartime demands quickened, 
shortages of commodities carried upon water occurred. There was never a shortage of 
coal at Zonguldak, just a lack of colliers. The assignment of convoys for both transports 
and colliers would have lessened the losses. Curtailing the Caucasus campaign with its 




OTTOMAN LOSSES TO RUSSIAN BLACK SEA MINES 
Year Ships Sunk Gross Tons 
1914 7 23,230 
1915 44 52,567 
1916 23 26,989 
1917 12 1.676 
86 104,462 
Source: Rene Greger, The Russian Fleet, 1914-1917 (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 1972), 67-
69. 
the defensive distance would have forced the Russians into extending communication and 
logistic corridors while at the same time saving the Ottoman X Army Corps from 
decimation. 
Carl von Clausewitz, a noted military planner wrote: "a prince or general can best 
demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his 
resources, doing neither too much or too little. "344 Enver had an objective in the 
Caucasus campaign, stopping four Russian armies pouring across the frontier, but 
deploying ships and troops in such a haphazard manner was counterproductive. Results 
indicated Enver failed to plan, organize or think through the expedition. Compounding 
the situation, Enver had convinced Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of 
Marine, to command Ottoman forces in Syria; and Tschurukasla Mahmud, the assistant 
344Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. by M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 177. 
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Minister of Marine, resigned along with other ministers over the unprovoked attack upon 
Sebastopol. The removal of experienced naval planners left merchant captains and naval 
commanders out of the information loop. The vacuum created a communication void for 
Enver, resulting in a lack of coordinated action and a navy without insightful leadership. 




Historical accounts of the battle for the Dardanelles stress the failure of the 
Entente ground forces in securing the Gallipoli Peninsula and thus the thwarted march 
into Istanbul. However, the ground campaign was caused by a textbook, naval defensive 
mine operation orchestrated by the Ottoman navy and conducted by the German Admiral 
Guido von Usedom. Usedom and the Ottomans were aided by the arrogance of Anglo-
French commanders who arrogantly planned for Ottoman capitulation in a timely manner. 
Also assisting the Ottomans was the decision by Russia not to actively attack the 
Bosporus Straits from the Black Sea and the massive Russian mine barrage outside of 
the Bosporus Strait. The combination of Entente arrogance, Russian abstention, along 
with mine apprehension, all coupled with Ottoman immovability, created the Entente 
defeat in the Dardanelles. The victory rested squarely with mines, how the Ottomans 
deployed such weapons, and the Anglo-French reaction. 
Two types of mines were available in 1914: observation and contact mines. 
Observation mines are electrically activated and are utilized for offensive purposes. The 
mine must be ignited by an observer. The positive aspects of such weapons are that areas 
seeded are still available for passage and not off limits to Allied ships. The negative 
aspects rest on the observer and electrical current. Observation mines need constant 
monitoring and electrical power. Remove either, and the mine becomes useless. Contact 
mines are designed to explode when struck by a ship. The mine usually is kept at a 
certain depth below the surface. The Ottomans' inventory consisted only of contact 
mmes. 
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Mine ignition is generally effected by electricity via internal batteries, with the 
circuit being closed by shock of contact or established by electrochemical means. In 
some mines, ignition is effected by purely mechanical means, or percussion. In order to 
prevent accidental explosions prior to seeding, safety breaks are placed between contact 
points (horns), and detonators. Safety breaks are made from sugar and water. The 
hardened sugar prevents premature detonations, and the sugar dissolves shortly when 
exposed to water. 
Contact mines are used in all cases where control from shore stations cannot be 
secured, such as war zones or approaches to fortifications for defensive purposes. The 
mines may be anchored to create a minefield or line, or left free floating. Free floating 
contact mines are best used when current will drift the weapon down upon enemy an 
anchorage or into established sea Janes. Free floating contact mines may ride upon the 
surface or, with the use of ballast weight, drift beneath the waves. 
The explosive utilized in Ottoman mines was gun-cotton soaked in paraffin. The 
gun-cotton paraffin explosive would explode even when wet and extended the operational 
life of the mine. Additionally, gun-cotton soaked paraffin was safer to maintain and 
extended the shelf life of the mine. The weight of the explosive found in Ottoman mines 
is unknown. However, the average weight of pre-World War I mines, which comprised 
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the bulk of the Ottoman inventory, was 13 O pounds. 345 
The amount of explosive carried by a mine is limited by two conditions: the mine 
must not destroy adjacent mines or bring them to explosion; and the distance between 
mines must not exceed a certain maximum if the minefield is to be effective. Under 
ordinary seeding, distance between mines in rows is 200 to 300 feet. Russian mine-
laying utilized the "throw and go" seeding method, where mines are dropped without 
specific and at times adequate spacing. The "throw and go" method is quick but requires 
considerably more mines than planned fields. Ottoman minefields were laid in a timely, 
precise manner. All the minefields in the Dardanelles, with the exception of the last, had 
been seeded before the Anglo-French forces arrived in force. Table 26 lists the Ottoman 
minefields as of 8 March 1915. The exact layout of the mine lines is found in Appendix 
8. 
The coordinator of the Ottoman coastal defense was the German Admiral Guido 
von Usedom. Usedom would keep the German moniker "Inspector General of Coastal 
Fortifications and Minefields" while in service for the Sultan and was an expert on 
coastal and harbor defenses.346 Preceding Usedom was retired German Vice Admiral 
Wilhelm Schack, who arrived in May 1914 with howitzers from Krupp. Usedom arrived 
in theater on 30 August 1914 and set up headquarters at Canakkale.347 In order to protect 
mining operations, Usedom ordered all Entente officers out of the Dardanelles and began 
345Havgaard, 442-443. 




























February 26, 1915 
February 26, 1915 
November 14, 1914-February 19, 1915 
November 14, 1914-February 15, 1915 
November 14, 1914 - February 15, 1915 
November 14, 1914- February 15, 1915 
November 14, 1914- February 15, 1915 
November 14, 1914- February 19, 1915 
November 14, 1914- February 19, 1915 
November 14, 1914 - February 19, 1915 
March 8, 1915 
Source: James A. Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns: An Historical Analysis of the 
Decisions of the Commanders," Naval College Revie111, Vol. XIX, No. 10 (June 1967), 
77-83. 
to deploy mine layers. However, Usedom did not close the straits. Instead, he opted to 
restrict the channel so that closure could be achieved quickly. 
Admiral Usedom had doubts as to the survivability of the straits. Defensive 
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preparations had not proceeded far enough to secure the waterway by the commencement 
of hostilities. Usedom believed that the straits could be forced by the Anglo-French 
forces assembled in theater, and he voiced such reservations to Admiral Souchon.348 
What few defensive options open to Usedom were very limited; mine inventory 
consisted of English, Italian, Bulgarian, Greek and Russian, many having been left over 
348Gorlitz, 29-30. 
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from the Balkan wars; shore gun batteries had not been trained and were clearly open for 
visual attack; visual defenses had been acceptable in the nineteenth century, but 
concealment was necessary for survival in 1914. Usedom gambled that if the Entente 
could be forced into a close-quarter or 11 hugger-mugger11 fight, good defensive measures 
could prevail. 
Usedom did not fabricate mines in theater but instead created an indigenous 
munitions infrastructure to recondition deteriorated mine variations at Zeytin Burnu. To 
protect the mine fields from being cleared, a series of earthen emplacements were erected 
and left open to be seen, forcing a would-be enemy to destroy both manned and 
unmanned outposts. Miles of barbed wire and entrenchments had created a maze of 
defensive breastwork in order to concentrate fields of fire in the event of a forced 
amphibious landing. The ground campaign was commanded by Djevad Pasha and 
General Liman von Sanders. 
In the event the Anglo-French forces penetrated the minefields, Usedom had 
placed a three-barrel, eighteen-inch torpedo battery at Kilid Bahr. The reload time for 
this battery was twenty minutes, creating a problem if more than one three-bank were 
fired. To compensate, the minelayer Bulair was loaded with floating mines, some 
compliment of the Russians, to release into the channel current in order to buy time for 
reloading. 349 Finally, the Yavuz, Torgud Reis, and Barbaros Hayeddin stood ready to 
349Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. II (New York: Scribner's, 1923 ), 
266. 
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provide a last-ditch stand.350 
Admiral Usedom's greatest achievement in assisting in the defense of the 
Dardanelles was training. The Germans did not have enough personnel in theater to 
achieve all objectives without assistance. Usedom trained the Ottomans on coastal 
protection and layered defense. The shared knowledge of Usedom and the Ottoman 
servicemen's grit created an unexpected reception for the Entente. 
Confronting Admiral Usedom would be the Anglo-French naval forces 
commanded by British V ADM Sackville Hamilton Carden, Commander Naval Forces in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. Carden's plans for the Dardanelles had three phases: silence 
the outer fortifications to the straits; silence the intermediate forts; force the straits to the 
Sea of Marmara. Carden anticipated success by utilizing the superior Allied naval forces, 
and the need to seize the high ground on the Gallipoli Peninsula was deemed 
unnecessary. 351 
The Allied campaign to force the Dardanelles was based upon the premise that the 
Ottoman Empire could be knocked out of the war quickly. With Germany's weaker ally 
out of the fight, Russia could be armed and a quick end to the Central Powers realized. 
England did possess naval forces adequate to subdue the fixed fortifications protecting 
the straits. England also had available flag officers with intimate knowledge of the 
capabilities and readiness of Ottoman defenses, because of tours of duty as naval advisors 
350Van der Vat, 194. 
3s 1Paul G. Halpern, ed. The Keyes Papers, Vol. I (London: William Clowes & 
Sons, 1972), 82-83. 
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to the Ottoman Minister of Marine. In theory, the thrust up the Dardanelles to Istanbul 
could be accomplished with little expense. 
With tensions rising, Usedom, on 6 September 1914, moved the ironclad 
Mesudiye to Nara in order to create a floating battery. On 29 September the British 
stopped the Ottoman gunboat Akhisar just outside the Dardanelles. The Akhisar was 
within the territorial waters of the Ottoman Empire. Britain was not at war with the 
Ottomans, and the English ship was in violation of Ottoman sovereignty. The English 
informed the Akhisar that all Ottoman warships and enemy merchants were blockaded. 
The intransigence of the English and the obvious possibility the straits might be rushed 
compelled Usedom to close temporarily the water course on 30 September.352 Usedom's 
fears of a surprise rush upon the straits had merit. On 1 November 1914 the destroyers 
HMS Wolverine and H.lvf.S. Scorpion entered the Gulf oflzmit and sank the survey 
vessel Beyrut off Urla and the steamer Kinaliada. Britain was still "officially" at peace 
with the Ot1oman Empire. But British actions indicated a plan to provoke Istanbul into 
declaring war. When the Ottomans refused, England and France initiated a declaration on 
5 November, 1914.353 
The British had deployed the submarines B9, Bl 0, and Bl 1 at Tenedos by 
November 1914 in order to assist in the blockade of the Ottoman coast. On 13 December 
1914 the British submarine B 11, commanded by Commander Hochrook, RN, entered the 
352Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 29. 
353Gtileryliz, 30. 
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straits, transited five mine barrages, and sank the ironclad Mesudiye. Between November 
1914 and February 1915, ten rows of mines and an antisubmarine net were put into place. 
The navigational aids were removed or rendered inoperative, and notices were 
promulgated that the straits were closed completely.354 
In January 1915 Russian Supreme Commander, Grand Duke Nicholai 
Nikolayevich asked the British Liaison Officer for some sort of diversionary action to 
relieve pressure on the embattled Eastern Front. Mr. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the 
Admiralty, presented the idea of making a naval demonstration in the Dardanelles 
region. 355 Churchill's conviction was expressed in the statement: "Through the Narrows 
of the Dardanelles and across the ridges of the Gallipoli Peninsula lie some of the shortest 
paths to a triumphant peace. "356 Admiral Fisher, First Sea Lord, vigorously objected to 
the plan to lay siege to the Dardanelles. Admiral Fisher's experience in the eastern 
Mediterranean convinced him that forcing the Dardanelles was an mistake. Fisher's 
objections were well known to the British War Council but the authorization to proceed 
was agreed upon on 28 January 1915. He recommended an defensive agreement with 
Istanbul prior to the war on the premise of having reliable access to Russia. Fisher, 
creator of the "dreadnought" and architect of the British Navy, intended to resign over the 
decision, but Lord Kitchner, British Secretary of State for War, convinced Fisher to stay. 
354Henry Morgenthau, Secrets of the Bosporus (London: Hutchinson, 1918), 68-
69. 
355Cassar, 95. 
3s6Holland Thompson, ed., The World War, Vol. I (New York: The Educational 
Book Company, 1921), 340-341. 
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London became occupied with the attractive political possibilities of the venture 
but the British failed to inform themselves of the actual existing resources available. The 
operation was launched without an adequate supply of troops, ammunition, or planning. 
The few troops available--Australian, New Zealand, and Indian--had not worked together 
or participated in combat work-ups prior to the landings on 25 April 1916. Assisting the 
English in the Dardanelles campaign were the French Navy under Rear-Admiral 
Guepratte. Guepratte's force consisted of older warships of questionable worth, which 
indicated Paris placed little emphasis on the Ottoman theater. In order to facilitate the 
attack, an informal agreement with Greek Prime Minister Venizelos gave the Entente use 
of the Greek island of Lemnos along with harbor accommodations at Mudros. Greece 
remained "neutral" during this period in name only.357 
The ground campaign was orchestrated by the English General Sir Ian Hamilton 
and the French General d'Amade. Hamilton had not worked with the troops or officers he 
commanded, delayed the movement of troops to staging areas when inspection of 
transports revealed that no combat cargo loading had taken place. The pell-mell approach 
to cargo was indicative of the entire operation. The lack of ground troops, necessary for 
the total destruction of fixed fortifications, forced the Anglo-French commanders to 
choose between delaying the operations in order to have the troops available, or forging 




The Anglo-French naval bombardment of the entrance to the straits commenced 
on 19 February 1915, and at that time British mine sweepers conducted exploratory 
sweeps in the Dardanelles and found no mines existed to seaward of Kephez Bay. 358 The 
mine sweepers, manned by civilians and actually converted fishing trawlers, began to 
sweep the channel in earnest on 1 March 1915 .359 The straits at Kephez Bay are less than 
5000 yards wide. Usedom had erected defenses at Kephez Bay consisting of light mobile 
guns, powerful carbon arch search lights, and miles of telegraph wire. Additionally, 
Usedom brought the fledgling Ottoman naval and army air assists into the fray, 
preventing the Allies from achieving air superiority. 
British forces landed on Lemnos on 25 February 1915 and began to prepare the 
island to support the Dardanelles operation. The relative ease of securing the island did 
not equate to the Gallipoli Peninsula because Usedom was concerned with the Straits, 
not the Greek islands outside the channel. Spurred on by the ease of the Royal Marines' 
success with the Dardanelles forts, Greece offered to aid in the capture of Gallipoli and 
Istanbul. On 1 March, Athens offered to cooperate in exchange for Smyrna and a 
substantial portion of Anatolia. Athens desired to acquire Istanbul or at least a 
neutralization of the city. The regional proximity of Greece proper and the large Greek 
resident population in Istanbul would ensure Athens' influence in regional decisions 
358E. Keble Chatterton, Dardanelles Dilemma (London: Rich and Cowan, 1935), 
90. 
359Sir Roger Keyes, Naval Memor;es, Vol. 1 (New York: Dutton, 1934 ), 203. 
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regardless of Russian desireS.
360 
London gave no official approval, and Greece remained 
"neutral." However, on 3 March and again on 5 March, the Greek Royal Crown Council 
in Athens rejected any open involvement in the war. Venizelos resigned on 6 March, 
and active Greek support of Entente objectives was curtailed. 
The Porte also faced the problem of Russian action in the Black Sea. The Russian 
Supreme War Council ordered on 19 February 1915 that the Russian Black Sea fleet 
prepare to transport 37,000 men of the V Caucasian Corps, based in Batun1, to the 
Bosporus. The support of the Russian troops was based upon a successful breaching of 
the Dardanelles, and landing was anticipated in the first week of March, assuming the 
Ottomans capitulated.361 
In order to prevent Ottoman warship action in the Black Sea, Russian ships had 
seeded the Bosporus Straits with 847 mines during November and December 1914.362 
Because the area of seeding was outside of Russian control, protecting the fields and 
maintaining the integrity were impossible. Also, the current in the Bosporus Straits is a 
constant five knots, flowing from the Black to the Aegean Sea. The combination of five-
knot current and the Russian "throw and go" mine laying techniques resulted in a 
haphazard field and Usedom being able to harvest Russian mines for use in the 
Dardanelles. Additionally, Russia utilized floating mines called "little fishes." These 
mines floated down the channel and could pass through the Sea of Marmara, down the 
36°Cassar, 9 5. 
361 Greger, 48. 
362lbid., 70. 
Dardanelles, and become a menace to the Anglo-French fleet or be harvested by the 
Ottomans.363 
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On 5 March 1915 HMS Queen Elizabeth, utilizing aircraft for spotting, attempted 
to fire across the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to silence the shore batteries.364 The 
English also utilized a method of 11 listing11 wherein the ship was ballast on one side in 
order to increase the angle of the guns. Large caliber British naval guns had only a 15°-
250 elevation range, which was good for ship-to-ship long range duels but inadequate for 
deflation fire. The efforts failed, and on 7 March the French tried to force the straits at 
Kephez, only to be repulsed. 
The Ottoman minelayer Nousret seeded a minefield parallel to the channel at 
Eren-Keni Bay on 7 March.365 The Nousret laid only twenty mines, though the ship was 
capable of carrying forty. The on-hand mine inventory of the Ottomans had been very 
limited, and on 2 March the Ottoman gunboat Jntibah transported the last mines of the 
arsenal in Istanbul. 366 Any additional mines would have to be transported from Germany, 
or harvested from Russian fields. The Nousret-laid minefield was about 3000 yards long 
and roughly seven miles from Kephez. The mines were moored about fifteen feet below 
the surface. The depth setting was to target deep draft capital ships.367 




367Keyes, Vol. I, 230-231. 
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On 11 March the Anglo-French forces attempted to sweep the straits to seaward. 
The premise was that any mine cut loose from mooring cables would either be located 
and neutralized or swept to sea by the east-west current. Confronting the current was a 
major factor in the ineffectiveness of prior sweeping efforts. The British Commander, 
Roger Keyes, himself rode in the minesweepers during the attempt.368 A number of 
mines were swept, and one sweeper struck a mine and was destroyed. During the 
operation, several of the sweepers and escorting destroyers were mauled by the shore 
batteries. The sweep failed to clear the channel. 
Carden and Keyes pushed ahead to force a channel. On 12 March the English 
augmented the civilians on the minesweepers with active-duty sailors. The mission 
would be to force the fields regardless of the losses. On the night of 13 March the 
downstream sweep was again attempted. The Ottoman defenses once more beat back the 
sweepers, allowing only a single, two-ship moored sweep to succeed.369 
On 13 March the cruiser HMS Amethyst was severely damaged by indirect gun 
fire from fixed and mobile howitzers. The plunging fire could not sink an armored ship 
but could destroy command and control stations. With no command and control, 
communication breaks down, causing indecision. With this, the Allies began to 
contemplate injection of land forces to silence the guns in order to allow an adequate 
368Archibald Steward and Charles J.E. Peshall, Immortal Gamble (London: Black 
and Co., 1917), 38. 
369James A. Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns: An Historical Analysis of the 
Decisions of the Commanders," Naval War College Review, Vol. XIX, No. 10 (June 
1967): 79. 
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sweep of the channel. From 13 to l 7 March sweepers conducted check sweeping of the 
area to seaward of the Kephez fields. This effort was undertaken to ensure the force of 
battleships and cruisers had a clear channel for a planned daylight effort to force the 
straits on 18 March. A daylight assault was planned in order to allow naval gunfire 
spotting upon Ottoman fixed and mobile gun emplacements. Additionally, a daylight 
sortie allowed the use of aircraft for gunfire spotting and mine reconnoitering.370 
Because of illness, the Anglo-French commander, Admiral Carden, was replaced 
by the Rear Admiral Michael de Robeck on 16 March 1915. Admiral Ro beck had taken 
part in the planning of the day light assault and indicated no desire to alter the plan. 
British airplanes had been tested for minesweeping duties and had the ability to 
detect mines up to a depth of eighteen feet. Reports from aviators indicated no mines 
seaward of the Kephez fields, even though the Nousret had laid twenty on 7 March. The 
of the mines laid by the Nousret had escaped detection. The plan of attack was as follows, 
as taken from the planning memorandum of Carden's: "The general idea is to silence the 
defenses of the narrows and of the mine field simultaneously, so as to enable the 
sweepers to clear a passage through the Kephez mine field; if this is successful the attack 
will be at once continued on the remaining defenses until the fleet has passed through the 
Dardanelles."371 The Anglo-French battleships commenced bombardment at 1100 hours 
on 18 March with the mine sweepers going into action two hours later.372 At 1345 hours, 
370/bid., 80. 
371 Keyes, Vol. I, 226. 
372Meacham, 81. 
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the French battleship Bouvet struck a mine while maneuvering around the Nousret's mine 
line. The Bouvet blew up, capsized and sank within two minutes. Out of her complement 
of 709, only 71 were saved.373 At 1611 hours, HMS Inflexible also struck a mine of the 
Nousret"s line. The ship did not sink, however, and was beached at Tenedos and 
eventually repaired. At 1614 hours, HMS Irresistible hit a mine. Finally, at 1900 hours, 
HA1S Ocean became the last victim of Nousret's minefield. Both the Irresistible and the 
Ocean sank during the night of 18 March. The two ships' crews were removed by 
destroyers working under incoming fire from Ottoman gun emplacements. 374 
The Anglo-French commanders conferred upon the Queen Elizabeth and 
concluded, " ... the battleships could not force the straits until the mine field had been 
cleared--the mine field could not be cleared until the concealed guns which defended 
them could be destroyed, and they could not be destroyed until the peninsula [Gallipoli] 
was in our hands, hence we shall have to seize it with the Army." 375 With this 
recommendation, the Dardanelles operation evolved into a ground campaign regulating 
the Anglo-French naval units to a secondary role. The removal of aquatic forces, in 
which the Entente enjoyed supremacy, and their replacement by ground forces, in which 
the Ottomans enjoyed superiority, would result in defeat and ultimately withdrawal of 
Entente forces in January 1916. 
373Claude Ferrere, Histoire de la Marine Fran~·aise (Paris: Flammarion, 1956), 
374. 
374Meacham, 82. 
375Baron Rosslyn E.W. Wester-Wemyss, The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924), 41-42. 
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The Anglo-French forces failed to force the Dardanelles because the British were 
afraid to force the minefields. The British believed it was necessary to sweep a 
guaranteed safe passage prior to the passage of heavy warships. British Admiral Keyes 
in his memoirs declares, " ... there was never any question of taking battleships through 
unswept mine fields. "376 
Reliable intelligence on the mines was grossly neglected. The British had the 
expertise of admirals Limpus and Gamble to draw upon but instead seemed to have relied 
upon exaggerated mine figures from Greek sources. Admiral Kerr, British advisor to the 
Greek Royal Navy, reported from Athens that the Dardanelles were protected by 17 rows 
of mines at the Kephez-Chanak Narrows.377 Additionally, British Captain Kennedy, 
reporting from HMS Indomitable to Rear Admiral Troubridge, Commander of the British 
First Cruiser Squadron, Mediterranean, claimed to have the plans for the Ottoman 
minefields in mid-August 1914.378 Good intelligence in mine defense could have 
calculated the available mines and the optimum hazard those fields represented. 
The total number of mines laid by the Ottomans at the Kephez barrier was 352. 
Of the 352, fewer than 150 had been laid after 1 January 1915.379 The total number of 
mine lines was eleven. To successfully mine the narrows at Kephez, it would take 
183. 
56. 
376Keyes, Vol. I, 246. 
mMark E.F. Kerr, The Navy in My Time (London: Rich and Cowan, 1933), 182-
378Captain Kennedy to Rear Admiral Troubridge, 18 August 1914, Lumbry, 442. 
379lfans Kannengiesser, The Campaign in Gallipoli (London: Hutchinson, 1928), 
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approximately 26 mines in line, spaced at about I 00 yards. 380 Good intelligence would 
have indicated that clearing a channel directly ahead of capital ships would suffice for 
transit. Yet, on 18 March, when such an endeavor was planned, Admiral Robeck 
hesitated when confronted with the Nousret's mine field, a mine line outside of the transit 
route. When severe losses to mines had occurred, there was no longer any thought of 
challenging the mines anywhere until the guns had been silenced so that the sweeper 
could clear the threat.381 
The defense of the Dardanelles and the predicament of the Anglo-French forces 
altered Russia's strategy. Before the Dardanelles campaign, Russian naval forces were 
very active, mining the Bosporus Strait, shelling the coaling facility at Zonguldak, and 
wreaking havoc on Ottoman shipping. But on 17 February 1915 the Russian Supreme 
War Council forbade the Black Sea fleet from leaving Sevastopol.382 The reasons are not 
given but the absence of a tangible threat from the Russians allowed the Ottomans to 
concentrate resources on the Dardanelles. Russian mine fields, void of reseeding and 
with no protection from poaching were charted and became supplies for the Ottoman 
fields in the Dardanelles. The Russian contribution to the Dardanelles Campaign was the 
H.I.M.R.S. Askold and Captain M.I. Smirnov as liaison officer. However, there seems to 
380Granville Fortescue, What of the Dardanelles? (London: I-Iudder and 
Stoughton, 1915), 36. 
381 Admiral Robeck would later organize cattle raids on Turkish civilians using 
Greek irregulars starting in 1916. The use of Greeks initiated intercommunal warfare that 
lasted until 1922. See Paul G. Halpern, ed., The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1915-
1918 (Brookfield:Gower Publishing Company, 1987), 67-69, 329-332, 334, 340. 
382Greger, 48. 
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have been no coordination between the Entente fleets and their governments with similar 
military objectives but differing geographical ambitions. 383 With the decision to alter to a 
ground war in the Dardanelles, the Russian Supreme War Council on 18 March vetoed 
any injection of Russian troops into the Dardanelles fiasco. 384 The Russian Black Sea 
fleet was released to harass Ottoman shipping, but with no viable threat to inject Russian 
ground forces, the Ottomans concentrated on defense of the Gallipoli Peninsula. 
The defense of the straits by the Ottoman forces was a successful bluff perpetrated 
upon the Entente. Operational sorties of the Russian Black Sea fleet indicated fear of 
the Ottoman fleet, and thus the glut of mines seeded at the Bosporus passage. The mines 
were to prevent passage of the Yavuz [Goeben] and Midilli [Breslau] into the Black Sea. 
The mines also prevented the Russian Black Sea fleet from laying siege to Istanbul via 
the Bosporus Strait. Souchon bluffed the Russians into operating with caution when 
dealing with the Yavuz. That caution led to the Russians' blocking the only passage to 
assist the Anglo-French forces. 
The Anglo-French naval gun support proved to be a double-edged sword. The 
large caliber guns, necessary to destroy the gun emplacements, could not be elevated to 
an angle great enough to create plunging fire. In order to achieve the desired fall of shot, 
the battleships had to operate beyond 10,000 yards from the shore. This range decreased 




on the Anglo-French battleship, in open barrettes, could elevate to an angle sufficient to 
create plunging fire, but at a cost of large caliber guns. The short range of the secondary 
armament necessitated operating within the range of Ottoman howitzers and at short 
range the large caliber naval guns could fire only point blank into the bluffs overlooking 
the Straits. The Entente faced operating far out and hoping for a direct hit, or coming in 
close and getting mauled.385 Entente ships ultimately did move in closer. The newer 
warships first were stationed 14,000 yards off the beach and ultimately ended up less than 
8,000 yards. The reduced distance allowed for the deflation fire from small caliber 
weapons but at the cost of severe structural damage to topside command and control from 
returning Ottoman fire. 386 
Admiral Usedom bluffed the Anglo-French forces into action that favored the 
Ottomans, a land campaign. The Anglo-French naval forces could not silence the fixed 
fortifications overlooking the straits. Usedom's construction of numerous emplacements 
forced Allied warships to expend great quantities of shells on all potential emplacements, 
active or passive. The mobile guns and the "shell game" the Ottomans perpetrated 
bought Usedom time to counter the mine sweepers. Additionally, the Ottoman fixed 
fortifications were earthen redoubts as well as concrete. The Anglo-French fleet shelling 
3ssFor a detailed review of Entente naval gunfire at Gallipoli, see Walter C. Ansel, 
"Naval Gunfire in Support of Landings: Lessons from Gallipoli," Proceedings (July 
1932), 1001-1010. 
386For an excellent, first hand report of the damage caused by plunging fire, see 
Lieutenant D.D. Mercer, R.N., "Ships Versus Forts: Dardanelles, March 1915," 
Proceedings (October 1932), 1453-1457. 
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damaged the concrete but the earthen works survived all but direct hits. The survivability 
of the earthen forts created difficulties not anticipated and Commander Keyes, Chief of 
Staff to Admiral Carden, wrote to his wife that the enterprise was a " ... bigger thing than 
we anticipated and harder than the Admiralty realized."387 
In addition to the Dardanelles mining operation, separate mining of the Suez 
Canal by Ottoman forces was attempted on 11 April 1915. The operation was overt 
more than covert. The mines were carried over land from Syria and planted in the 
fairway. But the desired effect, diverting resources from the Gallipoli campaign, did not 
materialize.388 Ottoman naval personnel also mined the Karum River in Persian 
Arabistan, along with the Euphrates River above Kurnah in an attempt to slow the British 
advance in Mesopotamia. 389 
When comparing the Dardanelles mining operation to the Russian Black Sea and 
the Anglo-American North Sea fields, it can be seen that the Ottomans achieved total 
closure with far fewer resources. The Dardanelles defense depended upon threat of mines 
as a deterrent whereas the North Sea and Black Sea relied on sheer numbers to achieve 
closure. Table 27 compares the total number of mines laid during World War I. 
387Keyes to his wife, 8 March 1915. Found in Halpern, The Keyes Papers, Vol. I, 
102-105. 
388Vice Admiral Richard Peirse to Vide Admiral Arthur Limpus, 18 April 1915, 
found in Halpern, The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean, 12. 
3s9Julian s. Corbet, Naval Operations, Vol. III (London: Longman, Green and 
Co., 1923), 11-17. 
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TABLE 27 
MINES LAID DURING WORLD WAR I 







Source: James A. Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns: An Historical Analysis of the 
Decisions of the Commanders," Naval War College Review, Vol. XIX, No. 10 (June 
1967), 84, 91; and Rene Greger, The Russian Fleet, 1914-1917 (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 
1972), 71. 
Admiral Usedom bluffed the Anglo-French forces away from a naval campaign 
just as the Ottomans were running out of ammunition. The English shipyard, 
Armstrongs, was to have delivered a shipment of ammunition for the Dardanelles 
fortifications as well as for the battleship Sultan Osman-i Evvel. England seized both the 
ship and ammunition, creating a shell shortage, necessitating good firing discipline in 
order to conserve what was available. Reports concerning ammunition on hand by 
Djevad Pasha, the Ottoman commander overseeing fo1iifications, are found in Table 
28.390 The ammunition remaining on 18 March 1915 would have been sufficient to 
withstand two additional attempts to force the Dardanelles.391 




OTTOMAN GUNS AND AMMUNITION AFTER 18 MARCH 1915 
Diameter (in inches) Number of Guns Shells Available 
14 naval guns 5 271 
9.4 14 868 
6 quick firing 8 371 
8.2 m01iars 18 720 
6 Howitzers 32 3706 
5 or less 70+ NA 
Source: Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. I (New York: Scribner's, 1923), 
263. 
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A combination of four defensive measures confronted the Anglo-French forces 
attempting to traverse the Dardanelles: forts, mobile howitzers, minefield batteries and 
minefields. All were all good, but mutually dependent. The minefields blocked the 
passage of the straits and kept the fleet beyond their limits. The minefield batteries 
prevented the sweeping of the minefields. The forts protected the minefield batteries by 
keeping battleships at a distance with long range coastal batteries. The mobile howitzers 
kept the battleships on the move and increased the difficulty of overcoming the forts. So 
long as all four factors stood together, the defenses constituted a formidable obstruction. 
But not one could stand alone, and if one were broken, the fall would entail the collapse 
of the others. 
Ottoman grit stood the challenge with help from Germany. Any assistance 
provided by Berlin was technical, not material. Direct and unencumbered 
communication with Germany was possible only after Bulgaria joined the Central 
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Powers on 6 October 1915. 
The Ottoman navy maintained the minefields once the conflict switched to a 
ground campaign, and the Anglo-French naval forces did not challenge the straits for the 
duration of the war. But on 13 May 1915 the Ottoman destroyer Muavent-i Milliye, 
captained by the German Captain Firle, torpedoed the British battleship HA1S Goliath 
and returned unscratched: the first recorded successful torpedo attack by a destroyer on a 
battleship.392 The Anglo-French forces so discounted the Ottoman navy that patrols to 
prevent such attacks were not maintained.393 
The defense of the Dardanelles can be attributed to resolve: the Ottomans would 
not concede. The Anglo-French forces underestimated the Ottomans and overestimated 
the worth of naval gunfire. When Allied victory could have been achieved, Admiral de 
Robeck could not face losing ships. The Ottomans were able to turn the Allies from 
naval forces in which the Entente had superiority, to the Ottoman strength: ground 
forces. The failure led to the impression that modern coast defense guns along with land-
based aircraft would slaughter any landing force before the surf zone. Such views, 





BLACK SEA ACTION, 1914-1918 
The Ottoman Empire had enjoyed the Black Sea as its own private lake for several 
centuries. A map of the Black Sea Region is found in Appendix 9. The relationship 
provided a secure region in which the Empire conducted trade and transportation with 
little fear of disruption except from nature. The security and peace would change forever 
when Russia looked south for ice-free exits to the West. The potential threat from Czarist 
expansion schemes forced Istanbul to maintain fleet units capable of interdiction and 
blockage of waterborne aggression. The Sultan's government may have been concerned 
with ethnic uprisings in the Empire, but Russian aggression via the Black Sea was a 
paramount concern that dictated Ottoman naval policy for more than two centuries. 
In order to understand fully the naval situation in the Black Sea, the historical 
account of Russian southern expansion needs to be examined. Although Russia appeared 
on the Eastern political scene in the ninth century, there was no major friction with the 
Ottoman Empire beyond limited border raids. It was not until the reign of Peter the Great 
(1682-1725) that Russia exhibited any real interest in extending its southern boundaries. 
Determined to establish a foothold on the Black Sea and gain access to warm water ports 
of the Mediterranean, Peter captured the Ottoman Black Sea fortress of Azov in 1696. 
Russian occupation with the Russo-Swedish War and the alliance between Sultan Ahmed 
III (1703-1730) and Charles XII of Sweden (1697-1718) allowed the Ottomans to regain 
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possession of Azov in 1711. 
New Russian aspirations in gaining a foothold in the Mediterranean beoan to take 
b 
form in the eighteen century. Occurrences centered around the four factors: evolution of 
Western Powers into world powers; the rise of Czarist expansionism; the decline of 
Ottoman military prowess; and the counteraction of Western power to Russia's southern 
expansion. 394 
Russia's Catherine the Great (1763-1796) continued the push towards the Middle 
East. When Russia became entangled with the Poles, the Ottomans declared war on 
Russia. Catherine then dispatched the Baltic fleet around Europe and annihilated the 
Ottoman Navy at Chesme. The Russian fleet continued "mopping up" operations in the 
Aegean Sea, and in 1772 occupied Beirut, where the Russian flag flew for five months. 395 
Although the naval effort failed to penetrate the Dardanelles, the treaty concluded in 
1774, coupled with subsequent military ground pressure on the Ottoman Empire, gained 
Russia additional territory and free navigation in the Black Sea.396 
The arrival in 1798 of the French General Napoleon Bonaparte in the Middle East 
resulted in the first defensive alliance between Russia and the Ottomans, in which Russia 
was granted free passage through the Straits and the strategic waterway was closed to the 
warships of other foreign powers. By 1812 the French interest in Middle Eastern 
394Charles Moran, The Sea of Memories (New York: Scribner, 1942), 247-248. 
395lvan Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1959), 6-7. 
396George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1962), 11. 
228 
adventures had ceased, and Russia's aggressive southward expansion resumed. Britain, 
with commercial interests in the Mediterranean, saw the need to promote actively the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Istanbul's appeals to the Greater Powers for regulations 
to operate the Straits resulted in a neutralization policy in the Treaty of 1809. Russia was 
denied military access to the Mediterranean via the Dardanelles; however, St. Petersburg 
was assured no hostile fleet would attack its Black Sea possessions.397 
In 1832 the Ottoman Empire faced attack by Egyptian Mehemet Ali Pasha (1805-
1849). The Russian fleet came to the Sultan's aide and, according to the Unkiar Iskelessi 
Treaty that followed, Russia became "guardian" of the Straits and the Ottoman Empire 
became dependent upon its powerful northern neighbor. 398 A later war between the 
Ottoman Empire and Egypt resulted in the intervention of Western European powers, 
principally England. With concern over Russian intrusion in Istanbul, the Straits 
Convention of 1841 checked Russian influence and placed the Ottoman Empire under 
Western protection.399 Western European efforts to check Russian influence in the 
Middle East led to the Crimean War. 
The Crimean War ensued after Russia's Nicholas I (1825-1855) countered 
Napoleon Ill's (1852-1870) efforts to strengthen the French influence in the Near East 
with a demand for protection over Orthodox Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire. 





in 1854. The Treaty of Paris, signed in 1856 after the fall of Sebastopol, excluded the 
Russian fleet from the Black Sea and restricted the construction of defense installations 
along the seacoast.400 
In 1877 internal revolt in the Ottoman Balkan region encouraged Russia to 
repudiate the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris and invade via the Balkan and 
Caucasus regions. Russian success was assured by the Black Sea fleet's dominance. The 
Ottoman navy could not prevent the landing or resupply of Russian forces marching 
along the seacoast. Additionally, fear that Russia might bring the Baltic fleet around 
Western Europe and lay siege upon the Straits prevented redeployment of Ottoman war-
ships from the Sea of Marmara. England, once assured that Russia had no outward plans 
upon Egypt or the Suez Canal, refused to come to the aide of the Ottomans.401 
Russian military gains were not followed by diplomatic success. The Treaty of 
San Stefano in 1878 awarded Bulgaria and thus Russia with territory and influence that 
would have upset the balance of power in the Near East. England forced a modification 
of the treaty, saving European Ottoman possessions and Istanbul rewarded England with 
Cyprus. With the occupation of Egypt in 1878, English control was thus substituted for 
Ottoman power at the crossroads of the Levant. England had no vital interest in Cyprus 
prior to 1869 and the opening of the Suez Canal. Cyprus was desirable to protect English 
gains in the Near East and to block any possible Russian advances into the Mediter-
400Gtilerytiz, 4. 




British concerns for Russian expansion from the Black to the Mediterranean 
Seas goes back to Lord Nelson in 1799, who wrote, "The Russians are anxious to get to 
Malta, and they care for nothing else. 11403 
Fear of Russian advances towards the Mediterranean and the Middle East led to 
the Second Mediterranean Agreement in December 1887. The agreement concerned the 
possible military occupation of some Ottoman territory, ostensibly in order to preserve 
the independence of the Empire, by Britain, France, and Russia. The agreement clarified 
British opposition to both Russian encroachment into the Mediterranean and French 
inroads into Syria. 
The twentieth century dawned upon an Ottoman Empire confronting an injured 
Russia reeling from a disastrous war with Japan. The Russian Black Sea fleet was 
prevented from sailing to aid the Baltic fleet because of the Ottoman refusal to allow 
foreign warships through the Straits.404 The refusal to allow passage through the Straits 
increased Russian desires to control the watercourse. The complete defeat of the Russian 
fleet by Japan at Tsu-Shima in 1905 would not have been unavoidable had the Ottomans 
relented and allowed passage of the Russian Black Sea fleet. But the opportunity to lay 
the blame on Istanbul and not credit Japanese naval advances or Russian incompetence 
was advantageous. 
402Bernard Newman, Mediterranean Background (London: Hale, 1949), 192. 
403Quote found in John Maffee, "Ivan Hugs Shores of Tripoli," The Washington 
Post 25 February 1969. 
404 The New York Times, 8 January 1904. 
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Material inferiority was not the only issue confronting St. Petersburg. The 
Russian officer corps was bloated, and many lacked the desire to perfect the personnel 
and crew training necessary to achieve a level of attainment. The living environment on 
Russian ships was harsh by Western standards, with hazing by senior crew members 
horrific. The combination of low pay, hazing, and substandard living conditions 
fermented into discontent.405 A mutiny in June 1905 on the battleship Potemkin, along 
with the training ship Prut, cruiser Ochakov, and destroyer Svirepy, and the unwillingness 
of the crews of other ships in the Black Sea fleet to suppress the mutineers showed the 
unreliability of the personnel. The unprofessionalism in the Russian fleet necessitated 
fleet-wide} reforms as well as replacement of ships lost at Tsu-Shima. 
Russian visions of exploiting the ice-free Black Sea ports were stifled by 
non-control of the Straits. The Ottoman policy of excluding passage of warships did hurt 
the Russo-Japanese War effort but also allowed St. Petersburg the luxury of having a 
relatively secure southern border. The commercial outlets were open without disruption 
except during short periods of warfare, and Russian naval funds that were expended for 
the Black Sea fleet went more for coast guard duties than actual blue water warships. 
The situation for the Russian Black Sea fleet changed in 1906. In order to force 
the Straits and not be deprived of ice-free passage of both commercial and military 
warships, the Russian Naval General Staff (GENMOR) suggested an expansion program 
in order to have on hand naval forces half again the combined assets of the Black Sea 
4osF.O. 371/1469/20817, O'Beirne to Grey, 12 May 1912, St. Petersburg, cited in 
Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 301. 
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powers. Table 29 lists the 1906 Russian assets and the proposed Black Sea fleet. 
TABLE 29 
PROPOSED EXPANSION OF RUSSIAN BLACK SEA FLEET 
1906 Proposed Additions 
Battleships 6 +3 
Cruisers 2 
Destroyers 19 +9 
Gunboats 6 
Submarines 0 +3 
Source: Rene Greger, The Russian Fleet, 1914-1917 (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 1972), 9-
10. 
Russian naval plans were slowed by Russian economic conditions. The Russians 
attempted to purchase ship plans from Germany and England in order to bypass the 
design phase of shipbuilding. But foreign plans called for fabrication not readily 
available in Russian yards, and St. Petersburg was forced to acquire several ships from 
foreign shipyards. The deteriorating situation concerning Germany and Austria 
redirected funds from the Black Sea fleet to the Baltic Sea forces until late 1909. 
Russian shipbuilding started modernizing along the same route that made Italy 
successful: foreign capital and joint ventures. The Germans established partnerships 
with Baltic yards and the British, the Black Sea shipbuilders. The British firm of John 
Brown advised the Russian yard Bunge and Ivanov at Nikolaev.406 In preparation for 
406Hythe, Naval Annual, 1912, 54. 
dreadnought construction, the yard was furnished with new shops, railway connections, 
and the latest machinery· British Vickers acquired an interest in the Ateliers et F onderies 
de Nicolai'eff, where the English firm started construction of the Ekaterina JI in 
September 1912. The English firm John Brown advised on the dreadnoughts 
Jmperatrista Maria and fmperator Alexander 111 in July 1912.407 The British Second Sea 
Lord, Prince Louis of Batten berg, encouraged English shipyards to expand and 
modernize the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The premise was that the Russians would act as 
a check on any Ottoman attempts to acquire full sovereignty over Egypt. 
The Greek tycoon George Averoff contracted in October 1909 to acquire an 
armored cruiser and the Ottomans responded by purchasing two German battleships. 
Russia responded by restoring funds to the Black Sea shipyards at Nikolayev and Odessa. 
In April 1911 the Russian Vice Admiral Ivan K. Grigorovitch, Russian Minister of 
Marine, forced through a Black Sea building program that would remove any doubt about 
Russian dominance of the Black Sea. Table 30 shows the comparison of Russian to 
Ottoman naval forces in 1911. 
The Ottomans responded to the Russian Black Sea buildup by ordering the 
Resadiye and .lvf ahmud Resad Vin June 1911. Additionally, in 1914 the Ottomans and 
Russians began competing negotiations with Brazil in order to purchase the two Sao 
Paulo-class dreadnoughts.408 The Ottomans needed the ships to confront Russian and 


























Source: Fred T. Jane, ed. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1914 (London: Sampson Low Marston, 
1914; reprint, New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1969), 411,409. 
Greek expansion plans, the Russians wanted to prevent the Ottomans from acquiring the 
ships. The Russians needed to prevent the Ottomans from dominating the Black Sea 
prior to the completion of the new Nikolayev battleships. Ottoman naval plans were not 
directed towards Russian but Greek imperialism. However, Russia, in attempting to 
influence events during the Italo-Ottoman and Balkan Wars, found the Russian Black Sea 
fleet incapable of intimidating the C.U .P. in Istanbul or Slavic ally Bulgaria. 
In an attempt to "stabilize" the situation, the Great European Powers dispatched a 
strong naval force to Istanbul. The Russians were represented by an old battleship, a 
cruiser, and a gunboat. The Russian warships originated from the Black Sea, and other 
European powers provided warships from Mediterranean squadrons or fleets. The 
Russian Black Sea Fleet Chief of Staff officer, Captain I van Kononov, suggested 
dispatching several large, deep draft battleships to the Mediterranean, forming a 
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squadron, and then claiming a right to take the ships to the Black Sea for dry docking or 
major maintenance. The warships could become involved in shipyard "accidents," 
preventing a timely departure and thus circumventing the Treaty of Paris. The warships 
from the Baltic would balance out Ottoman purchases abroad and provide relief to the 
Black Sea naval imbalance.409 
The Russian Black Sea fleet was never regarded as a main player in any prewar 
planning.410 The Ottoman-Russian diplomatic situation was fairly straightforward. 
Russia would interfere with the internal politics of the Ottoman Empire through ethnic 
Armenians in the east while seeking out foreign cooperation over the Straits question. 
Russia had been exerting considerable pressure on Istanbul to remain neutral in the event 
of a general European war, but, like England and France, refused to give any guarantees 
to respect Ottoman borders. Following the visit of the Czar to Constanza and Bucharest 
in June, Russia and Rumania agreed to cooperate in the event of the closure of the Straits. 
Russia also encouraged Rumania and Bulgaria to take action to "disturb the Turks. "411 
Any Russian naval operations in the Black Sea theater were considered ancillary 
to the main battlefront in central Europe. The 1908 plan set the chief objectives of the 
Black Sea fleet as a1mihilation of the Ottoman fleet and for landing at the Bosporus. A 
year later, in 1909, a variation on this plan allowed for the appearance of the 




411 Gtilerytiz, 27. 
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ensured by blocking of the Bosporus with 2300 mines laid in three fields.412 
The expected strengthening of the Ottoman fleet with ships ordered from England, 
Italy and France led to a radical alteration in the 1909 plans. In the 1912 plan, the 
Bosporus blockade was omitted, and the 1917 plan expected the Ottomans to strike first 
around Sebastopol, placing the Russians on the defensive until the new battleships came 
on line.413 The Russian Black Sea commander, Vice Admiral Andrei von Eberoard fully 
b ' 
expected to wage a defensive battle with the forces of a weaker naval power: submarines, 
small torpedo boats, destroyers, and naval aviation. Ebergard planned also on defensive 
mining along the routes to Sebastopol and Novorossisk and offensive mining at the 
Bosporus Strait. Port Arthur proved defensive mines could shape a theater or deny the 
use of shipping channels and the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were utilized to 
formulate Ebergard's the mining plans.414 
Russia sought assistance for the Black Sea through Paris when Russian Vice 
Admiral Aubert and Vice Admiral Prince Lieven worked out a general agreement for 
collaboration with French Minister of Marine Delcasse. The Russian Minister of Marine, 
the Vice Admiral Ivan K. Grigorovitch, needed time to rebuild, and France had shown a 
willingness to enter into a military understanding. The Franco-Russian naval convention 
of 16 July 1912 called for aid during wartime against a mutual foe. The gist of the treaty 





transport of troops and supplies for land operations. Troops stationed in the lower 
Caucasus region would be transported via waterways to the Ukraine or vice-versa. But 
the Russians feared the situation would completely change if the Austrian or Italian fleet, 
or both, were allowed by treaty or persuasion to pass through the Strait. Delcasse and 
the French admirals had planned on concentrating forces at Bizerte in order to check the 
Italian or Austrian fleets. Actually the French had promised nothing that Paris did not 
intend to do in the first place. French naval plans called for checking either Triple 
Alliance member at Bizerte regardless of Russia.415 
The Russian threat in the Black Sea was a fact the Ottomans had to contend with. 
However, Romania and Bulgaria also attempted to create respectable navies capable of 
striking off shore. When Bulgaria received full independence on 5 October 1908, Russia 
offered to sell the Bulgarian navy a cruiser, two popovkas-class gunboats, minelayers, 
torpedo boats and auxiliaries. The Bulgarians declined the offer on the grounds that a 
large fleet was unnecessary. Russia could always be counted on for assistance, and such 
a large force would only drain the cash-strapped country. Bulgaria was satisfied with 
small auxiliaries for coastal defense and concentrated on land warfare. 416 
Romania had gained independence in 1880 and with little coast line on the Black 
Sea, emphasized river patrol boats on the Danube estuary. The 1899 naval expansion 
program had called for six coastal battleships, four destroyers and twelve torpedo boats. 
415Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 304. 
416Gardiner, 411. 
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The Danube Division was slated to be strengthened by eight river monitors and twelve 
river torpedo boats. The aggressive buildup in the Danube River signified the importance 
of Danube security to Romania, and the actual purchase of four river monitors and ei aht 
b 
river torpedo boats the difficulties in funding. 
The Romanian 1899 naval program, folded into the 1912 program, called for six 
light cruisers, twelve large destroyers, and one submarine. Subsequent plans called for 
naval expansion totally out of financial reality for Romania, a coastal battleship of 13,000 
tons and ancillary units.417 Romania did order four Aquila-class destroyers from Pattison 
in Naples, Italy in 1913. How Romania was going to transit the ships through the 
Ottoman-controlled Straits is not clear. But Romania had sided with Istanbul in the Third 
Balkan War and forced Bulgaria to fight on two fronts. The splitting of Bulgaria's forces 
ultimately led to the recapture of Western Thrace and saving the C.U.P.'s regime. The 
"unobserved" passage of the Romanian destroyers would have been a small price to pay 
for the defeat of Bulgaria. Romania did possess a merchant marine of 41 steamers of 
75,174 gross tons, of which four vessels had been outfitted as auxiliary cruisers. 
The Ottoman Fleet commander, as of 1 October 1914, was Admiral Wilhelm 
Souchon and the second in command was Admiral Arif. Ottoman fleet assets were 
' 
divided into two squadrons, each with a destroyer and torpedo-boat component. 
Additionally, a mine group under Captain Nazmi Emin was formed for both defensive 
sweeping and mine seeding. Appendix 10 shows the breakdown of Ottoman assets as of 
417 Ibid., 421. 
1 October 1914. 
The Ottoman-German fleet commanded by Souchon had only one hope for 
victory, a quick, decisive strike. The Ottoman naval situation would be favorable only 
until the Russian dreadnoughts were completed. After the new Russian dreadnouaht 
b 
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became active, the Russians would quickly entrap the Ottoman-German fleet. So success 
for the Ottoman-German fleet dictated a knockout punch delivered by sea prior to the 
activation of these dreadnoughts. Additionally, Souchon and the German ambassador, 
Baron von Wangenheim, were concerned that since the Battle of the Marne on 5 
September 1914, German forces had been on the defensive. In the east, Austrian forces 
had been repulsed by Russian troops in the Ukraine region. Germany was under severe 
stress, and an offensive in the Black Sea and southern Caucasus region could relieve 
pressure on Austria and Germany. The Ottomans fully understood that a victorious 
Russia would mean disaster for the Ottoman Empire for closing the Straits and thus 
severing Russia's supply lines. No country could prevent the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire except a victorious Germany and to defeat Russia and save Germany, 
Souchon had to defeat the Russian Black Sea fleet. In order to prod Russia into attacking 
the Ottoman Empire, Souchon ordered the Midilli and several torpedo boats into the 
Black Sea on 20 September 1914.418 
418File No. 711.673/42, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, United States, 20 
September 1914, Istanbul. Found in United States, Papers Relating to the For~i~n 
Relations of the United States, Supplement (Washington, DC: Government Pnntmg 
Office, 1928), 111. 
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In order not to provoke a war, Ebergard was ordered not to sortie in the southern 
reaches of the Black Sea. The first order for the Russian Fleet was to secure the coast of 
the Black Sea in order to prevent landings of Alliance troops. For the Ottomans, the path 
to intervention into the war was concluded on 11 October when Enver, Talaat, Djemel 
and Ottoman Foreign Minister Halil agreed to hostilities in exchange for $9,620,000 in 
gold from Berlin. The death of King Carol of Romania momentarily slowed the process 
due to the belief that a Bulgarian-Romanian-Ottoman defense agreement could be 
arranged via Romania, however, by 21 October Germany had shipped the agreed-upon 
price.419 
The decision to sortie out on 27 October was decided at a conference attended by 
the Ottoman ministers and the German ambassador von Wangenheim. Wangenheim 
insisted the Ottomans strike at Russia immediately. Ottoman Grand Vizier Said Halim 
resisted, claiming the slow Ottoman mobilization had not proceeded far enough to allow 
offensive action. Said Halim planned on the European war bleeding both sides white. 
Neutrality until 1918 would allow for a German-trained army of almost one million, 
making dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire doubtful. However, under pressure from 
Ottoman War Minister Enver Pasha and Wangenheim, the Grand Vizier gave permission 
for Souchon to sortie into the Black Sea, but not attack the Russians. Souchon's 





Additionally, Crown Prince lzzedin, heir to the throne, brother of Abdul Hamid, 
was very clear that no declaration of war should be made without consent and approval of 
the ruling council, and the majority of that body opposed entering the war. Enver, in 
dispatches to Wangenheim, had planned an attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet without 
a declaration of war. Naval Minister, Djemal Pasha, the head of the Ottoman Fleet, was 
left out of the fleet war plans.421 
The Ottoman navy, commanded by Souchon, sortied out of the Bosporus Strait on 
27 October 1914 from an anchorage off Haydarpasa, Buyukdere, and Istine and 
assembled within the breakwaters. At 1700 hours, the visual signal, "Do the utmost for 
the future of Turkey" was sent three times, and the fleet sailed out into the Black Sea.422 
Secret orders instructed the commanding officers to proceed to Russian waters and strike 
at the Russian Black Sea fleet. "The Turkish fleet is to achieve naval supremacy in the 
Black Sea. Seek out the Russian fleet and attack it wherever you find it without 
declaration of war. "423 Souchon learned from intelligence that the Russian fleet had just 
returned to Sebastopol to coal after a cruise. Souchon planned on mining the harbor 
entrance, trapping the Russians and systematically destroying the berthed ships. Any 
ship fleeing the bombardment would have to navigate a dense minefield and the sec-
420Djemel, 112, 127-132. 
421Trumpener, 51-52. 
422This Signal is not found in Ottoman signal books in use in 1914. See Turkish 
Naval Forces Command Culture Publications, Translated by Tayfun Isevi. Ottoman Navy 
Signal Code Book (Ankara: Naval Forces HQ Press, 1995). 
423Trumpener, 51-52. 
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ondary armament of the Yavuz. 424 
On 29 October 1914 Yavuz, along with escorts Tasoz and Samsun, arrived off 
Sebastopol, and at 0630 hours they opened fire. Russian shore batteries returned fire and 
' 
Yavuz was hit three times near the funnel, forcing a withdrawal after doing little damage 
to the Russian fleet. While returning to Istanbul, Yavuz captured the Russian steamer Jda 
sank the Russian minelayer Prut, and damaged an escorting destroyer Leytenant 
Puschkin. Yavuz arrived back in Istanbul on 30 October after doing little damage to the 
Russian fleet. 
' 
In addition to the Yavuz, Tasoz, and Samsun, the Ottoman passenger liner Nilufer 
was painted to resemble a Russian steamboat with black hull and yellow funnel and was 
outfitted with mine rails and sixty mines. The Nilufer laid a mine barrage off Sebastopol, 
closing the channel and preventing the Russian Black Sea fleet from pursuing the Yavuz 
and her escorts. 
Another squadron led by the Hamidiye arrived off Feodosia at 0630 hours, and an 
Ottoman and German officer were sent ashore to inform local authorities that hostilities 
would begin in two hours. Chivalrously, Hamidiye waited until 0900 hours before 
opening fire and shelled the harbor installations for an hour before steaming to Yalta. At 
Yalta, Hamidiye sank the steamer Sura and the sailing vessel Svyaloy Niko/av before 
returning to Istanbul on the 31 October. 
424]ulian Stafford Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol. I (London: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1920), 360. 
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The Gayrel-i Vataniye and Muavent-i Milliye arrived off Odessa at 0230 hours on 
29 October. A small line of boats making its way into the harbor was attacked, and the 
Russian gunboat Donets was sunk and the Kuranet damaged. The Muavent-i Milliye 
shelled the oil tanks and harbor installations, and damaged a berthed merchant ship. 
Russian shore batteries prevented a planned landing to destroy grain installations, and the 
two warships returned to Istanbul via the Snake Islands. 
The kfidilli and Berk-i Satvet arrived off Novorossiysk after a rough passage 
during which the crews experienced severe sea sickness. An officer from the Berk-i 
Satvet was sent ashore to warn authorities of the intended attack but the Russians refused 
to accept the warning and arrested the officer. The Berk-i Satvet entered the harbor and 
communicated that shelling would commence immediately if the emissary were not freed. 
The officer was released, and the Berk-i Satvet generously waited until 1050 hours before 
opening fire on the shore installations. The Midilli laid a sixty-mine barrage in the 
Straits of Kerch before assisting the Berk-i Satvet in shelling Novorossiysk. After 
destroying the oil facilities there, the Ottoman warships targeted the merchant piers, 
resulting in seven ships being damaged and the Nikolai sunk. At 1300 hours, Midilli 
departed Novorossiysk and sortied to Varna to destroy the telegraph to Sebastopol. Both 
ships were back in Istanbul by 30 October. 
In reviewing the operations carried out against Sebastopol, Feodosia, and Odessa, 
the Ottoman commanders agreed that none had succeeded in damaging the Russian fleet 
or hampering Petrograd's war machine. ( Czar Nicholas II changed the German "St. 
Petersburg" to the Russian "Petrograd" at the outset of the war. ) The loss of two small 
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warships and several merchants would not adversely affect the Ru · fl Tl G ssian eet. 1e erman 
officers voiced a low opinion of the Ottoman Navy in general but praised the ordinary 
Ottoman seamen for their bravery and hard work during the action, especially since the 
fleet had little real sea training. The German crews, however, had their own problems, 
and Souchon's orders of the day state, "that feigned illness is cowardice in the face of the 
enemy." The order was read in German and was addressed only to the German crews. 
The attack led to Russia's declaring war on the Ottomans on 2 November 1914 
' 
followed by Great Britain and France on 5 November. Russian offensive action aoainst 
b 
the Straits and the Anatolian coast began on 5 November 1914 with the mining and 
shelling of the coal port of Zonguldak. Ottoman losses began with the sinking of the 
loaded troop transports Bahriye Amer, Bezm-i Alem, and .Mi that Pasa off of Kandi Iii. 
The loss of almost a division of well-trained X Army Corps troops headed to Trabzon 
was a result of the lack of communications between Souchon and Enver Pasha or of 
overconfidence on the part of Souchon. Miscommunication, differences in priorities, 
Enver's ground defense in the Caucus, and Souchon's views of the Russian Black Sea 
fleet created confusion and delay that cost the Ottomans troops, ships, and opportunities 
for success. However, Souchon's complaints of time schedule differences had some 
validity. The Ottoman Empire did not utilize standard Western European methods of 
hourly time or yearly calendars. The Ottoman-fixed element for time was sunset, not 
noon, as in Western European practices. Using sunset was necessary for daily prayers. 
Additionally, three different calendars were in active use in the Empire: the lunar, the 
Julian, and the Gregorian. All three differ from the Roman calendar used in western 
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Europe. Unless Souchon was fully aware of the possible time differences, confusion 
would be probable.
425 
Souchon's inactivity suggest he may have believed the Russians 
would hunker down as in Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War. Ebergard planned 
on the exact opposite. 
Souchon did provide convoy protection for X Army Corps after the loss of the 
three transports. But the loss of the three large transports slowed the Army's deployment, 
and convoy duty prevented offensive action against Russian naval targets. Compounding 
the situation was the condition of Ottoman warships. Other than the Yavuz and the 
Midilli, no Ottoman warship could do over twenty knots, slowing the faster ships down to 
keep with the slowest. Russia economics delayed building dreadnoughts in the Black Sea 
and Eberhard had to settle for large oil fired destroyers instead. Conventional naval 
doctrine would have viewed the destroyers as less an asset than dreadnoughts but the 
action in the Black Sea showed large destroyers were ideal for the theater. 
The Yavuz rejoined the fleet after repairs were completed to the battle-damaged 
superstructure in mid-November. On 18 November Yavuz, with the Midilli as escort, 
encountered a Russian squadron off the Crimea. Ebergard respected the Yavuz and would 
only duel when the Russian fleet was at a numerically superior position. The Yavuz 
opened fire, but it was hit by returning fire on the port casement III, and sixteen sailors 
were killed. The Russian battleship Evstafiy was hit four times and retired out of the 
firing line leaving Ebergard outgunned, and he withdrew. Ebergard switched to 
425Emin, 170-171. 
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offensive mining in the belief that the fields could bottle up the Ottoman fleet. 
Ebergard needed to stall for time until the three Impertritsa A1ariya-class 
dreadnoughts became operational. The Yavuz had proved vulnerable to shellfire but also 
reaffirmed that German naval engineering had created a warship capable of taking as well 
as delivering a hit. Ebergard chanced that a huge minefield outside of the Bosporus 
opening could create enough havoc to damage the deep-draft Yavuz. Table 31 lists the 
number and general type of offensive mines seeded by the Russian Black Sea fleet along 
the Anatolian coast during the war. In addition to offensive mines, Ebergard laid a 
defensive mine barrier along the northern Black Sea coast involving 4,423 mines by the 
end of 1914. The Russians had been experiencing major setbacks fighting the Germans 
on the eastern front, and the prospect of a German-inspired amphibious landing, and not 
the Yavuz and lvfidilli, concerned Ebergard.426 In order to improve the odds that the Yavuz 
might hit a mine, Ebergard intended to sink block ships in the channel, either narrowing it 
to make the odds of a successful mining greater, or blocking it completely and thereby 
bottling up the entire Ottoman deep-draft fleet. 
From mid-November until January, troops of the Ottoman X Army Corps were 
transported east in order to facilitate the winter Caucasus campaign planned by Enver. 
The Ottoman fleet provided convoy duty where necessary and harassing shore 
bombardments on Batum, Sebastopol, Akkerman, and Tuapsa when possible. When the 
convoys were protected, no transports were lost to Russian surface ships. Russian mines 
426Halpern, A Naval History, 226. 
TABLE 31 
RUSSIAN MINES USED IN THE BLACK SEA 
1914 1915 1916 1917 Total 
Mines seeded 1247 58 2187 2186 5678 
Mine Type Weight (kg) Explosive Weight (kg) 
Model 1912 609 100 
Model 1909 480 130 
Model 1908 582 115 
Model 1906 450 55 
River Type (Little Fishes) 30 
Source: Robe1i Gardiner, ed., Conway's All The World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921 
(London: Conway Maritime Press, 1985; reprint, London: Conway Maritime Press, 
1992), 416-417. 
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claimed few successes because the "throw-and-go" method of seeding was inadequate for 
complete blockade and because the Russian were unable to prevent Ottoman mines-
weeping. But on 26 December the Yavuz hit two recently laid mines just outside the 
Bosporus. Over 600 tons of water flooded the forward section but trim was unaffected 
and the ship returned to port safely.427 The ship's compartmentalization was excellent. 
The damage to the Yavuz was costly. Ottoman facilities were inadequate to implement 




The new year 1915 found the Ottoman fleet without the services of the Yavuz and 
the Russian fleet preparing to place into service the dreadnought Jmperatriysa Mariya. 
The mine campaign instituted by Ebergard had begun to show success not only on the 
Yavuz, but also the cruiser Berk-i Satvet and the minesweeper Ron and mine layer Nilufer. 
The warships were damaged beyond repair and would sit out the rest of the war. 
Ebergard took advantage of the absence of the Yavuz by releasing the old 
pre-dreadnoughts to shell the Anatolian coast, concentrating on the coal facilities at 
Zonguldak and Eregi. In an effort to stifle the Istanbul economy, Ebergard concentrated 
on merchants plying the Anatolian coast. 
After the new year, Souchon decided to reinforce Zonguldak with four 12.0 cm 
coastal defense guns. The guns were sent to be transported by the Yesilirmak with 
protection provided by the Midilli, the Hamidiye, and the Berk-i Satvek while en route to 
Zonguldak. At 1800 hours, the Berk-i Satvek hit a mine, resulting in general flooding aft. 
Two tugs towed the warship back to Istinye, where the cruiser sat out the war because of 
lack of repair facilities. The Russians intercepted Ottoman radio communications and 
dispatched five battleships, two cruisers, and ten destroyers in the hope of catching the 
Midilli and the Hamidiye. Missing the Otioman cruisers, Ebergard scoured the Anatolian 
coast, destroying 51 merchant vessels.428 
428 Ibid., 46-4 7. 
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Enver's Caucasus campaign had become a rout by 24 January 1915 and the 
remnants of the X Army Corps trickled to the Lazistan coast in the hope of being rescued. 
The Russians bombarded the coastline, preventing succor or rescue. In addition to the 
Ottomans, the Russians went after neutral American shipping charted to the Red Cross. 
The American steamer Vaslinton, transporting medical supplies to Trabzon, was sunk 011 
8 February. The Ottoman navy could not protect the merchants and fight the war at the 
same time. In less than two months, the Russians had sunk over 100 Ottoman merchant 
ships, and the shortage of coal warranted rationing, which led to economic stress on the 
war effort. 
Istanbul got a reprieve when the Russian Supreme War Council, on 9 February, 
forbade the Black Sea fleet from leaving Sebastopol unless the situation with regard to 
the Allied attack on the Dardanelles required assistance.429 All Ottoman warships in the 
Black Sea returned to the Straits in order to await the Entente thrust up the Dardanelles. 
The Russians anticipated landing the V Caucasian Corps of 37,000 men around the 
Straits by mid-April. The troops were to be transported from Batum to the Bosporus, 
where the Russians expected to realize the plan of acquiring the Straits via English and 
French naval power. 
The failed attempt to force the Dardanelles by England and France necessitated a 
change of plans for the Russians. Transporting of troops was shelved, and the notion of a 
forcible amphibious operation around the Bosporus region was put on hold. On 28 
429Greger, 48; Nerpasov, 44. 
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March the world's first carrier-battleship task force arrived off the Bosporus and began 
shelling defensive positions outside the Strait. Seaplanes from the Russian seaplane 
carriers Almaz and Nikola bombed the lighthouses at Rumelifenerli and Anadolufenrli. 
Accompanying the Russian task force were six high seas minesweepers. Ebergard had 
assembled forces capable of forcing the Bosporus if the minesweepers could clear a 
channel and if the seaplanes found a safe route through the Russian offensive 
"throw-and-go" field. The mining techniques used by the Russians and the inability to 
maintain the fields had prevented the Russians from knowing exactly where the mines 
were seeded. After shelling the defensive positions with little success and with no 
forcible break in the thick fog, which prevented seaplanes reconnoitering through the 
minefields, Ebergard opted to shell coal facilities at Eregli, Kozlu and Zonguldak.430 
The Yavuz returned to action on 1 April, and, along with the Midilli, sailed for 
Sebastopol while the Hamidiye and the Mecidiye, with the Yadigar-i Milley sortied 
towards Odessa. At 0630 hours off Odessa, the Mecidiye was mined, flooding the boiler 
rooms. The Mecidiye sank, partly submerged in shallow water, with a loss of 26 crew 
killed. All logs and ciphers, radio equipment, and sighting gear were destroyed before 
the ship sank. The Yadiggr-i Jvfillet torpedoed the wreck, and the remaining ships 
returned to the Bosporus. While returning to Istinye, the Yavuz sank two Russian 
freighters and damaged another. Even with the Yavuz back in action, Souchon was unable 
to hit the enemy hard. Even the attempt to sink the Mecidiye failed, and the Russians 
430Greger, 48; Layman, IO 1. 
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raised the cruiser, repaired it, and had it commissioned as the p,,ut (P 1 th f . ru was e name o 
the Russian minelayer sunk on the first skirmish of the war.) 
With the Anglo-French forces bogged down at the Dardanelles, the British 
Admiral Michael de Robeck, on 25 April, requested that the Russian's apply pressure 
upon the Bosporus to check the flow of reinforcements to Gallipoli. Ebergard responded 
by shelling the forts at the entrance of the Bosporus as well as at Kava Narrows. 
Additionally, Ebergard's ships shelled the right flank of the Chatalja line and adjacent 
coastal defensive positio~s. But shore bombardment without follow-on forces become 
little more than a naval menace. The German Admiral Guido von Usedom 
' 
choreographing the Dardanelles defense, was aware that the Austro-German thrust in 
Galicia would req{1ire Russia to expend any troops available for defense, and thus no 
follow-on forces would be landing after Ebergard's shelling. Additionally, Ebergard also 
had serious coal limitations that prevented any long-term operations off the Bosporus.431 
On 2 May the Russian carrier-battleship task force arrived again at the Bosporus 
to renew action on the defensive positions. Russian seaplanes were used to spot for the 
,_ 
battleship gunfire but the shelling caused little damage. Moving along the coast, the Rus-
sians shelled Igneade and Kozlu and instituted interdiction measures against Romanian 
smuggling. Unlike the action on 28 March, Ebergard did not attempt to sweep the 
channel or attempt any reconnoitering of possible passages through the minefield. The 
Russian decision not to apply serious pressure around the Bosporus region allowed 
431 Julian Stafford Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol. II (London: Longman, Green 
and Co., 1921), 373-74 and 295. 
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Istanbul the opportunity of mustering forces against England and France on the Gallipoli 
Peninsula. 
The Russian fleet loitered along the Anatolian coast for four days and brought 
Ottoman coal transport to a complete halt. Since the outset of the war, the Ottoman 
merchant marine had lost over 50,000 tons of register-shipping and an unknown number 
of sailing vessels. By 20 May Ebergard's concentration on coal interdiction stopped 
regular coal supplies to Istanbul. The Russian's landed a raiding party and destroyed the 
coal mines, loading equipment, and power house. Camli produced a low quality coal 
difficult to burn but the facility was on a rail line, allowing for some resemblance of 
scheduled delivery .432 
Ottoman naval action had been sporadic while the Yavuz was out of operation. 
But on 10 May the Yavuz, escorted by the Numune-i Mamyet, engaged two Russian 
battleships and several minesweepers. The Yavuz had planned upon engaging just the 
minesweepers, but radio communications brought the Russian battleships Tri Suyatiteliya 
and the Panteleimon into the fray. The Yavuz opened fire at 0715 hours, and the Russians 
returned it immediately. The Yavuz was hit twice and forced to retire. The small Russian 
ships shadowed down the Yavuz but did not engage.433 This engagement illustrates the 
true problem Souchon was facing: how to engage the enemy but avoid damage to the 
battle cruiser upon which Ottoman hopes of matching Russian naval strength rested. 
432Gtil eryiiz, 4 8. 
433 Ibid. 
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Ebergard realized the Yavuz could not be risked, and any allusion of Ottoman superiority 
was gone. Istanbul had to fight on the Black Sea as a weaker power. 
Russian submarines began operations along the Anatolian coast in mid-May 1915 
but only two submarines were suitable for such distances: the Nerpa, and the Tjulen. 
Both were Krupp-Germania built Kambala-type ships delivered in 1907 and were ideal 
for Black Sea operations. 
On 7 June a Russian task force of five battleships, three cruisers, and fourteen 
destroyers shelled Zonguldak and then Eregli, where the Ottoman merchant ship S.S. 
Progress was sunk. Near Karasu, the Russians captured the merchant Edincik and 
recovered the ship's log book, noting the arrival of the German submarines UB-8 and 
U-21 at Istanbul on 4 June. The Russian action forced Ottoman merchant convoys to stay 
under the protection of the Bosporus forts, and coal rationing in Istanbul was once again 
enforced.434 
On 10 June while engaged in collier convoy duties, the Midilli encountered the 
Russian destroyers Derzkiy and Gnevniy off Zonguldak. The Derzkiy was crippled by the 
opening salvo and had to be salvaged by the Gnevniy. The Midilli was hit seven times 
with small caliber shells forcing a retreat and did not finish off either Russian ship. The 
Midilli, like the Yavuz, could not be risked. 435 Russian battleships were not sortied in June 




Ottomans with an opportunity to resupply, via convoys, the coal for Istanbul. However 
' 
because of the Russian sweeps in early 1915, few colliers were available and demand 
outstripped supply. 
On 5 July the German submarine UB-8 became operational for Black Sea sorties. 
However, Ebergard had marshaled the Black Sea Fleet, and UB-7 found no opportunities 
for attack and returned to port on 22 July. The UB class submarines were ill equipped for 
the Black Sea and would find little success during the war. 
On 12 July the A1idilli departed the Bosporus for Karabuena in order to escort the 
merchant S.S. Kesan through the minefields. After a half-hour steaming, the cruiser hit a 
mine laid by the Russians on 21 December 1914 northeast of the entrance. Though 
flooded with over 642 tons of sea water, the cruiser reached Istiye where it was dry-
docked and inspected revealing slight seam damage. But because of a shortage of 
materials and qualified shipyard personnel, the cruiser was laid up until February 1916.436 
In July the Russians began deploying destroyers and torpedo boats out of Batum 
in order to increase their sea presence along the Anatolian coast. The move was 
successful, and the Russians sank over 150 small sailing vessels in less than six days.437 
The numerous sailing vessels plying the Black Sea indicated an almost complete absence 
of large-bulk transports. But the economic demand for goods transported via waterway 
had grown to a level that rewards outweighed risk. The demand for shipping permits, 
436Corbett, Naval Operations, Vol. III, 79. 
437Emin, 13 8-13 9. 
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necessary in order to conduct any mercantile enterprise, had been a catalyst for inflation. 
Public discontent resulted in the creation of a "Supreme Food Commission" in 1918 to 
regulate the marketing of shipping permits and reduce black-marketing. 
On 3 August the Ottomans organized a convoy consisting of the Muavent-i 
Milliye, Numune-i Hamiyet, Tasoz, and Hamidiye, and the large colliers Eresos, Jlliria, 
the Seyhun, and the Zonguldak. On the return leg of the convoy, the Russian submarine 
Tjulen torpedoed and sank the Zonguldak near Kefken Ada.438 From 29 August to 3 
September, the Ottomans lost 319 sailing vessels along the eastern Anatolian coast. The 
destruction of the last Black Sea large colliers occurred on 5 September. Two large 
Russian destroyers, along with the submarine Neepa, attacked a convoy consisting of the 
Eresos, the Jlliria, and the Seyhun, protected by Numune-i Hamiyet, Hamidiye, and the 
Muavent-i Milliye. The Hamidiye closed with the Russians, and in the course of the fight 
both of Hamidiye's 15 cm guns were put out of action. The cruiser was forced to 
withdraw, and the colliers scattered. The Russians forced the colliers aground at the 
estuary of the Sakarya River and systematically destroyed all three plus the Ottoman tug 
M.V. Seyyar. 439 
German naval planners began operating U-boats covertly out of Varna, Bulgaria 
in late September, Varna was bet1er suited for U-boat operations because of a direct rail 
link to Germany. Based was at Eurinograd, the UC-13 had been covertly operating from 
438Gtileryuz, 49. 
439Greger, 51; Nerasov, 65. 
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Bulgaria from 30 September. On 6 September 1915 a treaty of friendship and alliance 
was signed formalizing the relationship. When Bulgaria entered the war on 6 October 
' 
UB-14 began to sortie from Eurinograd with initial success. Between 3 October and 19 
October, UB-14 sank the Russian merchants Kay'a and the Apseron. However success 
was short-lived. Bulgaria did not possess a fleet capable of defending the coast and thus 
had to be defended with the meager resources available to Souchon. In order to 
strengthen the defense of Varna and Eurinograd, Souchon deployed UB-8 and UB-7 in 
late October.440 
Bulgaria entering the war did spread the Russian Black Sea fleet. The Bulgarian 
Navy was Russian-trained, and Istanbul now had a large pool of Russian-speaking 
officers fully versed in Russian tactics. But Bulgarian ports were figured into Ebergard's 
Bosporus amphibious operations and Varna and Eurinograd were shelled on 22 October 
and 27 October .441 Souchon left the submarines in Bulgarian waters in the hope of 
luring the Russians back for an ambush. Ebergard did not return until 24 December, and 
weather conditions prevented the submarines from deploying effectively. 
The Russians deployed submarines around the coaling center of Zonguldak, and 
on 14 November the Yavuz narrowly missed being hit by a torpedo fired by the Russian 
submarine Marz. The Yavuz was the only Ottoman surface ship capable of defending the 
colliers since the Midilli had been mined on 18 July. The Yavuz was also the prime 
' 
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target of any Russian submarine and Souchon removed the battle cruiser from Black Sea 
operations temporarily on 15 November. 
By the end of 1915, the Ottoman navy had lost most of its Black Sea colliers and 
large transports. Transport of coal now depended on a fleet of small sailing vessels, 
dhows, tugs, and Bosporus ferries. Along the Anatolian coast, naval operations became 
increasingly half-heaiied. When the Yavuz was damaged on 26 December 1914, 
conditions were right for the Russian fleet to take full command of the Black Sea without 
having to wait for the new battleships. The Russians appeared regularly in Ottoman 
waters, sinking everything in sight. Logistics and weather were the only limitations on 
Ebergard's fleet until German submarines appeared on September 1915. Prior to the 
submarines' arrival, the Russians sank a total of 36 merchants and brought in three prizes. 
After the submarines began operations, only one merchant and two gunboats were lost. 
But damage had been done to the Ottoman economy. The coal shortage reduced the 
operational tempo of the Ottoman fleet and the chronic shortage of raw materials now 
threatened to plunge the Ottoman Empire into a state of chaos. 
All the Russian fleets' success could not alter the fact Russia remained severed 
from the Entente. The Ottoman Black Sea Squadron had held the line and prevented the 
Russians from reaching the Mediterranean. The failure to break through the Dardanelles 
resulted in Entente commanders looking at the Black Sea region as a secondary front and 
resources for war in the theater would become scarce for both sides. 
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1916 
When the Anglo-French forces withdrew from Gallipoli, the Dardanelles transport 
fleet organized by Usedom became available for transport duties in the Black Sea. But 
the Yavuz and the repaired Midilli were the only surface combatants capable of convoy 
duties, because the Hamidiye has experienced engineering difficulties and would not be 
available to operate until after February 1916. The Russian Caucasus campaign, 
beginning in February, threatened Trabzon, and Yavuz and Midilli were utilized to ferry 
troops in order to counter the Russians. The absence of protection for the colliers allowed 
the Russians to act aggressively, employing seaplanes to attack Zonguldak and damaging 
the merchant Irmingard. On 12 March Russian destroyers sank the Seyyar. The Russian 
submarine Marz claimed the Darica on 24 March and the Dubrovnik on 1 April. While 
the Midilli and the Yavuz were utilized as troop transports from February to June, the 
Russians destroyed 15,678 tons of irreplaceable merchant shipping.442 On 24 April, the 
Russian submarine Tjulen attacked the merchant paddle-ferry Resanet, towing six barges 
of coal. The Resanet ran aground and was salvaged later, but the coal barges were 
destroyed and, as with ships, no replacement was available. 
The Russians conducted an amphibious landing and seized Trebizond on 18 April. 
The Russians moved south towards the British army driving north from the 
Mesopotamian theater. England may have been Russia's ally, but Petrograd's actions 
indicate intent to capture Baghdad and securing a waterway to the Persian Gulf. Russia 
442Greger, 68. 
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had controlled much of Persia; however, diplomatically Petrograd could not force land 
concessions from Ahmed Shah of Persia (1909-1925). The war against Istanbul provided 
Russia an opportunity to gain not only the Dardanelles but also the flatlands of the 
Euphrates River valley. Because the region was sparsely defended, and with the 
cooperation of non-Turkish Ottoman subjects, the Russians were able to meet up with 
the British at Kizil Robot in the summer of 1917. But the revolution in Russia prevented 
any real subjugation of the region. 
Souchon went on the offensive in May 1916 when the Midilli laid a minefield off 
Killia. The mines were delivered by rail from Germany and allowed the Midilli to lay 
three mine lines off Cape Tarcjamlit and near Sebastopol on 6 May. On 4 July the Yavuz 
and the Midilli shelled the town of Tuapse, sinking the Russian merchant Knyaz 
Obolenskiy. The Midilli sank the Russian merchants, Marina Anetta, Rezviy, and 
Rockl(ffe . The newly rail line from Germany brought shells for the battle cruisers and 
allowing the Yavuz to become more active. 
The success of the German U-boats and the action of the Yavuz and the Midilli off 
the Crimea led to a chanae in command within the Russian navy on 16 July. Vice 
b 
Admiral Vladimir Kolchak replaced Admiral Ebergard as Commander-in-Chief of the 
Black Sea Fleet.443 The Black Sea had become increasingly important to Russian Army 




coastline from Yavus and Midilli.
444 
Kolchak had been an Arctic explorer and had fought 
with conspicuous gallantry in the Russo-Japanese War. In the years between wars, he 
had taken part in reorganizing the Russian Admiralty in Petrograd and had been promoted 
to Rear-Admiral at the unprecedented early age of forty-three and was promoted to Vice-
Admiral when assigned to the Black Sea. 445 
The docking of the Yavuz for repairs did not stop the Midilli. On 22 July while 
en route to mine Novorossiysk, the Midilli engaged the Russian destroyer Schastliviy. 
However, the Schastliviy communicated via radio with the lmperatritsa Mariya, resulting 
in the shelling of the Midi lli starting from a range of 24 miles. The Midilli was blanketed 
by shells but escaped by dropping mines in the it's wake. In order to prevent further 
Ottoman offensive action, from 31 July to 8 August the Russians laid 820 mines in a 
semicircle north of the Bosporus. All the mines were seeded at night in a systematic 
manner, not the "throw-and-go" methods utilized earlier. Additionally, two minefields 
were laid to blockade the sea routes along the Romanian and Anatolian coasts. The 
mines were seeded close to shore to allow Russian battleships the opportunity for shore 
bombardment. 
The entrance of Romania into the war on 27 August 1916 did little to alter the 
naval campaign in the Black Sea except remove smuggling from the Romanian pati of 
Constanza. Neve1iheless, Ottoman troops from the Bosporus defenses had to be 
444Nekrasov, 94. 
445Peter Fleming, The Fate of Admiral Kolchak (Nevi York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc., 1963), 32. 
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redeployed to Galicia to prevent an Austrian Army collapse. Russian Naval Intellioence 
b 
indicated that a determined thrust at the Straits had a high probability of success but the 
two Russian corps designated for the Bosporus operation had to be redeployed to defend 
Romania, delaying any amphibious raid near the Straits.446 
The Russian minefields brought all waterborne coal and food supplies to Istanbul 
to a halt. In order to counter the mines, the torpedo boats Drac, Samsun, Kutahya, and 
Yavus and the gunboat Malatya were fitted out as minesweepers. From August to 
November, five ships including two minesweepers were sunk by mines in and around the 
Bosporus.447 
The German submarine force was reinforced in the middle of August by two 
additional UB boats, UB-42 and UB-45. The submarines took up station outside of 
Sebastopol, Poti, and Trebizond. On 31 August UB-45 sank the Russian transport 
Tevere, and on 2 September the transport Gioconda was sunk by UB-45. Both transports 
were fully loaded with Russian troops taking part in the Caucasus campaign.448 
Clearing the minefields in order to create a channel, the Ottoman minesweepers 
swept 157 mines in two days. The Russian naval commanders learned of the sweeping 
operations, and anticipated collier Patmos sailing instructions by decoding Ottoman radio 
messages. Kolchak responded by laying 220 mines at various depths west of Kara Burnu 





affected the Ottoman fleet, and sailings were sporadic for the remainder of the year. But 
a three-day storm between 23 and 25 September caused several hundred shallow Russian 
mines to tear loose and detonated at sea. The nature-made channel allowed shallow 
drafted dhows and barks an opportunity to make the Zonguldak-Istanbul route in relative 
safety. 
On 2 November, the Russians conducted an amphibious raid on a camouflaged 
anchorage in the mouth of the Terme. Twenty Ottoman sailing vessels were destroyed by 
a raiding force of 190 men. This raid was the closest the Russian ground forces would 
come to Istanbul.
449 
The year ended when the Russian destroyer Pamyat Merkuriya fired 
on and sank the Ottoman gunboats No. 12 and No. 16 off the Bulgarian port of Rumeli 
Karaburna. Both gunboats had been pressed into service as minesweepers at Varna and 
were returning to Istanbul when attacked.450 
A summary of 1916 finds the naval activity intensifying for the Russians while 
the Ottomans descended into economic collapse. Istanbul had to have coal to fuel the 
economy of war, and Russia was intent on curtailing that fuel. The result was constant 
pressure on the coal facilities at Zonguldak, Camli, and Eregi. The pressure resulted in 
Ottoman naval assets being utilized not for offensive action but defensive protection of 
merchant colliers. When military necessity demanded intervention elsewhere, such as in 




Ottoman warships could not stop the Russian march along the sea at Trabizond. 
Russian capital ships along with seaplane tenders had complete mastery of the theater. 
The Russian amphibious landing of 53,000 men in two large scale assaults, with no 
Ottoman naval presence, is clear evidence of Russian sea control. The strengthening of 
the German submarine forces did bring some relief for the colliers, and several Russian 
merchants were lost. But Russian military commanders switched to a massive mining 
campaign at both the Bosporus and Varna and successfully countered any effect of the 
German submarines. 
Soon after the changing of command of the Russian naval forces, Vice-Admiral 
Kolchak replaced Admiral Ebergard, the land campaign switched from a military 
operation to ethnic cleansing. Starting in 1916, almost one million Muslim Turks and 
Kurds were forced to migrate to western Anatolia. This exodus compounded economic 
and social problems inherent in 11 normal 11 wartime.451 There is no evidence that Kolchak 
instituted ethnic cleansing, but the abuse of non-military Ottoman Muslims occurred in 
earnest after Kolchak assumed command. As the Russian naval campaign slowed, the 
around action accelerated and Russian advances along the Black Sea indicated a strong 
b 
desire to fulfill the Sazonof-Paleologue agreements of 4 March 1915, in that Istanbul and 
the Straits were conceded to Russia. Further agreements included the vilayets of 
Trebizond, Ererum, Van, and Bitlis in the deal. 452 France and England had failed to 
451 Emin, 248-294. 
452Copies of agreements can be found in Mears, 611-618. 
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deliver the Straits to Russia using massive naval and minimal land power, and Petrograd's 
actions indicated a desire to utilize sizable naval and land power to secure the Black Sea 
basin with or without Entente assistance. 
1917 
The year began for Istanbul with four Russian submarines prowling the Bosporus 
Straits continuously. The Russian submarine Nerpa attacked the merchant Nusret on 7 
January. On 12 January the Russian submarine Narval attacked and sank the salvage 
fleet sent to assist the Nusret, sinking the ferry Neveser, the merchant Moda, and the brig 
Dervis, along with seven sailing vessels. In order to strangle further the economy, the 
Russians lay an additional 440 mines in three semi-barriers northeast of the entrance to 
the Bosporus, and the barriers were laid shallowly, partly between the shore and the 
existing mines. Whatever channel had been created by the 23 September 1916 storm was 
now fully blocked, and on 6 February the merchant Neveser hit a mine and sank.453 
During the early months of 1917, Russian destroyers sank a considerable number 
of small sailing vessels and dhows, now the sole means of transportation along the coast. 
Because of weak coastal defenses, the Russian destroyer Derzkiy was able to sail into 
Sinop on 29 January and destroy seven sailing ships. In March, the Russians shelled 
Giresum and Tirebolu, and a number of small craft were lost. 
The aggressive Russian offensive in eastern Anatolia was in high gear. The 




insurrection instigated by Petrograd created wholesale slaughter.454 Russian naval 
planners intended on capitalizing on the chaos in eastern Anatolia by an amphibious 
landing off the Bosporus on 26 March. Three Russian seaplane tenders, Aleksandr, 
Nikolaj, and Romania, conducted photo reconnaissance of the projected landing sites. On 
4 April the three seaplane tenders reconnoitered the Bosporus and seaplanes bombed 
coastal batteries at Kilgos. In responce to the bombing, seven Ottoman planes flying 
from Kefken attacked the Russian tenders. Russian uncertainty over air superiority 
placed the amphibious operation on hold. Additionally, the status of the Yavuz and the 
Midilli was unknown, and an amphibious assault within range of those two ships was not 
prudent. 
During April and May, Ottoman minesweepers cleared a channel out of the 
Bosporus and the Russians responded by sending a fleet of small motorboats to re-mine 
the approaches. The operation was conducted at night without being seen by coastal 
patrols and the re-mining remained unknown to the Ottomans until 27 May, when a mine 
self-detonated. On 17 May Germany dispatched six minesweepers to Istanbul by rail. 
This group, combined with Ottoman assets, managed in two weeks to clear a minefree 
route. To hamper the work of the minesweepers and to block the route for small craft, the 





type, which had a charge of thirty kilograms but which could be carried by small 
motorboats. The Russians seeded over 800 11 small fish 11 mines in two weeks. Istanbul 
7')0 .... j . 
454For information on the Russian-inspired Armenian uprising, see McCarthy, 192-
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responded by aerial attack that forced the Russians to attempt night seeding, which 
proved disastrous. Several minelaying boats were destroyed and future night mining was 
curtailed.
455 
Russian indecision over amphibious operations and the questionable attempt 
at night mining, suggest a serious fear of air attacks. 
In May the Russian fleet began to operate out of Trabizond, cutting sailing time to 
Ottoman defensive positions from one day to three hours. The forwardly deployed 
Russian fleet was vulnerable, with an extended supply and communication lines, but 
Ottoman fleet units could not take advantage of the situation. On 30 May the Russians 
entered the harbors at Unye and Ordu and sank whatever vessels were found. The 
Russian Black Sea Fleet remained aggressive and very active well after the Russian 
Revolution. Nevertheless, growing friction between Kolchak and the Revolutionary-
inspired Central Committee of the Black Sea culminated on 26 May with Kolchak's 
request to be relieved of command. Kolchak's successor, Vice-Admiral Lukin, attempted 
to continue Kolchak's policies but politics had begun to influence the Russian crews.456 
Kolchak resigned his appointment and accepted an invitation from the United 
States Navy Department to lead a small technical mission to United States. He returning 
during the chaos of the Revolution and would ultimately become "Supreme Ruler of All 
Russia." That position placed him in the position of confronting the Bolshevik 
revolutionaries and would eventually cost him his life. Kolchak was convicted and 
455Gtilerytiz, 52. 
456Halpern, A Naval History, 252. 
267 
executed for inciting massacres while leader of the White Regime.457 . 
On 23 June the Midilli, rearmed with 8-150 mm guns in place of the 12-105 
111111 
and fitted with mines, sortied to Fidonisi Island. After mining the area and destroying a 
Russian radio station, the cruiser made for the Bosporus. However, on 25 June the 
lvfidilli encountered the Russian battleship Svobodnaya Rossiya (the ex-lmperatritsa 
Ekaterina) and the destroyer Gnevnity. After exchanging salvos, the Midilli made for 
Istanbul. This was the last skirmish in the Black Sea between the Russians and 
German-crewed surface units. 458 
During the months of July and August, Russian surface units shelled small 
villages along the Anatolian coast. The large towns of Sinope and Tirebolu were 
repeatedly shelled, though the Ottomans had demilitarized the cities. Although the 
shelling was characteristically random and suggest no systematic effort to prepare the 
region for an amphibious landing, Istanbul interpreted the shelling and subsequent 
commando raids as an indication of a possible full-scale amphibious operation. Ottoman 
troops were transferred to coastal areas to defend important coastal areas.459 On 27 
August Russian naval commanders dispatched large destroyers to western Anatolia to 
reconnoiter the coast in connection with a possible large-scale landing. The destroyers 
sank nineteen merchant vessels. Ottoman surface units were non-existent because of a 
complete lack of coal. In addition to small merchant vessels, the Russians destroyed 
457Fleming, 111. 
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fishing boats plying just outside the Bosporus Strait On 29 August th R · s · e uss1an upreme 
War Council decided to postpone any Bosporus landing and delayed the anticipated 
Dobrudcha amphibious assault because of the lack of troops and the situation on the 
Eastern front. Instead of ferrying troops, the ships would be utilized for grain transport 
from the Kuban region of Novorossiysk to Odessa, since the railroad could not assure 
delivery. Rail traffic had been disrupted by revolutionary action from Bolshevik cells 
within the Russian army, and from Ottoman commandos disembarked via German 
submarines.460 
Souchon was relieved of duties on 4 September 1917 and returned to Germany to 
assume command of the Fourth Squadron of the High Sea Fleet. Souchon's replacement 
was Vice-Admiral Hubert von Rebeur-Paschwitz.461 
Russian destroyers operated along the Anatolian coast west to Constanza and 
swept the coast of all merchants. From 30 September to 24 October, 23 Ottoman 
merchants were sunk or run aground. Fearing the route to Constanza was mined, Istanbul 
deployed the gunboat Hamidabad, towing three small German-built minesweepers to the 
forward-theater base at Igneada. En route, the Russian destroyers Py/Kiy and Bystriy 
intercepted the Hamidabad, and the gunboat was set ablaze. The minesweepers escaped 
when the craft were released to flee. Istanbul deployed the Midilli to hunt the Russians, 
but the destroyers fled north to safety. The Russian Black Sea commander, Rear Admiral 
460Greger, 62. See also Halpern, A Naval Histo,y, 244. 
461 Halpern, A Naval History, 255. 
269 
Nemitc, having relieved Vice-Admiral Lukin, ordered the Russian fleet to intercept the 
Midilli. But the crew of the battleship Svobodnaja RossUa refused to pursue and returned 
to Sebastopol. On 8 November Nemitc ordered all units of the Black Sea Fleet to obey 
only orders from the Central Committee of the Black Sea. The Russian Black Sea Fleet 
did not conduct any offensive action for the remainder of the war.462 
With Russia imploding and the Russian fleet dockside, the Midilli showed the flag 
along the Anatolian coast. Mines were an ongoing problem, but with the threat of 
offensive action from Russia removed, coal shipments resumed. An armistice was 
concluded between Germany and Russia on 16 December 1917. Although the threat to 
merchant shipping was gone, and the Russian army was in retreat, the Ottoman navy had 
little to celebrate. The Ottoman fleet was worn out, and every ship needed refitting. But 
the morale of the crews remained high, even when Russian surface action forced Istanbul 
to marshal the fleet within the Bosporus. The three years of action had raised public 
opinion of the navy, and the level of training had done much to improve the fighting spirit 
of the Turkish sean1en. 
In summary, 1917 began with the Russians in command of the Black Sea. The 
massive mine barrage, along with the merciless destruction of Ottoman merchant ships, 
paralyzed Istanbul and crippled the Ottoman economy. Prior to the replacement of 
Vice-Admiral Kolchak by Rear Admiral Lukin, preparations for a large scale amphibious 
landing off Sinope and later around the Bosporus almost became reality. The coast had 
462lbid., 65. 
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been reconnoitered, and ships, troops and supplies asseinbled · th c · Tl · 
m e nmea. 1e mternal 
Russian political fallout from the February Revolution was not felt in the Black Sea until 
June, and the initial change was only the replacement of Kolchak by Lukin. The Russian 
desire to acquire the Bosporus was still strong until an attempt to land Russian troops at 
Varna on 27 August. The Ottoman mobile defenses, developed and refined in the 
Dardanelles campaign, proved too formidable. The prospect of amphibious landing in 
Anatolia and running the risk of even more virulent defenses seems to have influenced 
the Russian Supreme War Council. 
The Russian offensive against the colliers had serious repercussions on the coal-
fueled Ottoman Fleet. Lack of coal prevented much of the fleet from large scale-
deployment The need to supply the two most capable ships, Yavuz and the Midilli, 
caused diminished steaming time for other less capable units. The minesweeping 
operations along the Anatolian coast were an example of the determination of Ottoman 
crews in the face of overwhelming Russian superiority. The Ottoman use of airplanes to 
torment Russian minelayers and submarines prevented complete closure of the Bosporus 
and possible capitulation due to economic prostration. The Ottomans may not have won 
every skirmish, but the Sultan's fleet was intact and still active at the end of 1917. 
Russia was forced into peace and Romania defeated by F alkenhayn, Istanbul 
once again found the Black Sea peaceful. But lack of warfare did not equate to slack 
time for the Ottoman fleet. On 20 January, the Yavuz, Midilli, Samsun, Muavent-i Milliye, 
Numune-i Hamiyet, and Basra sortied out of the Dardanelles and caught the Entente by 
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surprise. The Ottoman naval commander, Rebeur-Paschwitz, wanted to demonstrate to 
the Allies that the Entente dreadnoughts that were shelling the Ottoman armies in 
Palestine needed instead to guard the Dardanelles. 
Rebeur-Paschwitz planned on a surface raid on the British-occupied Greek port of 
Salonika. British reinforcements for General Allenby were beino assembled at Salonika 
t, ' 
and a Ottoman surface attack could prevent Allenby from following up on the Palestine 
campaign. Additionally, a surface attack would restore morale within the Ottoman ranks. 
Before the operation could commence, altered the operational objectives to the 
destruction of British observation forces off the Dardanelles. Rebeur-Paschwitz feared 
that a surface raid on Salonika would allow superior Entente forces the opportunity to 
block access back to the Dardanelles. A successful sortie by Yavuz could draw Entente 
forces back to the Straits, where the German submarine UC 23 would seed mines and lie 
in wait for a target. 463 
On 20 December 1917, a British armed steamer ran aground by the Gulf of Saros. 
Ottoman troops boarded the craft and found among the ship's papers a chart of the 
Dardanelles showing dark lines in the channel. Ottoman Fifth Army Commander, 
General Liman von Sanders, passed the information onto Rebeur-Paschwitz who 
interpreted the lines to indicate mines and thus ignored his charts compiled via air 
reconnaissance that showed a clear channel. 
463V an der Vat, 222-224. 
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The Admiral pressed ahead using the captured charts and th v t k · e 1 avuz s rue a mme 
on the port side. The damage, buffeted by an armored skirt and coal bunkers, did little 
damage and flooding was contained. The sortie continued and soon the Ottoman 
warships opened fire on the British monitors H.M.S. Raglan and M-28, anchored at Kusa 
Bay, Imbros. The Midilli's fire was excellent, and soon both monitors were sunk. The 
ships continued southwest of Im bros, where the Midilli was mined which destroyed the 
steering gear. Yavuz, turning to assist Midilli was mined at the stern. As the Midilli 
drifted, two more mines exploded on the port side of the cruiser. Several minutes later, 
another mine exploded under the bow. A fifth mine detonated under the bridge, and 
Captain Hippel ordered the ship abandoned. Only half of the 500-man crew survived to 
abandon ship, and only 140 were rescued. 464 
The Basra, Muavent-i Milliye, Amsun, and Numune-i Hamiyet rushed to assist the 
Midilli. At the same time, British destroyers HMS Lizard and HMS Tigress rushed to the 
area in order to engage the Ottoman warships. The Yavuz, in an attempt to assist Middilli, 
struck another mine amidships, port side. Captain Stoelzel, Yavuz's command officer, 
decided to return to the Straits once the Midilli sank and rescue was hopeless. With a 
pilot on board to assist in the Dardanelles channel, Yavuz struck a third mine amidships, 
starboard side. The flooding from the starboard blast corrected the list created from the 
two previous port explosions. The battle cruiser had experienced three mine detonations 
but still maintain fourteen knots entering into the channel. 
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As the warship maneuvered close to the Asiatic shore off Nagara to avoid 
minefields, Yavuz plowed into the sand bank, burying one-third of its keel into the sea 
bed. Stoelzel attempted to counterflood the aft compartment, shift coal and ammunition, 
and jettison unneeded material to lighten the ship, all to no avail. Stoelzel ordered all 
secret documents destroyed and began to remove the crew and all supplies on the 
assumption the Entente would destroy the warship with indirect fire using planes for 
spotting. The British attempted the first offensive air attack upon a warship from 21 
through 26 January, with little success. The British Admiral, Arthur Hayes-Sadler, failed 
to follow up on the attack, believing the Yavuz was still too powerful to attack. Admiral 
Usedom, commanding the defenses of the Dardanelles, began to salvage the Yavuz on 21 
January. Usedom believed indirect fire would be ineffective and the largest ordnance 
available to the Entente for air delivery, 230 pounds, unlikely to do considerable damage. 
Stoelzel returned the crew to the ship and continued the lightening process. To protect 
the Yavuz, Usedom brought in eight shore anti-aircraft batteries and kept any Entente 
warship beyond gunfire range by using shore artillery.465 The salvage operation consisted 
of lightening and ballast shifting in the belief that the warship would pull itself out of the 
sand. On 26 January, with Torgud Reis tied fast along the starboard side and pulled the 
Yavuz free. 466 
465 Ibid., 229. 
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The vacuum created by the Russian Revolution lefi vast areas t · open o occupat10n, 
not only in eastern Anatolia, and the lower Caucasus region ot·toman 1 t· · . nava opera1ons1n 
January and February consisted of ferrying German troops to Giresun and Odessa from 
Constanza and Varna. Ottoman army units were also transported to Trabzon in order to 
secure the region and protect the Muslim population from retreating guerrilla attacks. 
Ottoman control of the Black Sea jeopardized the British position in Persia. Ottoman 
forces quickly occupied both Persian and Russian Azerbaijan and Persian notables and 
clerics became openly anti-British.467 
On 30 March Ottoman naval units resumed patrols with instructions to attack any 
Russian surface combatants encountered. Counter-Revolutionary forces within the 
Russian military advocated resumption of the war instead of accepting the Brest-Litovsk 
Treaty of 3 March, but confusion within the Russian military prevented any armed 
resistance. On 2 May the Yavuz and the Hamidiye entered Sebastopol and found the port 
already in German hands. The Brest-Litovsk treaty required Russia to relinquish it's fleet 
and bases to Alliance forces. The Ottomans took advantage of the dry-docking facilities 
and repair yard. The hull was scraped down and the mine damage inflicted in January off 
the Dardanelles was repaired. The Russian cruiser Prut, the former Mecidiye, was 
recovered in a poor state. Once seaworthy, the cruiser was towed to Istanbul by the 
Hamidiye and arrived on 13 July.468 
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The threat from the Russians reappeared on 28 June when Bolshevik cells in 
Novorossiysk refused to intern the Russian Black Sea fleet, as required by the treat of 
Brest-Litovsk. The Yavuz, Samsun, Numune-i Hamidiyet, and Muavent-i Milliye were 
dispatched to Novorossiysk to force the internment of the Russian warships still in port. 
On arrival, the Ottomans found the Russians had scuttled the ships. The Yavuz returned 
to Istanbul and was laid up at Istinye until the end of the war. 
With the naval war in the Black Sea ended and the Dardanelles sealed by Entente 
forces, the Ottoman fleet was reorganized with the Hamidiye as flagship. The torpedo 
boats Akhisar, Drac Musul, and Sultanhisar remained on active duty. The Berk-i Satvek 
and the Peyk-i Sevket remained on patrol in the Black Sea off the Crimea, and the Burak 
Reis, Isa Reis, and Sakiz cruised between Zonguldak and Batum.469 
On 14 July Ottoman naval commander Rebeur-Paschwitz received only the 
destroyer R-10 and four tugs from the interned Russian Black Sea fleet. The Germans 
feared that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty did not allow for the transfer of warships without 
monetary compensation. The Ottoman navy would later receive a mixed group of small 
naval craft and auxiliaries which were neither commissioned into the fleet nor entered 
naval service. The Ottomans had good reason to believe a large portion of the Russian 
fleet might end up under Istanbul's control. A secret letter from the German Foreign 
Secretary about the treaty stipulated that the Alliance should be given the Russian 
warships for "peaceful aims," such as minesweeping and police service. In case of war 
469 Ibid. 
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necessity, the warships might be used for military purposes with full compensation for 
losses. Since this agreement dealt with only German crews, the Germans planned to have 
the ships manned with a nucleus of Germans with a large Ottoman crew for "training. 11 
The German plan was to bring the two pre-dreadnoughts, the Evstqfi and the Zlatovst, to 
Istanbul for defense of the Dardanelles. The idea was abandoned when Ottoman 
commanders realized there were not enough trained sailors left after the Germans placed 
the Russian dreadnought Valga in service.470 
The ruling political party of the Ottoman Empire was the Committee of Union and 
Progress. Popular unrest from economic mismanagement fostered disagreement among 
the C.U.P. and the ruling triumvirate, Enver, Djemal, and Talaat, resigned 7 October 
1918. A new cabinet under Izzet Pasha opted to sue for peace rather than pursue the war. 
Grand Vizier Izzet Pasha immediately sought peace with the British. However, a draft 
naval armistice had been prepared by 7 October 1918, the same day Izzet assumed power. 
The timing suggest prior discussions. The first draft naval armistice dealt with economic 
more than military subjects, of the nineteen clauses, ten addressed logistic or revenue 
producing subjects. In the second draft, dated 22 October, of the 24 clauses, seven dealt 
with economic or revenue producing subjects. The final document, agreed upon and 
signed on 30 October, consisted of 25 clauses; twelve dealt with economic or revenue 
producing functions. 471 
470Halpern, A Naval History, 258. 
471 A copy of naval armistices is found in Newbolt, Naval Operations, Vol. V, 418-
422. 
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Armistice dicussions were held aboard the HMS Agamem · d non an an agreement 
was signed on 30 October. 
472 
The Porte concluded an agreement with the British Admiral 
Calthorpe who excluded the French Admiral Arnet from negotiations for two reasons: 
the Ottoman negotiators were only accredited to negotiate with the British; and the 
diplomatic maneuvering over the spoils of the war had begun.473 The armistice called for 
all repatriation of Allied prisoners, demobilization of the armed forces, and severance of 
diplomatic ties with the Central Powers. The Ottoman navy would be interned at Istanbul 
and Izmir and turned over to the Allies. The new Naval Minister, Rauf Pasha, disbanded 
staff and ship crews. However, minesweeping units would continue sweeping the 
barrages and minefields in order to allow safe passage for Allied warships. The Allied 
warships entered Istanbul on 13 November 1918. With her German crew repatriated to 
Germany, the Yavuz was towed away and allowed to settle into the mud off oflstanbul. 
The Porte refused to allow the English to salvage the warship or remove Yavuz from 
Otto man territory. 4 74 
In summary, 1918 witnessed the Ottoman Fleet re-emerging as a force in the 
Black Sea. With the Russian Revolution spreading to Sebastopol and Novorossiysk, the 
only force capable of restraining Bolshevik sailors was the disciplined Ottoman fleet. 
472Halpern, The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean 1915-1915, 361. 
473 HMS Agamemnon was named after a Greek Admiral who sac~ific~d his 
dauahter to ensure victory at Troy. The daughter's mother, Agamemnon s wife, executed 
the Admiral to avenge her daughter. Agamnmnon's son Orestes, kill his mother to 
advenge his father, who killed his sister. The armistice agreed upon on 30 O~tober wo~ld 
lead to such intercommunal killing when Greek troops were allowed to land 111 Anatolia. 
474Van der Vat, 231. 
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The unstable political situation in the lower Caucasus regi d'd ll c · . . 
on 1 a ow 1or I11Ject1on of 
Ottoman ground units into Batun1, Rize and Sukhum Kale B t tl · ' · · u 1e economic damage 
inflected by the Russians, and almost seven years of warfare left tl Ott E · , 1e oman mp1re 
prostrated. The Ottoman navy still possessed the discipline to cor1duct 1 · nava operat10ns 
in a professional manner right up to the armistice at Mudros. Coal supplies from 
Zonguldak had resumed to an extent that fuel for the fleet was not a grave concern. 
Nevertheless, armament logistics, shells, powder, mines, and small-arms ammunition had 
become scarce. The resources necessary to conduct offensive operations had been 
depleted, nevertheless the fighting spirit of the fleet remained and the crew's esprit de 
corps resulted in few desertions. 
The operations of the Ottoman fleet in the Black Sea were very intense. Russia 
possessed a fleet capable of strangling the Anatolian coast, and the technical expertise to 
conduct amphibious operations sufficient to defeat the Ottomans had Istanbul not had 
some sort of professional fleet. Ottoman naval units did prevent total collapse at the 
hands of Ebergard's destroyers and minesweepers. Russian battleships did not achieve 
battlespace dominance as envisioned by Mahan's theory on sea warfare, and neither did 
the Ottoman's Yavuz. The Black Sea action clearly showed the theater was dominated by 
small vessels: destroyers, gunboats, torpedo boats, and submarines. With these assets, 
Ebergard targeted the only facet open to attack: seagoing commerce. Table 32 lists the 
Ottoman ship losses in the Black Sea. 
The loss of merchant shipping capable of ferrying coal had a negative effect on 
the economy and subsequently the war effort. The Ottoman coal regions around 
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TABLE32 
OTTOMAN SHIP LOSSES IN THE BLACK SEA 











Source: Rene Greger, The Russian Fleet, 1916-1917 (London: Ian Allan Ltd. 1972) 67-
68. ' ' 
Zonguldak and Eregli became prime areas for Russian warships. The destruction of 
colliers caused a drastic reduction in coal production. Table 33 shows coal production 
from 1913 to 1918. 
TABLE 33 
OTIOMAN COAL PRODUCTION, 1913-1918 
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 
826,000 651,240 420,317 408,203 146,000 186,000 
Source: Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1930), 117-118. 
Using 1913 as a base, the Ottoman economy witnessed a reduction in coal 
production of 22 percent in 1914, 49 percent in 1915, 51 percent in 1916, and 87 percent 
in 1917. The decrease experienced in 1917 was because of the destruction of the loading 
apparatus in the harbor of Zonguldak by the Russian fleet. The increase witnessed in 
1918 reflects the collapse of Russia rather than a change in Ottoman strategy. 
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Russian at1acks on the coal traffic had the intended result . · h d l · s. economic ar s 11ps 
and a reduction in Ottoman ship deployments Nonetheless }1ad the 1· · t b · , ru mg Jun a not een 
as negligent, the shortages could have been controlled. Souchon repeatedly had to 
struggle with the Russians and with Enver's careless approach to the coal situation. Enver 
had not restricted the use of coal by private firms and somewhat naively believed the fleet 
could protect the colliers. Souchon noted the Yavuz could burn as much coal guarding 
the colliers as the colliers could load.475 
As the fuel shortages became more apparent, coal from Germany provided the 
minimum 400 tons a day for economic activity. The Germans therefore provided roughly 
12,000 tons of the estimated 30,000 tons of Ottoman coal consumption in order to keep 
railway and munitions factories open.476 German coal, and whatever coal made the trip 
from Zonguldak was supplemented by poor-quality coal found around Istanbul and 
Rodosto. Plans for a railway east to the Eregli coal fields never materialized. Prior to 
the war, any railway east had to have Russian approval, and St. Petersburg refused. 
Enver's government believed the war would not last the year that it would take to build 
the line, and thus considered it unprofitable. Enver's negligence prevented the 
construction of the one rail line Istanbul had to have in order to survive economically .477 
The Ottoman Black Sea Squadron did have successes against a numerically 
superior Russian force. Table 34 lists the Russian ship losses in the Black Sea. The loss 
475Paul Halpern, A Naval History, 233. 
476/bid., 238. 


















Source: Rene Greger, The Russian Fleet, 1916-1917 (London: Ian Allan Ltd., 1972), 66-
67. 
of Russian merchant shipping was not as problematic for Ebergard as for Souchon. The 
Russians had a rail and road system capable of transporting wartime logistic 
requirements, and seaborne commerce was not necessary for war operations. 
The Ottoman fleet did not possess the resources to prosecute the war. With the 
exception of the Yavuz and the Midilli, Ottoman warships were not capable of dueling 
with the Russians. The British inspired quest for dreadnoughts left no funds for small 
boats, which wartime experience had shown were the real determiner for success. 
Additionally, the infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire did not allow for rapid repair or 
construction of wartime losses. Finally, the personnel reduction started by British Admi-
ral Gambel in 1907 removed crews, both officers an enlisted men, to an extent that when 
the remnants of the Russian Black Sea fleet became available, the manning levels 
prevented utilization. 
The Ottoman fleet had proved itself in combat, and the Allies intended on 
utilizing the battle-tested fleet. Ottoman action had repeatedly prevented the numerically 
larger Russian forces from dominating Anatolia, and if Allied intentions of dividing the 
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Sultan's domains were to be successful, the warships had to be neutralized. The Treaty 
of Sevres, signed on 10 August 1920 but not enforceable, would have divided the 
Ottoman fleet among the victors. To Britain: Yavuz, Hamidiye, Mecidiye, Muavenet-i, 
Millet, Numene, Tasoz, Basra, and Samsun. To Japan: Turgot Reis. To other powers: 
Berk-i Efsan, Pelagni Deria, Zuhaf Peyk-i Sevket, and Nusret.478 Allied restrictions on 
Ottoman warships resulted in the bulk of the surface fleet's being interned under the guns 
of the Allies at Izmit and Istanbul. In order to combat smuggling, the Aydin Reis and the 
Preveze were released and assigned to prevent gun-running from Soviet Russia. Turkish 
nationalist had purchased arms and supplies from Soviet Russia. 
Mustafa Kernel covertly utilized the vessels to smuggle arms to nationalist forces 
resisting Greek aggression and to prevent Allied interference in the gun smuggling, the 
Aydin Reis and the Preveze were incorporated into the Red Russian navy. The 
nationalist victory over Greek forces caused the new Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 
July 1923 , which allowed Turkey to keep the fleet. However, economics prevented 




The Ottoman navy entered the Twentieth Century lagging behind comparable 
navies. Istanbul would spend a considerable sum of money trying to keep pace in a naval 
arms race that would climax in the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 and the London Treaty of 
1930.
479 
Neve1iheless, an overextended, underfunded, badly balanced Ottoman navy was 
able to hold off two of the largest amphibious assaults prior to Normandy, at Gallipoli 
and Rize; execute the first successful sinking of a battleship by a destroyer; confront the 
first carrier/battleship task force; and experience the first air launched torpedo attack 
along with equaling the considerably more superior Entente sea fleet. 
The circumstances that led to the anemic condition of the Ottoman navy can be 
found in three sources: political intrigue, the British naval mission, and the Ottomans' 
ignorance of their own naval needs. Ottoman political leaders did not view the Ministry 
of Marine as a desirable position. This resulted in twenty-one leadership changes 
between 1900-1919, as shown in Table 35. Factoring in the lead time in warship 
purchase and fabrication, most ministers did not enjoyed a fleet comprised of ships 
ordered during his tenure. Each minister was forced to utilize fleet units ordered by 
political rivals. The exception was Ahmed Djemal Pasha. 
479Costello, 40, 44-45. 
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TABLE 35 
OTTOMAN NAVAL MINISTERS, 1900-1919 
Name End of Duty 
Celal Bey 1901 
Hasan Rami Pasha 1904 
Arif Hikmet Pasha July 1906 
Huseyin Husnu Pasha January 1907 
Topcu Ferik'i Ryza Pasha March 1907 
Miriliva Emin Pasha April 1907 
Emin Pasha May 1907 
Arif Hikmet Pasha June 1907 
Ferik Halil Pasha January 1908 
Sadrazam Hakki Pasha March 1910 
Mahmut Muhtar Pasha May 1910 
Salih Pasha November 1910 
Mahmut Muhtar Pasha May 1911 
Topcu Ferik'i Hursid Pasha October 1911 
Curuksulu Mahmut Pasha July 1912 
Ahmed Djemel Pasha February 1913 
Rauf Bey November 1918 
Topcu Ali Riza Pasha December 1918 
Sakir Pasha March 1919 
Ahmet A vni Pasha April 1919 
Salih Hulusi Pasha September 1919 
Source: Muhlis Ergin, Curator, Turkish Naval Museum, Istanbul, to author, 23 October 
1997. 
Djemal exploited the public's positive view of the navy. As a result the Ottoman 
Navy became a minor restraint on War Minister Enver Pasha's plans. Grand Vizier Said 
Halim appointed Enver Minister of War in January 1914. This appointment was without 
C.U.P. approval or the Sultan's. The Grand Vizier seems to have believed Enver could 
be controlled if appointed to the government. Djemal Pasha, and Interior Minister Talaat 
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Pasha, did not fully support Enver's policies and did counterbalance the War Minister's 
grandiose plans. 
Enver's hold on the Ottoman Army was questionable at best, and the Navy was 
fully out of step with his plans. As long as the Navy continued to elude his control 
' 
Enver could not act and thus would not get truly adequate funding. The Austrian 
Ambassador, Marquis Johann von Pallavicini, reported that certain naval officers had 
formed a "ligue militaire" and approached Russia for subsidies and aid to bring down 
Enver and the Committee of Union and Progress. But Russia's designs on Anatolia 
prevented any real assistance, and Pallavicini's suggestion that Austria might be willing 
to assist in arming the Navy went nowhere.480 Pallavicini did confronted the Grand 
Vizier over rumors of Enver's designs on Macedonia and Albania. The Grand Vizier 
insisted the army and navy were barely strong enough to keep order in the provinces. 
Nevertheless, fear Enver might attempt to retake lost European provinces concerned 
Austria .. The Grand Vizier was not above palace politics and looked into replacing 
German drill instructors with Italian officers in order to lessen German influence. Austria 
and Italy shared a tense border on the Adriatic, and to have Italians staffing an Army 
influenced by Enver's imperialistic designs on upsetting the status quo in the Balkans was 
of great concern for Vienna. 
The Ottoman Navy also played a major role in diplomatic intrigue. The Grand 
Vizier was reported to have approached Italy about supplying arms and ammunition at 
480Weber, 40. 
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favorable prices in return for certain economic concessions_4s1 Said Halim is also 
reported to have agreed to place warship orders with Italy. This would explain the Italian 
contract for four Italian Impavido-class destroyers. 482 The Austrian Foreign Minister, 
Count Leopold von Berchtold, reported that the Ottoman Navy was talking with the 
Japanese, who had seized on the suggestion that their officers might staff the Navy. The 
Porte did not encourage Japanese hopes of turning an agreement, but Tokyo nevertheless 
remained willing to help.
483 
The fear of antagonizing Russia by injecting Japanese into 
the Levant so soon after the disastrous Russo/Japanese War may have cooled any such 
plans. Japan was a rival of not only Russia, but Germany and France. Tokyo viewed 
China as a legitimate sphere of expansion, and such plans included European possessions 
there. 
Djemal was not opposed to war in general but was not prepared to commence 
operations in November 1914. At a cabinet meeting on 12 October 1914, the cabinet 
agreed to accelerate mobilization and allow Admiral Souchon the Black Sea excursion 
that might trigger intervention into the war. Djemal noted that the Entente considered the 
Goeben and Breslau German ships, regardless of the flag and the only Entente member 
at risk would be Russia, and thus a quasi-peace with England and France could be 
maintained. The release of the Goeben and Breslau was at Enver's insistence, not 
481 /bid., 42 
482Gardiner, 3 92. 




Djemal did not have a favorable impressi·ons of s h G 
· ouc on or erman 
military assistance. 
Admiral Souchon commenced the Ottoman fleet deployment on 27 October 1914 
in order to give the Russians an opportunity to attack the Ottoman fleet and thus be 
labeled the aggressor. In the event the Russian Admiral Ebergard did not attack first, 
Souchon was to use his own initiative but Djemal clearly stated the desire not to become 
involved in the war. Souchon reported that the Ottoman fleet was attacked and in 
retaliation shelled Sevastopol. A scenario Djemal clearly believed. The Grand Vizier 
Said Halim questioned the report and in an attempt to maintain peace, proposed an 
inquiry in order to ascertain the facts and punish the officer in charge. The Entente 
rejected this suggestion, and the Ottomans found themselves at war. 485 
Enver Pasha had to contend with the Grand Vizier, the Egyptian Prince Said 
Halim, and the Sultan Mehmet V, both opposed to Enver's egocentric manner. Djemal 
was not influenced by German intrigue and questioned Enver's schemes. In order to 
remove Djemal as an obstacle, Enver offered him command of the Ottoman Fourth Army 
in Syria. Djemal accepted and departed Istanbul on 21 November 1914, leaving the fate 
of the navy with the War Minister, Enver. 
The British naval mission's only purpose were to benefit London and to funnel 
naval contracts to English shipyards. Any training, advice, or suggestions it provided 
484Ahmed Djemal, .Memories of a Turkish Statesman 1913-1919 (London: 
Hutchinson and Co., 1920), 130-131. 
485 Ibid. 
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were construed to benefit English concerns 486 Ottoman naval le d d 
1
. 
· a ers possesse 1ttle 
knowledge of naval planning. The exception was Admiral Mahmut Muhtar of the Young 
Turks movement. He distrusted British insistence upon using English-only yards he 
favored smaller ships indigenously built. Had Muhtar's views on the fleet been espoused 
in 1900 and not 1910, the Ottoman defeats in tl1e Italian and Balkan wars may not have 
happened. In both conflicts, the larger ships of the Ottoman navy, the ships the British 
insisted the Ottomans needed, went underused because they were too valuable an asset to 
risk losing. This fear turned the battleships into liabilities. The destroyers and torpedo 
boats, the lesser assets, had to carry the bulk of the fight to the Greeks and Italians. 
British views of Ottoman maritime security had been influenced by the actions of 
Germany. German battleships had become superior to British-designed ships, and the 
naval race in Northern Europe altered London's views on the Mediterranean. In order to 
compete with Germany's growing naval strength, Britain considered removing the 
English fleet from the Mediterranean back to home waters. Withdrawal of the fleet from 
the eastern Mediterranean could lead to a loss of influence in Istanbul at the same time 
that Berlin was gaining favor; and it might induce the Ottoman Empire to join the Triple 
Alliance as a means of securing support against Russia and reconfirming the Sultan's 
borders. Diminishing the British fleet could lead to security concerns over Egypt and 
question the status quo for Cyprus and Crete. British concerns for English possessions in 
the Mediterranean basin could be eased if France would agree to supply the bulk of the 
486Gtilerytiz, 14. 
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French fleet for control of the Mediterranean However 1·n th f · · , e case o a contmental war 
involving all the Triple Alliance-Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy-French naval 
forces would be tasked to defend against the Italian fleet as well as to ferry Algerian 
troops to France, leaving few if any forces to assist in the protection of English 
possess10ns. 
Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, feared that Britain could not hold 
Egypt if command of the Mediterranean were lost and he solicited Egypt's Lord 
Kitchner's views while at a meeting at Malta on 8 May 1912.487 Kitchner did not believe 
that he could hold the Egyptian Mediterranean coast without the English fleet. He 
envisioned falling back into the desert as the Ottomans had done in the Tripolitanian 
conflict and waiting until reinforcements from India arrived through the secure Red Sea 
region. British concerns for Egypt could be mitigated ifltaly were exhausted in 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and if the Ottoman navy were unable to conduct amphibious 
operations along the Mediterranean coast or the Suez Canal.488 
Kitchner estimated that if the Ottomans joined in with the Triple Alliance, the 
bulk of Istanbul's forces could march overland from Syria into Egypt. Preventing the 
transiting of troops across the Suez Canal could be accomplished with the few gunboats 
presently on station. Kitchner was concerned with the possible landing of Ottoman 
troops at Alexandria and Tinch Tay, to the east of Port Said. To prevent such landings, 
487N.O. 387, Sir E. Grey to Lord Kitchner, Malta, 8 May 1914. Found in Gooch, 
Vol. X, Part I, 590. 
488Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 21-23. 
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Kitchner needed the British fleet to stay in the eastern Med't . h' 
1 erranean, w 1ch was not 
Possible due to public demands for protection in England's horn t B · · h e wa ers. nt1s 
influencing the material direction of Istanbul's navy could prevent the Ottomans from 
landing troops by sea . A fleet expending limited funds on capital ships would not have 
resources to spend on amphibious or troop transport vessels. 
The personnel reduction put in place by Admiral Gamble reveals that, while the 
Ottomans were reducing, all potential enemies were increasing manning levels. Russia 
was increasing personnel and material for the Black Sea fleet, and Greece was purchasing 
battleships from the United States and ordering one each from Germany and France. 
Great Britain, which was in a naval race with Germany, increased personnel from 
129,000 to 136,000 over a seven-year period.489 At the same time, an English Admiral 
was insisting upon a reduction in force for the Ottoman Navy. Simple mathematics 
clearly shows that the manning force envisioned by Gamble did not adequately address 
Ottoman needs. Such a reduction did remove an older officer corps not trained and thus 
not influenced by English mentors. The reduction in force had the potential to create an 
impotent navy capable of little more than custom duties and no chance of enforcing the 
Sultan's suzerain over Cyprus, Egypt, Tripolitania, or Arabia. 
The Ottomans used naval programs and tactics drawn up by the British mission. 
The frenzy of shipbuilding typical of the early Twentieth Century drove naval plans to 
include large capital ships. The Ottoman ministers responsible for naval matters did not 
489Jane, All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906/07, 41. 
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seem to realize that the programs the British naval miss· d . 
IOn propose were mfluenced by 
both Alfred Mahan's view on empire-buildina and British e · · . . . 
b xpenence m empire-se1zmg. 
In neither scenario is the true problem of the Ottoman Empire c f t d· 1 . on ron e . t at of empire 
protecting. The Ottomans were not into empire building or seizing. The Ottomans 
wanted only to hold onto what was theirs, not antagonize the mainly Christian states that 
the Ottoman Empire bordered. 
Empire maintenance calls for smaller, more numerous warships, which were 
inexpensive to acquire, maintain, and utilize. Most importantly, they could not be so 
valuable as to preclude utilization in any situation. Had the Young Turks' views of naval 
needs been followed--a large number of indigenously produced destroyers and torpedo 
craft versus the foreign-built capital ships the British espoused--the Ottomans' security 
needs would have been better served. The use of small craft for coastal defense of distant 
regions of an empire was not unique. The English pioneered this naval doctrine in the 
late nineteenth century. The distant dominions of the British Empire were protected by 
gunboats, destroyers, and cruisers. But the British naval mission promoted a program 
exactly opposite to what the English themselves utilized with a similar far-flung empire. 
Ownership of a capital ship promoted what the Ottomans hoped to avoid: ethnic 
nationalism and a naval arms race with Christian countries .. The "national honor" of 
countries such as Greece and Italy dictated acquisition of battleships and dreadnoughts, 
and the Ottomans became ensnared. The difference between the other countries and the 
Ottoman Empire was the ability to acquire ships. The Italians had shipyard facilities 
capable of building such ships. The Ottomans had no facilities capable of producing 
ships larger than a protected cruiser. Even such a modest · t . d 
1 
· . 
proJec presente og1st1cal 
hurdles such as large caliber armaments fabrication and rolling standard steel plates of 
thickness of one inch or more. Neither could be accomplished in Ottoman yards. This 
necessitated acquiring naval assets overseas. 
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The late British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill wrote in a letter to Turkish 
President Inonu that "German intrigues and British and Turkish mistakes [that] led to our 
being on opposites sides. "
490 
German intrigues did play a part in dragging the Ottomans 
into the war. The German ambassador to the Ottoman court, Baron van Wangenheim, 
knew his position and served the Kaiser well. However, Wangenheim did not take 
Cyprus and Egypt from the Ottomans; the English did. The English sided with Greece 
over Crete, and a British naval mission to Greece orchestrated the interdiction of 
Ottoman troops during the Balkan Wars that ultimately led to the Ottoman defeat and 
subsequent slaughter of Muslims. 491 Finally, the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, along 
with the Anglo-French Entente of 1902, left the Ottomans with no ally to provide sea 
power to complement Ottoman land forces. When Istanbul found no naval power to 
complement Ottoman ground forces, it forced spending to acquire a respectable fleet. 
Economics and political reforms coupled with social engineering did not allow for 
expansion of both army and navy services. Istanbul opted for army modernization in 
490Winston Churchill to President Inonu of Turkey, 27 January 1943, transcript 
found in Winston Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (London: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1950), 616. 
491 McCarthy, 135-164. 
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order to protect the populace and deter aggression firom less T d 
er powers. o eter 
dismemberment from Russia, France, Italy or Great Britain required a tangible navy. 
The primary mistake made by the Ottoman government was · t t· .c · 
m rus mg 1ore1gners 
in naval matters, especially the British. As for the Germans, total control of Ottoman 
naval assets did not occur until 9 September 1914, when Admiral Limpus of the British 
naval mission withdrew. Germany's Wangenheim intended on controlling enough of the 
Ottoman military to prevent Istanbul from copying Rome and ignoring treaty 
obligations. Limpus' leaving made Wangenheim's task easier. With Limpus gone, the 
Porte had no choice but to utilize the services of Souchon. He was not an ideal candidate 
for the Ottoman Navy, having a reputation of poor training and sloppy discipline and 
Souchon did nothing to indicate he considered himself seriously subordinate to Ottoman 
oversight or accountability. 
Non-military sealift is one where modern military planners place heavy emphasis. 
The use of commercial vessels to support the needs of the state is vital. S.G. Gorshkov, 
former Admiral of the Fleet for the Soviet Union, states, " ... among the main 
components which we [the USSR} include in the concept of the sea power of the state are 
the state's capabilities to study and exploit its resources, the condition of the transport and 
fishing fleet and its ability to support the needs of the state. "492 Both the British and 
Germans, when preparing plans for the Ottoman navy, left out non-military sealift. This 
might have been oversight, for both England and Germany had commercial shipping in 
492Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Development 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), 73. 
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such numbers that fleet support was never in question Howe · h E 
. ver, ne1t er "'ngland nor 
Germany had fought a conflict such as the Balkan Wars where th t . 
e ou come was decided 
entirely on the inability of one side to transport troops a short dista nee. 
The Ottoman merchant marine was significantly smaller then those of Greece and 
Russia. The lack of a sizable merchant fleet consisting of general or break-bulk cargo 
ships forced the Ottoman mercantile to rely on foreign ships to carry freight and 
passengers. The barrier to creating a viable merchant marine tended to lie with the 
economic capitulations the Ottomans were forced to contend with. These economic 
agreements stifled indigenous merchant shipbuilding. The British naval mission's prime 
directive was to look after British interests, and British bottoms carried a sizable share of 
the capitulation trade. Had the Ottomans dispensed with the capitulations and created a 
merchant marine capable of servicing the needs of the empire, the English shippers would 
have been the losers. 
The failure of Ottoman commercial vessels to deliver troops from Asia to the 
European theater during the First Balkan War cost Istanbul the war. Admiral Usedom, 
when confronted with this predicament, brought Austrian ferries in and requisitioned 
every available craft. Had the Young Turks movement successfully pursued economic 
self-sufficiency, commercial vessels may have been available in greater numbers. 
Compounding the sealift shortage was Enver's ill-advised Caucasus Campaign. Ottoman 
merchant shipping tonnage was 250,000 in 1914. By 1916, 102,786, or 41 percent, had 
been lost as a direct result of supporting the offense in the Caucasus Region. Even with 
. 1 · · " d · Otto a11 waters the lost tonnage the seizure of Entente merchants 1ppmg trappe 111 m n , 
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could not be replaced. For any nation that relied extensively on waterborne commerce 
such as the Ottoman Empire did, loss of 41 percent could be d ·r 
1 manage 1 rep acement were 
possible or alternative delivery methods utilized In the Otton1a th t 1 · n ea er, rep acement 
was impossible, and alternative delivery impracticable The merchant h' · . s 1ppmg tonnage 
cited for 1914 was that for all of the Ottoman Empire. Merchant ships outside of the 
Dardanelles were prevented from entering the Straits once war commenced and the 
author believes the Ottoman Black Sea merchant shipping was in reality one-half the 
total tonnage cited in pre-war 1914. The corresponding tonnage reduction would increase 
the loss percentage to 82 percent and such shipping losses would quickly lead to the 
commodity shortages evident at Istanbul in 1916. 
The gunboat diplomacy that England exhibited against a friendly, neutral Ottoman 
Empire can be illustrated by how the British reacted in Mesopotamia. As the British 
annoyed the German-advised neutral Ottoman fleet at the Dardanelles, a British fleet set 
out from India. The British ship HMS Espiegle violated Ottoman sovereignty on 29 
September 1914 by sailing up the Shatt-a-Arab waterway. When requested to leave 
Ottoman territorial waters on 7 October, the British commander declined. By 7 October 
the follow on forces arrived in HMS Dalhousie and HMS Odin. An additional demand to 
depart Ottoman territorial waters was delivered on 14 October, but the British refused to 
leave by the deadline of 21 October.493 The Indian government was also tasked by 
London to provide troops on 2 October for seizing neutral Ottoman territory. This force 
493 A.J. Baker, The Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign qf 1914-1918 
(New York: The Dial Press, 1967), 18-21. 
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was conveniently in place when war "officially" commenced a d 1 d d 
0 n an e on ttoman 
territory in Mesopotamia on 4 November.494 
The stopping of Ottoman naval and commercial traffic in the Dardanelles, along 
with the blatant violation of Ottoman sovereignty in the Mesopotan11·an · reg10n, suggest 
that England hoped to provoke Ottoman military action in order to justify morally the 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The fact that the Ottomans did not succumb to 
British gunboat harassment is evidence that Istanbul desired to avoid the European war. 
The urgency London towards the Mesopotamian region could have been due to prior 
dealings with St. Petersburg whereas the region was divided among Entente allies and 
Britain's action suggest a fear that Russia might seize additional territory from Russia-
occupied Persia (Iran). The Russian war correspondent for the Russkia Vedommosti 
newspaper of Moscow, Vladimir Jabotinsky, writes in 1917, " .. .If we look deeper, we 
see at once why Russia wants fortresses in the Near East. She wants them because of her 
need to push towards the warm seas, through the Straits or through the mountain chains 
of Armenia. The real cause of the Russo-Austrian conflict was the problem of further 
partition of the Ottoman Empire."495 That view is also shared by George Cassar in The 
French and the Dardanelles. French political leaders were convinced that Churchill's 
drive up the Dardanelles was a cover for London's to control the region from Egypt 
through Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf to India. London could argue that, since 
494Jbid., 25-26. 
495Vladimir Jabotinsky, Turkey and the War (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 
1917), 59. 
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British ships and troops secured the Dardanelles the Engl' h h ld -C'. • 
' IS s ou 1ash10n the peace 
accords with the Porte. The real losers in such a scenario, where Ottoman authority was 
supplanted by British, is the French. The agreement fashioned O th A n e gamemnon 
resulted in exactly that expulsion of French control. 
England would have never attempted to intimidate by sea a nation capable of 
inflicting damage upon the it's fleet. British naval commanders knew the status of 
Ottoman naval forces and had no respect for a navy that the English themselves directed 
for almost fifty years. Ottoman naval orders were good for English shipyards, but a 
strong Ottoman navy would be a threat to British imperialism. The time the Germans had 
some influence upon the Ottoman navy was brief compared to that of the British. Total 
German control did not occur until September 1914 and it ended with the Agamemnon 
agreement in October 1918. In this brief time, the hallmark of the German control was 
effective communication. In the Dardanelles defense the Ottoman navy and army 
cooperated in operations, troop movements, defense and logistics, in a manner never 
experienced under British control. British naval tactics used by the Ottomans excluded 
input from army commanders. This non-communication in the Balkan War cost Ottoman 
land forces several opportunities to stem the assault from Bulgarian and Greek forces. 
German tactics, inspired by Usedom, had both navy and army in the communications 
loop. This allowed forces to be rushed to the scene of assault quickly, and it allowed 
coordinated defensive measures, enabling the numerically and logistically strapped Porte 
to concentrate resources where needed. Under British guidance, joint service 
coordination on such a scale was unknown . 
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Under German control, training and practical experi· . d 
ence mcrease navy 
Proficiency. Ottoman naval vessels offered more sorties fouo} t d b 1 , o 1 an won att es, and 
carried out an operational tempo second to none in the Mediterranean theater. All this 
would have been impossible without professional direction from officers dedicated to 
winning: direction the British did not provide. To place all the success with Souchon or 
any foreign naval mission would be erroneous. The British naval mission withdrew 
during the Italian and Balkan wars, leaving Ottoman naval commanders fully in charge. 
The Red Sea battles clearly showed Istanbul's willingness to fight. The covert resupply 
of forces in Tripolitania via France and Tunisia demonstrates a maturing view of sea 
power. Ottoman gunfire support in the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara demonstrates 
the Mahan view of naval force and the potential benefits derived from such platforms. 
Greek control of the Aegean littoral region was incomplete only because the Ottoman 
fleet sortied to do battle when the opportunity presented itself. Souchon's role in 
Ottoman naval development is peripheral at best. The Ottoman fleet was made battle-
ready by German assistance, but to assist Germany, rather than the Ottomans. Usedom 
provided leadership and proof that multi-force cooperation could defeat a materially 
superior foe. The German advisors could not do everything and the trench work was 
clearly Ottoman. 
The Black Sea operational tempo prevented Russia from landing troops around 
the Straits. Russian minefields around the Bosporus were laid to prevent passage of the 
Ottoman fleet, clearly demonstrating the respect Russian's had for the Sultan's navy. 
Had the Ottoman economy not faltered, the navy could have continued the fray once the 
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captured Russian fleet had been acquired 
In summary, the Ottoman navy entered the Twentieth Century incapable of 
defending the Empire. This failure to secure the peripheries ultimately led to the loss of 
territories too distant to defend. The British naval mission, along with incompetent 
Ottoman oversight, destroyed what should have been the empire's first line of defense: 
the Ottoman navy. Any German influence, regardless of political motives, created forces 
capable of combating Russia, a common enemy. 
As the world raced into dreadnought-building for national pride and security, the 
Ottoman Empire spent huge sums trying to equal her traditional enemies, Greece and 
Russia. . Using tainted advice, the Porte expended large sums trying to secure the 
remaining empire. Capital ships, which the Ottomans could not produce but the British 
insisted upon, were painstakingly acquired. Smaller ships the Ottomans could fabricate 
and ultimately did utilize were discouraged by the British advisors. The Ottoman navy 
entered World War I badly balanced by years of mismanagement. Yet this force held on 
and fought the English-French fleets to a draw in the Dardanelles while dueling with the 
Russians in the Black Sea. 
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' 
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ADMIRAL SIR HENRY LIMPUS 
Istanbul-HA YD ARP ASA 
BARBAROS HAYREDD!l\~ TORGUD REI.S: MECIDIYE 
Istanbul-HALIC (SHIPYARD) 
GAYRET-1 VATANIYE, BERKEFSAN, PELENG-1 DERYA, BERK-I SATVET; 
DRAC, NURULBAHIR 
Istanbul - HALIL 
ICLALIYE, BASRA 
Istanbul - DOLMABHCE 
ERTUGRUL 
Istanbul - KABATAS 
ISTANBUL 
Istanbul - ARNA VUT KOY 
SOGUTLU 
BOSPOSUR-BUYUKDERE 
YADGAR-1 MILLET, MUAVENET-1 lvf!LLIYE, NUMUNE-1 HAMIYET, 
SAMSUN, TASOZ, SIVRIMISAR, DEA1!RN1SAR, SULTANHISAR, MUSUL, 




MESUDIYE, ASAR-I TEVFJK, YARHISAR, HAMIDABAD, AKHISAR 
PREVEZE 
ANTALYA, TOK4T, NO 9 AND NO 11 (MOTOR BOATS) 
SELANIK 
FETH-I BULEND, FAUD 
IZMIR 
MUIN-1 ZAFER, YUNUS, TIMSAH, IZZEDDIN, TRABZON 
SUEZ (INTERNED BY BRITISH AS OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1911) 














Cf: l_ ,Q :ron lero 
'/ ,v Port Kllloni-~ 
~kyro1 sf:1 
Port T rebuki 
:... ,, ,, 
~ 
(;'~Andros 
P\r1tu1 / \Jr Q' Tino\ v.., \:J 
Poro1 o 2, 3 fl., 0.L ~ e'.)' 
If 0 o\l'·. <-, S)'rl y,ont 
4 °t~r//> a 
\) {)LJ \::-:>01 
.Q ."off . rd· ~ ;? 'v., . 
Milo 




Source:Paul Halpern,The Roya1 Navy in 
the Mediterranean 1915-1918 





20 40 60 80 100 
miles 
-· , ·"'· 
J\PPEtlDIX 6 
P .LAN O pr 
ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN 
GREEK & TURKISH FLEETS 




Source:·D.J.Cassavetti ,Hel las and the 
Balkan \.lars(London:T.Fisher 
Unwin,1914 )48. 
BES/KA )i~ I I 
\ 
--Greex course, up bl/ 9h5z 111a.m.1 
-·-·-Turkish .. ., 1 , _ .. _ I 
~,Ti ~ .. 
S,fton.f'raed&.CiJ.~ 1 • Lonrlon 
,.,.,.,.,., Grtu,i< coursas aft~r 9~5Z~a.m.j 
-.H++ Turkish .. ~ ,, .. 1 
1 
_ __ .Course of"Arerotbetw•ns"Jtf}s:si; 
9>i 16"' shqws position of both ffellts 
wium Tur/.cs opened fi'ra 
91t5z'" tfitJ critical moment ortlit1 
enga9amt1nl when *Barbar08SO .-
turned (o reiroat and ceased fire 
Scelo 








AVC""<or, ..z, .l!!JAA',BA~0.3.:TA 
J,,.,rrJAI r Tc~cvr AF/.f 
r'Y.D...rA ,l'i'. -..:-s.sc,t../.D/.rH 
P.:JA,;q.A D /-1'6" .P.T/J)I..C ,4' 
« ack c:,,/' r' ;,..::,,..,-c;,;:-;r 
7,iiac~ o/ NY.D,"'("A c.c',c,,-J;s 
FR.CM . Jooo . TIJ-J... J S.30 
--··- 7.RACJ< OF -ruRI<, r;../ 
a"r-rt..e:.s.;..J:,,P.S 
CJs. fanc.e:::, /n rneTer4 
APPENDIX 7 
Source:K.L.Rankin,''The Battle of Hel1as 
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APPENDIX 10 
OTTOMAN NAVAL DISPOSITION AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1914 
Squadron I 
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